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I. INTRODUCTION 
State response to non- violent demonstration has not been uniform across geography and 
time. This thesis explores the existing puzzle around the different state responses to protests 
in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.  
The field of social sciences that investigates the relationship between the type of regime in a 
state and repression against its citizens is vast. Although the repression of non- violent 
protests by democracies has received substantial scholarly attention, there are still many areas 
that demand further development in the academic literature. 
The debate around why democracies and authoritarian regimes are expected to respond to 
non-violent protests in a certain way is one of the richest political sciences topics around. 
There is a general argument that suggests that a democracy will refrain from repressing its 
own own citizens, since by repressing freedoms and rights the elected politicians hinder their 
chances of reelection and necessary public support. Furthermore, democracies are expected to 
have a political apparatus that allow them to peacefully handle non-violent protests.  
On the other hand, autocracies are broadly expected to be less preoccupied with maintaining 
public support by protecting the aforementioned rights and freedoms, as politicians do not 
experience the same incentives as in a democracy. These kind of regimes seek citizen 
compliance bt spreading fear and are more likely to, as this standard argument suggests, 
promptly repress any social movement that would represent a threat to their power. 
In addition to examining why regime types differ in their approaches to dealing with non-
violent protest, another field of literature seeks to explain why different democracies might 
react differently to social protests based on the calculations of costs. Such current 
scholarship would lead us to believe that countries with similar political systems, histories, 
structures and challenges would react in a similar way to non-violent protests. Nevertheless, 
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that is not what is observed with the cases of Chile, Brazil and Uruguay. Although having 
similar political histories and possessing other similarities—such as being former 
dictatorships in Latin American that now have presidential systems—these three countries 
present different responses to non-violent social protests. 
For an example, from January 2011 to December 2013, Brazil responded with significant 
repression to almost 20% of non-violent demonstrations, while Chile significantly repressed 
around 13% of such events and Uruguay did not have any single event significantly 
repressed. 
In the literature, the hypothesis that best offers an answer to this puzzle explains the 
variation in the level of repression through the level of threat posed by a given specific 
protest action. To borrow the words of Earl et al. (2003, p. 581), that is to say ‘the larger the 
threat to political elites, the greater and more severe the expected repression’.  
Although such a hypothesis is intuitively satisfying, this thesis assumes it is not universally 
applicable, especially because it is able to explain a good part, but not all of the events 
observed. Therefore, this thesis examines two alternative explanations (stemming from 
regime legacy) which might also impact the level of repression exercised by Brazil, Chile 
and Uruguay: namely, elite continuity and police militarization.  
As mentioned above, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay have some similarities that would make us 
expect them to respost similarly to similar protests: they experienced authoritarian regimes 
at around the same time and transitioned back to democracy in close periods. Nonetheless, 
while Brazil still has a rather strong militarized police, influential elite and, out of the three, 
has achieved the less in terms of justice, truth and memory processes and accountability in 
relation to its Military regime, the other two countries present different dynamics nowadays. 
Although Chile has also maintained their militarized police and their elites have some 
considerable political influence, the country has made considerable steps to achieve 
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transitional justice. For its part, Uruguay dismantled its militarized police in terms of civilian 
control, has few examples of elites continuously influencing policies after the authoritarian 
years and has gone through an extensive truth and memory process during their 
reconciliation efforts. 
This thesis argues that these subtle variations might be related to the way each of these 
countries respond to protests. Out of the three Brazil presented the largest number of protests 
with Chile behind. Both had some violent response to non- violent protests, using rubber 
bullets, tear gas and intimidating dispersion tactics in recent protests, but showed similar 
proportional rates of non- repressive behavior towards demonstrations; and Uruguay has 
demonstrated an overall peaceful response to those events, not having not even one account 
of significant repression during the observed period of January 2011 to December 2013. 
Thus, this suggests that a variation in one or all of these aspects (militarized police, elites 
and transitional justice), which might represent the endurance of past institutions in current 
democracies, could bear a relation with the levels of repression against non- violent protests 
of a given country.  
In order to attempt to explain the aforementioned puzzle, this thesis is divided into two parts. 
The first one reviews the literature on the repression of non- violent demonstrations and 
presents this thesis’ hypothesis. This is followed by a research design section which explains 
the case selection and methodology employed herein, as well as defining some key concepts, 
exposing how the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables will be 
done and acknowledging the limitations of the data used. This procedure  allows this thesis 
to explore the factors that might influence the repression of non-violent protests in those 
countries. By doing so, the second part of this work focuses on the analysis of whether some 
factors contribute to the variation in the level of repression of non-violent protests between 
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the cases (Brazil, Chile and Uruguay). Subsequently, the findings will be discussed and 
concluded on part VI. 
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II. EXPLAINING THE REPRESSION OF NON-VIOLENT PROTESTS  
Many scholars have studied the democracy-repression nexus (Berlin, 2010; Reagan & 
Henderson, 2002; Schedler, 1999; Goldstein, 1978; Davenport, 2007a; Davenport, 2007b and 
Davenport, 2007c; Grassi, 2013) and there was once a common assumption that a democratic 
regime, given its nature and intrinsic values, would hinder political repression of any kind. 
This assumption can be found in works that defend democratic peace such as Sartori, 1976; 
O´Donnel, 2004; Diamond (1999) among others.  
Democracy is  
 
[t]hought to reduce violent conflict by providing institutionalized channels of 
communication with political opponents, by offering to incorporate them into 
political debate, and by conceding to at least some of their political and social 
demands. […] if regimes are open to dissent and have institutional channels 
through which grievances can be addressed, political actors will be more 
likely to press their claims from within the system. In general, democratic 
governments are more likely to be responsive and open to dissent than non-
democracies. Therefore, democracies should be less susceptible to rebellion 
(Grassi: 2013, p. 7). 
 
This rationale allows a very straightforward interpretation: in an authoritarian government a 
critical level of grievances can usually only be expressed through violent means; whereas in 
democracies, the peaceful and institutional resolution of citizen grievances prevail most of 
the time.   
Other authors (Reagan & Henderson, 2002; Davenport, 2007a and 2013) however, reject the 
assumption of an absolute domestic democratic peace and suggest a more complex 
relationship between regime type and political repression and go further to understand why 
some governments repress their constituents. 
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Ted Gurr (1986)
1
 posits that ‘violent repression is a reaction to well-developed governments’ 
(Rogers: 2011, p. 11), and Anne Costain (1992)
2
 complements this position by stating that 
early repression—that is repression before protestors are fully organized—terminates 
protests.  
Rogers (2011, p. 11) also points out that ‘repression is rarely visible when there is little to 
repress: the existence of a movement in a position to seriously challenge the state suggests 
that the state’s reaction to such a movement is almost by definition reactive’. Furthermore, 
there is a segment in the literature in which the nature of the relationship between the number 
of protests and the actions to control such protests is believed to be directly linearly 
correlated. Nonetheless, many authors (Stohl and Lopez 1984; Eberwein 1987; Gurr 1986a, 
Ziegenhagen 1986; Franks 1989; Hoover and Kowalewski 1992 In Davenport: 1995b, p. 684) 
counter this assumption by stating that such relationship is more complex and that variation 
in government response is due to 
[t]wo factors: 1) different attributes of the conflict behavior encountered, and 
2) the structure of the political economy (i.e., system type, economic 
development and so forth). To these authors, domestic threats are not one-
dimensional phenomena but rather multidimensional, defined, and responded 
to differently across con- texts (Davenport: 1995b, p. 684). 
 
Moreover, the term “repressive propensity” is used in reference to the level to which a given 
government classifies the actions of its constituents as threatening (or not) and choses to react 
to it repressively or not. A given administration might interpret large protests directed against 
the state´s policies, or the government itself, as a threat to that government´s legitimacy and 
authority. Such political behavior can disturb society and threaten those within power. Thus, 
by level of threat this literature refers to the level of threat that political oppositions, protests, 
                                                 
1
 Apud Rogers: 2011, p. 11. 
2
 Apud Rogers: 2011, p. 11. 
 
8 
 
strikes etc. might represent to the ruling government (Davenport, 1995b; Reagan & 
Henderson: 2002). 
Davenport assesses the possible interpretation of a threat by the government based on four 
criteria: ‘1) basic frequency counts of events, 2) the presence of violence, 3) the variety of 
strategies employed by dissidents and 4) current behaviors relative to the cultural norm’. 
(Davenport, 1995b: p. 685) Building on that, Reagan & Henderson (2002) identify the level 
of threat through the perception by leaders of the credibility and magnitude of the threat 
facing their regime (Reagan & Henderson: 2002, p. 120). 
In order to control such threats, augment the costs of protesting (to try to diminish the number 
of those that have such political behavior) and neutralize its undesired outcomes, 
governments might choose to politically repress protests which they interpret as a real threat 
to their interests (Davenport: 1995b, p. 685). 
Reagan & Henderson (2002) contribute to that by finding that 
(1) the level of threat is positively and significantly associated with political 
repression; (2) the level of threat has a greater impact than regime type on the 
likelihood of political repression; and (3) controlling for the level of threat, 
less developed states with intermediate levels of democracies—semi 
democracies—have the highest levels of political repression (Reagan & 
Henderson: 2002, p. 119). 
Moreover, the perception that a given government has of the intensity, representation and 
credibility of a threat posed against it is key to the existence or not of repression. This view 
implies that authoritarian regimes and democracies are equally likely to repressively respond 
to protests and that ‘the common view that democracies repress less is largely a function of 
the different type of threats they face in comparison with autocracies’ (Reagan & Henderson: 
2002, p. 1).  
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The first hypothesis that will attempt to explain the existing puzzle in the variance of the 
repression level in Chile, Uruguay and Brazil will reflect the aforementioned literature 
around the level of threats.  
H1: The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of non-violent 
protests. 
Possible alternative explanations for the variation in use of repression by Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay emerge from a careful reading of the literature on the impact of regime legacies in 
democratization processes.  
The literature on democratization examines the impact of “regime legacies” on the level and 
type of democracies. This part of the literature is especially useful for Latin America as will 
be further exposed in this thesis. This field of study examines the conditions that might affect 
the level of democracy in a country such as  
 (1) basic characteristics of the country (territorial extension, geographic 
location) that do not change over time; (2) institutional designs that remain 
unaltered during the period under study; (3) historical experiences that have 
already taken place by the time the country enters the sample; or (4) social 
conditions that change very slowly and because of limited data are better 
treated as time-invariant (Mainwaring & Pérez- Liñán: 2008, p.11). 
By doing so, it lays the foundation of the possibility that the use of political repression by a 
given government against its constituents might be connected to the remaining institutions 
from past political experiences (Mainwaring & Pérez- Liñán: 2008, p.11). 
To date, the discussion of regime legacies in democratization processes has not been tied to 
the protest literature. The literature around regime legacies is helpful to understand the 
dynamics that make Brazil, Chile and Uruguay be similar in most institutional areas. 
Nonetheless, the present research will attempt to build on that literature by studying two other 
dimensions—elite continuity and militarization of the police—which may help explain the 
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observed variation in the levels of repression in those countries. These two regime legacy 
variables seem to have particular potential for helping understand why certain democracies 
repress non-violent protest more than others.  
Regarding the first dimension—elite continuity—Wright and Escribá-Folch (2012) argue that 
authoritarian parties usually bargain with civilian elites in the regime transition, which might 
influence the power distribution after the democratization process since it may shield the 
interests of authoritarian elites. The authors suggest that a patronage system, as the one that 
could be observed in Brazil, can be useful in electing candidates sympathetic to the military 
line, which would guarantee military prerogatives, after the transition to democracy.  
Another mechanism that could facilitate the elite continuity and, therefore, make it easier for 
certain policies to remain in the subsequent democracy is the military influence on the 
composition of constituent assemblies. Many bargains were made at the transition from 
authoritarian rule to democracy in order to appease the elites’ interests. Through that, those 
who have gained their governing experience under authoritarian regimes (whether they were 
directly linked to military leadership or not) are more likely to continue those practices if they 
continue to hold power after democratic transition. 
Adding to that, Hagopian (1990) argues that the political bargains made by the elites during 
the regime transition might allow the military to remain holding a great level of formal and 
informal power over the civilians, while preserving the ‘clientelism and undermining the 
ability of political parties to transform themselves into genuine transmission belts for non-
elite interests’ (Hagopian: 1990, p. 147).  
Thus, there is strong motivation to repress since the interests that might be threatened are not 
necessarily the state´s but also of a particular group of individuals, which will try to hinder 
any major positive changes in the political culture and in the institutions in ways that impinge 
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on the quality of democracy in the medium to long term, therefore perpetuating their 
repressive modus operandi that aims at protecting their interests. 
Thus, the second hypothesis drawn from theory will pick up from this part of the literature 
and explore whether elite continuity in these countries might increase the likelihood of 
repression of protests in the new democratic regimes. 
H2: Elite continuity increases the likelihood for the repression of non-violent protests 
The third hypothesis of this thesis is motivated by a more recent literature that argues that the 
existence of a militarized police during the authoritarian years, and its consequent 
permanence after the democratic transition, might explain a higher incidence of repression 
against non-violent protests since this police is unfit to adequately deal with protests. 
Davenport (1995a) has labeled the effect of the military over the use of repression as the 
“military-coercion perspective (MCP)”, which focuses ‘on the military as an organization that 
specializes in the use of violence and actively participates in the implementation of repression 
within its jurisdiction’ (Davenport: 1995, p.120). The author states that repression is 
compatible with the ideology of this institution, which sees force as a tool to achieve control 
(Wayman, 1975 & Cortese, 1976 In Davenport, 1995a).   
In regards to this ideology, Kraska (2001) defined two important terms: militarism and 
militarization. The first is defined as an ideology ‘that stresses the use of force and threat of 
violence as the most appropriate and efficacious means to solve problems’. By its turn, 
militarization is the ‘implementation of that militarism ideology’ (Kraska, 2001 In Hill & 
Beger: 2009, p.28). Thus, a militarized police would basically be a force that exercises police 
functions with a military modus operandi. This argument is supported by other scholars that 
state that some police characteristics might affect the level and type of repression (Earl, et al., 
2003). 
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Building on that theory, Anderson (2014) argues that both the existence of a militarized 
police that remains as an heirloom of the authoritarian period influencing the repression of 
the current democracy against social protests, and the lack of accountability some countries 
might experience since the transition period might work as a motivator for perpetrators of the 
current repression.  
The causal mechanism that connects the militarized police and the impunity of past 
perpetrators can be succinctly put as follows: faced with the historical lack of accountability 
regarding high and low ranking officials that perpetrated systematic violations of human 
rights during the dictatorship years, the current members of the militarized police have a 
sense of assurance that, regardless of the way they might behave and regardless of the 
freedoms and rights they might be infringing, they will not be held accountable for their 
crimes. This sense of security, enhanced by the fact that in some cases the military can only 
be prosecuted in their own Judicial Courts, makes the military feel above the law and free to 
act as they (or their commanders) see fit (Conectas, 2013). 
The path towards reconciliation is already a challenging process for a country to take having 
gone through at least some kind of transitional justice. Nonetheless, it can be even more 
complex in case a country does not go through an appropriate and continued process of 
justice on the return to democracy. This might allow a culture of impunity to be absorbed and 
perpetrated by police forces, especially if this police force is so closely connected with the 
recent authoritarian past of a given country.  
Moreover, the lack of accountability in relation to the perpetrators of the military dictatorship 
is considered by many NGOs to be connected to the excessive use of force by the 
government´s forces, since there is the overall belief that perpetrators of new cases of 
repression will also not be held accountable for their acts (Amnesty International, 2013). This 
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argument is in line with broader literature around democratization that argues that the type of 
transition will have a great impact in future policy choices and hence in the quality of 
democracy (Skaar, 1999). 
The range of policy choices regarding the transition from an authoritarian regime to a 
democratic one, especially regarding transitional justice, is vast. This transition is a lengthy 
process, and many measures might be used in the process of 
dealing with the past human rights abuses, mass atrocities, or other forms of 
severe social trauma in the aftermath of authoritarian rule or violent conflict, 
(and includes) commissions, criminal prosecutions, reparations programs, and 
institutional reform policies including lustration/vetting are implemented as a 
means of achieving account-ability, promoting peace, strengthening 
democracy and protecting human rights (Freedom House Org., 2014). 
The transitional justice process is challenging and lengthy, but it is crucial for the rule of law 
of a country. If systematic and massive human rights violations are not addressed 
appropriatedly they might be a source of future violence and turbulence (United States 
Institute of Peace, September 2008).  
Skaar (1999, p. 1109) asks whether, ‘in situations where state officials of the previous regime 
have been responsible for murdering, imprisoning, torturing and disappearing its citizens, 
should the new government listen to public demand for disclosure of the truth and 
prosecution of the guilty? Or should it give in to the outgoing regime’s demand for impunity 
for past crimes?’ If the first is neglected during the transition period, there is a chance that the 
‘new democratic government may risk losing popular support and legitimacy, as well as risk 
failing to build respect for the rule of law and democratic institution (Skaar: 1999, p. 1109). 
This reflection is central to understanding whether there is a connection between the 
existence of a militarized police and the repression of non-violent protests, and if the 
transitional justice path followed by a given government might have an effect on the way the 
militarized police act during protests  
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Is there a relationship between the existence of a militarized police and the violent repression 
of non-violent demonstrations? Moreover, does a militarized police force behave more 
repressively when there has been lack of accountability in relation to crimes commit during 
the dictatorship of that country? These questions bring us to the final hypothesis: 
H3: The existence of a militarized police force increases the likelihood of the repression of 
non-violent protests. This likelihood further increases if there was a lack of accountability 
regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule. 
 
III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
i. Case Selection 
The reason for focusing on Latin America and choosing Brazil, Chile and Uruguay is because 
of the interesting puzzle regarding the different levels of repression existing in countries that 
had broad political- historical similarities  in the recent past. This degree of similarities would 
have been lost had other cases been chosen in the region, which would affect the credibility 
of the analysis. Furthermore, for the purposes of this research it was crucial that the three 
selected cases had experienced protests in a similar period so that the government´s reaction 
to them can be compiled. Thus, the time interval chosen to observe protests that happened in 
each of the three countries was 2011 to 2013. 
ii. Methodology 
For the purposes of this research, qualitative methods are mainly  employed. As the 
aforementioned case selection section made clear, three cases will be investigated: Brazil, 
Chile and Uruguay. This will be developed through a small-n comparative case study 
methodology and this method was chosen because it 
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resembles the statistical method in all respects except one. The crucial 
difference is that the number of cases it deals with is too small to permit 
systematic control by means of partial correlations. This problem occurs in 
statistical operations, too; especially when one wants to control 
simultaneously for many variables, one quickly "runs out of cases." The 
comparative method should be resorted to when the number of cases 
available for analysis is so small that cross-tabulating them further in order to 
establish credible controls is not feasible (Lijphart: 1971, p. 684). 
 
Furthermore, faced with the scarcity of time and financial capacities, the small-n comparative 
case study method presented itself as more ‘promising than a more superficial statistical 
analysis of many cases’ (Lijphart: 1971, p. 685). Nonetheless, one of the hypothesis (H1) is 
tested with the help of quantitative analysis method. For that specific hypothesis some simple 
correlation will help support the qualitative anaylis’ findings, the significance level used for 
statistical correlation is at the 0.05 level (2- tailed). 
a.  Concept Definition 
There are two main concepts that fall in the core of this research: the concept of protest and 
political repression. These two concepts have different definitions in the literature and it is 
very important that their meaning, for the purposes of this thesis, are defined before we move 
on to the next sections of the research. Furthermore, a clarification is needed: in order to 
avoid repetition protest and demonstrations will be used interchangeably, while repression, 
political repression, negative sanctions and response will also be used interchangeably. 
Protest 
For the purposes of this research, one single march through the streets will already be 
considered as one protest. In practice it means that it is not necessary for a longer string of 
events to have occurred for a protest to be denominated as such. For an example, an isolated 
event of a specific claim will be coded as one protest, as well as one event included in a 
broader string of events (e.g anti-World Cup protests).  
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Following Earl (2003), this thesis will not consider one man acts of protest (e.g. self-
immolation) as a demonstration, only coding events that clearly had collectiveness in its 
nature. Furthermore, people part of the social movement must explicitly articulate some claim 
(even if the claim is generalized dissatisfaction),
3
 support or grievance towards something. 
With that, block parties, concerts and other people gatherings are excluded of the study. Also, 
in order for a given event to be considered it is necessary that it has happened in the public 
sphere, which excludes private meetings of any sort (Earl, 2003). Finally, it is important to 
define the subdivision of protest that will be analyzed by this thesis. There are literally 
hundreds of different formats of non-violent protest that fall under an even bigger umbrella of 
all types of protest.  
Sharp (1973) put forward a list of 198 forms of non-violent action which he divided amongst 
three main categories: persuasion and non-violent action (considered to be at the mildest end 
of the spectrum); noncooperation; and, nonviolent intervention (which falls at the strongest 
end of the spectrum) (Sharp, 1973). Out of all Skaar’s methods of non-violent protest and 
persuasion this thesis will include those related to picketing, vigils, marches, assemblies of 
protest or support, all kinds of strikes, stalling and obstruction, sit-ins, stand-ins, non-violent 
land seizure etc. In order to be considered for the database, these methods must have more 
than one person present and happen in open and public spaces.  
The present research collected data from a wide range of collective action events, such as the 
ones mentioned above, but no event that had violence from the side of the participants was 
considered since it would fall beyond the non-violent scope. Thus, in order to be considered, 
a given event must have been non-violent. According to the Conflict Research Consortium of 
the University of Colorado 
                                                 
3
 The coding regarding the claims of protests will be presented in the operationalization segment of this 
research.   
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non-violent resistance is a strategy for countering the power of violent force 
with the power of the integrative system. Many non-violent techniques can 
also be effective when used against illegitimate uses of legal, political, or 
other types of force (University of Colorado, s.d.). 
Repression 
Another central concept that will be used throughout this research is the concept of 
repression. Regan & Henderson (2002, p.120) define political repression as the ‘systematic 
violation of the civil liberties and human rights of groups and/or individuals. While civil 
liberties generally refer to particular types of expression, human rights refers to the respect 
for people’s personal integrity’. 
Repression is also reflected at any action that violates human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as defined in relevant international human rights instrument, such as the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). This means that many different actions might be an instrument for 
repression. Torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or sanction, summary, extrajudicial 
and/or arbitrary executions and imprisonments, extensive and continued illegal surveillance, 
wiretapping, access to private and legally protected information (bank statements, phone and 
internet records) and any other suppression or violation of human rights and/or fundamental 
freedoms all tools through which a given government or another entity might want to exert 
control (or obtain another end) over a given population (United Nations, 1948) (United 
Nations, 1966). 
Furthermore, specifically regarding protest policing (which is not necessarily repressive) 
there is a vast number of tools that can be used to control, constrain and disperse 
demonstrations. Violent methods, which will be the object of the present study, vary from the 
use of coercive language to the use of lethal and non-lethal weapons (Davenport, 2005).  
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iii. Operationalization 
a. Dependent Variable 
In order to carry out the research proposed by this thesis both dependent and independent 
variables were identified. The dependent variable is the level of repression brought to bear 
against non-violent protests. An original scale will be put forward to observe the variation of 
such variable across the selected cases.  
Since the present research will only be focused in the ‘hard information’—such as the 
number of people present, number of injured and arrested and the use (or not) of coercive 
methods of protest dissipation (tear gas, rubber bullet, pepper spray)—there is little risk of 
‘description bias’. However,  
[e]ven under the best of circumstances, events reported in newspapers are 
affected by selection (what is reported) and description (how it is reported) 
bias according to criteria of news-worthiness, corporate interests, and the 
explicit and implicit expectations of audiences, which leads, most notably, to 
an over reporting of large and violent events […] and an under-reporting of 
phenomena in areas considered peripheral or of low interest (Rogers: 2011, 
p.24). 
 
The research will investigate every reported protest from 2011 to 2013 in each of the three 
countries and observe whether there were reports of repression, arrests, injured people, deaths 
and what the estimated total of participants was. With that we will be able to assess the level 
of overall repression of each of the study cases. Therefore, the scale of repression will be 
measured based on the following criteria: 
Table i: Operationalization of ‘Level of Repression’ used against non-violent protests 
A protest will be coded as having received ‘no repression’ when:  
- There was no use of coercive tactics (tear gas, rubber bullet, pepper spray, physical 
sanctions)  
           and  
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- no occurrence of outcomes such as injuries, arrests or deaths. 
A protest will be coded as having received ‘mild repression’ when: 
- There was use of coercive tactics (tear gas, pepper spray, water jets)  
      or  
- the occurrence of outcomes such as injuries and/or arrests. 
A protest will be coded as having received ‘significant repression’ when: 
- There was the use of coercive tactics (such as rubber bullets, physical sanctions)  
and 
-  the occurrence of outcomes such as injuries and/or arrests and/or deaths.4 
 
This research will observe and assess whether the dependent variable—repression against 
non-violent protests—has actually occurred in each of the three cases by using data found in 
local news media. For Chile the media used will be the online version version of the 
newspaper La Nación (Chile), for the observation of the Uruguayan case the La Diaria online 
newspaper will be the source and Folha de São Paulo was chosen for the Brazilian case. All 
of them have daily publications (physical and/or online). 
In order to select these media outlets some factors were analyzed: the number of subscribers 
on the national level (when available for subscription), not being overtly associated with the 
government or any political party, having daily publications and having an online search 
mechanism that allowed to research the observed period.
5
 The time interval that will be taken 
into consideration is 1 January 2011 to 31 December 2013, inclusive. 
                                                 
4
 Causes of death not- related with the use of coercive tactics (eg being run by a car—not police owned) will not 
be included in the coding. 
5
 Among the main news media in Uruguay, La Diaria was chosen because it currently has 7500 subscriptions 
(La Diaria, 2014. Available at: http://ladiaria.com.uy/faq/distribucion/), appears to have a bias-free reporting 
and has a satisfactory online search mechanism. In Chile, El Mercurio was the first choice, however its online 
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Each event was coded individually and then a table was compiled to observe the overall 
repressive behavior of the country in relation to non-violent protests in a given year. For a 
given calendar year to be considered as being ‘significantly repressive’ it must have met the 
threshold of ≥ 20% of all entries for the calendar year being labelled as ‘significantly 
repressive’. This threshold is such because no peaceful protest should be violently repressed. 
Hence, in the case that a fifth of all events of a given year have been met by ‘significant 
repression’, it is enough for that year to be considered as ‘significantly repressive’.  
If the ‘significantly repressive’ threshold is not met, the second threshold is for the ‘mildly 
repressive’ behavior which has to meet ≥ 33% of the total number of protests of a given 
calendar year under the ‘mild repression’ label, because one third of every non-violent event 
being repressed is already too great of a proportion, especially in democracies. Finally, if 
none of these thresholds are met, a given calendar year will be considered as being ‘non- 
repressive’. The same thresholds are used when establishing the overall level of repression of 
a given country. Thus, in a nutshell: 
Table ii: Operationalization of the scale for ‘Level of Repression’ 
A ‘significantly repressive’ year is a year in which ≥ 20% of all entries of a given calendar 
year were coded as ‘significant repression’. 
If the above threshold is not met, then a year might be considered as ‘mildly repressive’ if ≥ 
33% of all entries of a given calendar year are coded as ‘mild repression’. 
If none of the above thresholds are met, then the year in question will automatically be 
                                                                                                                                                        
search tool did not present entries for the entire period observed by this thesis. Although La Nación was a 
newspaper that somewhat supported Augusto Pinochet’s regime in Chile in the past, currently its online news 
source presents a satisfactory balanced reporting of protests. Folha de São Paulo currently has a mean of 
301,299 subscriptions of weekly and weekend subscriptions and it met the other criteria. (Folha de São Paulo, 
2014. Available at: http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/institucional/circulacao.shtml) No data of the ‘views and 
visits’ of these websites was available. 
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considered as ‘non- repressive’. 
In order to account for the lack of availability and bias that might occur in the collection of 
news media data, the Political Terror Scale (PTS) will be used to supplement the data. Taking 
into consideration that such scale represents an annual measure of state terror and that would 
not quite fit this thesis’ level of analysis, the PTS will only serve as a general check on this 
thesis’ findings on the level of repression against non-violent protests. The explanation of 
their scoring scale—which compiles the accounts of Amnesty International and the U.S State 
Department—is as follows: 
5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies 
place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal 
or ideological goals. 
4: Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the 
population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In 
spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest 
themselves in politics or ideas. 
3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such 
imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be 
common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is 
accepted. 
2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political 
activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are 
exceptional. Political murder is rare. 
1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their 
view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare 
(Gibeny, et al., 2012). 
 
b. Independent Variables and Intervening Variable 
Level of Threat  
Regarding the independent variable present in H1 (“The higher the perception of the level of 
threat, the higher the repression of non-violent protests”), another compilation of data found 
in local newspapers’ accounts of the events will be needed. In this case, the data analyzed 
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will be: the frequency counts of protests; the number of participants;
6
 and the motivation 
(claim) for each protest. This last point is important because it can expose a recurrent issue 
that is in the center of public discontent and can, therefore, be used as a proxy of threat 
perception by the government. The more recurrent a particular claim is at demonstrations, the 
bigger the threat it might represent to a government since it would be example of public 
dissatisfaction, which could put the government´s legitimacy at stake. It is also important to 
keep record of the different claims raised by protests because it might be the case that a given 
claim receives more repression than other, exposing the government’s perception of threat in 
relation to that specific claim.
7
 
Moreover, a given administration might interpret large protests directed against the state´s 
policies, or the government itself, as a threat to that government´s legitimacy and authority. 
Such political behavior can disturb society and threaten those within power. Thus, by level of 
threat this literature refers to the level of threat that political oppositions, protests, strikes etc. 
might represent to the ruling government when protesting (Davenport, 1995b; Reagan & 
Henderson: 2002). 
After a preliminary research it was found that the claims behind the social demonstrations 
could be broadly divided between ‘Education’, ‘Anti-Government’—where generalized 
dissatisfaction is included--, ‘Housing’, ‘Local Issues’ such as insatisfaction in relation to real 
estate development etc., ‘Transport’ and ‘Union demonstrations’. In order to assess the level 
of threat, the scale will be coded as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
6
 In case there is more than one media report of the same event, the number of participants present will be a 
mean from the data collection. 
7
 Naturally, there are certain claims that could be more or less sensitive to a specific government and/or elite. 
Therefore, a specific claim cannot be generalized as threatening to all study cases. 
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Table iii: Operationalization of ‘Level of Threat’ 
A protest will be coded as ‘Not a Threat’ when: 
 
- It is the 1st–122nd protest with the same claim in a given year;8 
and, 
- It has between 1–1000 people in a single event. 
A protest will be coded as ‘Mild Threat’ when: 
- It is the 123th–365th protest with the same claim in a given year;9 
and, 
- It has between 1–1000 people in a single event; 
               
Or; 
- It is the 1st–12th protest with the same claim in a given year;10 
and, 
- It has between 1001–100,000 people in a single event. 
A protest will be coded as ‘Significant Threat’ when: 
- It is the 13th or higher protest (coded as mild threat) with the same 
claim in a given year;
11
 
              and, 
- It has between 1001–100,000 people in a single event. 
Or; 
- When any given protest has more than or equal to 100,001 people in 
a single event. 
Or; 
- When it is the 366th or higher protest with the same claim in a given 
year;
12
 
and, 
- 1–1000 people in a single event. 
 
The logic behind the scale is simple. Up to 122 protests in a year (roughly one protest every 
three days maximum), with a small number of participants with the same claim is not very 
threatening and its potential to disrupt society is low.  
From the 123th until the 365th protest with the same claim (what could mount up to one 
protest per day with a given claim) and with a small number of participants it could already 
                                                 
 
 
8
 
910 11 12
 For the purposes of this research a given year will be measured through a 365-day period and not 
through a calendar year. For an example: If the first protest with a given claim happened on 3 September 2012, 
this thesis will consider events up and including 2 September 2013 to evaluate how many events under the same 
claim happened in the period of 365 days. 
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represent a mild threat to the government. The same happens to protests between the 1st—
12th protest with the same claim in a given year that have a medium range of participants 
(1000—100,000 people), which represents an average of one medium protest, with relevant 
potential to disrupt society’s daily lives and gather great attention to a cause, with the same 
issue per month. 
 A demonstration will be coded as ‘significant threat’ if it is the 366th or higher protest with 
the same claim with a small public (representing a mean of more than one protest per day per 
year); or if it is the 13th or higher demonstration with the same claim and with a medium 
number of participants (indicating a mean of more than one protest per month); or if it has 
over 100,001 people present, regardless of how many demonstrations with the same claim 
happened before it. 
Finally, for every event status (‘not a threat’, ‘mild threat’, ‘significant threat’) we will 
identify the existence or absence of repression (‘no repression’, ‘mild repression’, ‘great 
repression’)13 in order to identify whether the threat of a given protest is related to the 
reaction to it. Furthermore, the variable that accounts for the ‘level of threat’ and the variable 
that accounts for the ‘level of repression’ will be tested for their correlation (via a simple 
‘bivariate correlation’ in SPSS) to observe the relationship between the variables and support 
this thesis’ findings.   
Elite Continuity 
In ordert to analyze the independent variable present in H2—elite continuity—this thesis 
mainly draws from established literature regarding each of the cases. Media and NGOs’ 
reports are also observed to supplement this data.  
                                                 
13
 The coding for the ‘Levels of Repression’ can be found on table i, page 18 of this thesis. 
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More specifically, elite continuity is measured by analyzing whether sectors and families that 
had the biggest influence during the military dictatorship years (including those that 
somehow supported the regime), still exert a great level of influence over politics.  
Naturally, there is a wide range of possible ways to measure elite continuity, however due to 
the time and resource constraints not all methods are equally practicable. Therefore, in order 
to develop a small-n comparative case study approach, this thesis identifies a 
low/medium/high score for elite continuity for each of the three countries. 
A low score for elite continuity will be given for cases in which elites that had some 
influence during the authoritarian years have little or no overt influence on policies that could 
be related to the repression of non-violent protests. 
A medium score for this variable will represent an indication of continuity of the power 
dynamics between elites in the country: around the same families and business defending 
their interest, but with no clear interests at stake that could connect them to the repression of 
demonstrations. 
Lastly, a high score will be given for a country that evidently has elites influencing policies 
related to the government’s repressive behavior in order to protect their interests, including 
with names related to the past Authoritarian years being in charge. 
Existence of a Militarized Police and lack of accountability 
Lastly, regarding H3—“The existence of a militarized police force increases the likelihood of 
the repression of non-violent protests. This likelihood further increases if there was a lack of 
accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”—its 
independent variable, namely the existence of a militarized police, is confirmed or dismissed 
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by the analysis of scholars, media and NGOs’ reports as well as through the investigation of 
the division of the police body in each of the countries.  
The presence of a militarized police (that is, the independent variable) is identified through 
qualitative research of the nomenclature used as well as the police structures of each of the 
cases. As part of this effort, this thesis identifies those countries that have modern forms of a 
gendarmerie, which is, simply put, a militarized body responsible for civilian police duties 
and are most commonly not under Civilian control (Emsley, 1999). 
This hypothesis has an intervening variable (lack of accountability/lack of prosecution of 
dictatorship´s perpetrators) that is accounted for through an analysis of media/NGOs reports 
and the literature to investigate whether each of the cases held the perpetrators of the 
authoritarian years accountable or not. More specifically, this intervening variable will be 
operationalized through the observance of what kind of transitional justice, if at all, each of 
the three cases experienced when moving from the authoritarian regime to democracy, and 
what results in terms of accountability did these methods of transition bring to the country 
where it was established.  
Transitional justice is a set of both judicial and non-judicial procedures that can be 
implemented in countries that have the need to address extensive human rights violations 
committed in its history.  Transitional justice may be done through different paths which 
include but are not limited to: 
Criminal prosecutions, particularly those that address perpetrators considered 
to be the most responsible. 
Reparations, through which governments recognize and take steps to address 
the harms suffered. Such initiatives often have material elements (such as 
cash payments or health services) as well as symbolic aspects (such as public 
apologies or day of remembrance). 
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Institutional reform of abusive state institutions such as armed forces, police 
and courts, to dismantle—by appropriate means—the structural machinery of 
abuses and prevent recurrence of serious human rights abuses and impunity. 
Truth commissions or other means to investigate and report on systematic 
patterns of abuse, recommend changes and help understand the underlying 
causes of serious human rights violations (ICTJ, 2014). 
 
There is no magic formula when it comes to transitional justice and different countries might 
apply other measures, or even no measure at all, when addressing past massive human rights 
abuses. Accountability is a big part of the path towards full transitional justice and 
reconciliation since it helps reaffirm legal order and motivates higher trust in State 
institutions.  
Accountability might be achieved through the criminal prosecution of the human rights 
violators and has a better effect if combined with other measures. Although other tools such 
as truth commissions are also very important for the process, not holding perpetrators 
accountable may have crucial outcomes for the country’s future.  
A history of unaddressed massive abuses is likely to be socially divisive, to 
generate mistrust between groups and in the institutions of the State, and to 
hamper or slow down the achievement of security and development goals. It 
raises questions about the commitment to the rule of law and, ultimately, can 
lead to cyclical recurrence of violence in various forms (ICTJ, 2014). 
Thus, albeit relevant for the reconciliation process of a country, these other tools of 
transitional justice—truth commissions and reparations etc.—do not signal enough 
accountability and H3 argues that the possible lack of accountability of a country might 
exacerbate the response of militarized police to non-violent protests. This is so because an 
environment full of impunity in relation to past crimes might act as a motivator for new 
crimes to be committed. Once again, because of time and resource constraints, it is not 
possible to address all the possible variations of this variable. Nevertheless, in order to 
explore this hypothesis, three levels are identified: low, medium and high. 
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A low score is given to a country that has no militarized police (regardless of where it is on 
the transitional justice process). A country is scored as medium if a militarized police exists, 
but the country has done a lot to hold human rights violations perpetrators from the 
dictatorship accountable. Lastly, a high score is given to a country that has active militarized 
police and has not held criminal prosecutions related to its authoritarian years. 
c.  Limitation of the Data 
The data was collected from three different news media sources: La Nación for the Chilean 
accounts; La Diaria for Uruguayan cases and Folha de São Paulo for Brazil. In the two first 
study cases, Chile and Uruguay, these news media sources cannot be considered the main 
news vehicle of each country. There were other newspapers and sources that could be 
selected as such. However, some of the news media that would have a bigger reach (number 
of subscriptions and/or sales) and, therefore, could be preferable to the selected sources, did 
not have data available for the time period selected: January 2011 to December 2013. In the 
case of Brazil, Folha de São Paulo is amongst the main newspapers of the country, being 
usually the first in the number of sales and subscriptions.
14
 
Also, it must also be acknowledged that the time period investigated (1 January 2011 up to 
and including 31 December 2013) may also represent a limitation to the data and analysis 
since this short period observed could simply represent an anomaly in both the occurrence of 
demonstrations and in the repressive behavior of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. 
Furthermore, although the present research was careful when selecting media that were as 
bias free as possible, it must be acknowledged that a complete unbiased publication is almost 
impossible to identify in news media. A study of political positioning was made to access and 
help account for possible bias. None of the sources utilized herein used presented an overt 
                                                 
14
 Footnote 4, page 19 has more information about subscriptions and the reasoning behind the selection of each 
of the media sources. 
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level of bias of any major concern. Nonetheless, one must keep in mind that news media 
reporting bias is possible, which could affect the compiled data. 
Another limitation present was that, in many cases, the media reports did not include the 
number of participants involved and, therefore, those reports were not considered for the 
analysis of this thesis since once the number of participants is key for one of the hypothesis 
(Foweraker & Krznaric, 2001). 
With regards to the analysis of elite continuity (variable present in H2), it must be 
acknowledged that information on which elites had and still have influence over government 
policies is an information associated to the background of politics and, thus, is not easily 
accessed and analysed. In order to mitigate that, this thesis will analyse media and NGOs’ 
reports as well as scholar’s work.  
Finally, regarding the intervening variable on H3 some acknowledgements of the limitation 
of the information available must be made. Some of this thesis’ findings might soon be 
outdated because Brazil`s Truth Commission is expected to release a report containing 
recommendations for the government in December 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
IV. CASE STUDIES 
 
i. Contextual Factors 
The following section provides historical context for each of the three cases with regards to 
the military dictatorship, transition to democracy and recent protests while providing context 
for the variables studied in this thesis. The section for each country touches upon the scenario 
prior to the military dictatorship, the authoritarian stage itself, the recent protests and it 
presents some information regarding the variables herein analysed, including the levels of 
repression observed in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay between 2011 and 2013. At the end of the 
section for each study case there is a brief summary of the country in light of the three 
hypothesis put forward by this research. 
a.  Brazil 
Antecedents of the authoritarian years 
As it is known, Brazil is a young republic having only left the Portuguese Empire in 1889 
through a political-military uprising (Ouro Preto, 1986). Nonetheless, its recent political 
history is eventful. Its 1946 Constitution guaranteed free, fair and competitive elections and 
after the resignation of the legitimately elected President Jânio Quadros in August 1961 after 
only seven months as Head of State, it was legally expected that his Vice-President, João 
Goulart would be nominated as President given that the country was under a Presidential 
system. However, at the time of the resignation, João Goulart was visiting communist China 
and the strong Brazilian military class accused him of being a communist and prevented him 
from assuming office (Lewandowski, 1998).  
After much negotiating between the Military and João Goulart´s supporters, the political elite 
of the country decided to change the system from Presidential to Parliamentarian in which 
 
32 
 
João Goulart was its Head of State. A public plebiscite was held a year later and the former 
system was restituted and the fears of Brazil joining the communist block intensified 
(Carvalho, 1990).
15
  
In mid-March 1964 the Brazilian President announced the nationalization of private 
petroleum refineries and the expropriation of many lands to agrarian reform which only made 
the opposition grow in their fear. The Church and far-right conservative elites joined the 
military against the ‘communist’ President and a coup took place on 31 March 1964 
(Carvalho, 1990).   
Dictatorship 
Some refer to what happened in the country as a mild dictatorship or as a military 
intervention with the purpose of pushing the country back on track instead of an actual 
dictatorship. Furthermore, the elite support for the coup was so strong that it created the idea 
of the regime being a civil-military dictatorship. Nonetheless, today the Government 
officially calls that period simply the “Military Dictatorship” (Gombata, 2013).  
At the time, citizen’s mobilizations coming from the rural areas fuelled by some Marxist 
inclinations, scared the elites in São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais that had (and 
still have) the greatest control and ownership of Brazilian land. Just before the coup d’état, 
one per cent of the population controlled over 50% of the arable land of the country and 
wanted to suffocate any movement that sought to change the status quo, highly beneficial for 
them. Consequently, the Brazilian elites, especially the ones closely connected to agrarian 
business, offered their full support to the military control of the country (Fontes, 2014). 
                                                 
15
 At that time the world was going through the Cold War in which right and left, West and East and communist 
and liberal views of world intensified and were polarized. The United States of America and the USSR were the 
main actors of this arena and both competed for zones of influence (Carvalho, 1990). 
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During the first four years of the regime, the authoritarianism gradually intensified and 
changed the political atmosphere of the country. In order to give legitimacy to the political 
actions that violated the Constitution, many Institutional Acts were composed.
16
 These 
Institutional Acts restricted the rights of Brazilians and cancelled the validity of some 
Constitutional prerogatives which consequently put a hold on the democratic stage by even 
dissolving Congress and instituting a stage of ‘exception’ (Priori, 2004).  
Social demonstrations were common in the first years of the regime, but there was increasing 
repression and many demonstrators were tortured, “disappeared” and deprived of basic 
human rights such as freedom of association. Although there are no final official numbers, it 
is estimated that over 350 people were killed or “disappeared”, 25,000 people were 
imprisoned on political grounds and over 10,000 were exiled (Folha de São Paulo, 2014). 
The military tried to impose a social, political and economic model for Brazil which worked 
in the first years of the regime, but that lead to rapid inflation and subsequent social 
discontent. Faced with increasing social and economic pressures the military decided to 
gradually reopen the political arena by allowing opposition political parties to reform, which 
further destabilized the regime. The Amnesty Law of 1979 was part of the negotiation 
process between the elites, military and opposition and it is broadly believed that, without it, 
the transition back to democracy would have been much more turbulent. This law guaranteed 
that the dictatorship perpetrators and other criminals of the time would not be brought to 
                                                 
16
 The Institutional Acts (Atos Institucionais in their native Portuguese) were norms and decrees created between 
1964 and 1969. They were written by the Chief Commandants of the Aeronautic, Navy, Army or by the 
President and these acts were above any other norm or law of the country, including the Constitution. The most 
authoritarian of all Institutional Acts was the Institutional Act 5, which allowed the President to terminate 
political mandates, suspend political rights of any person, intervene in cities and states in any way he saw fit and 
forbade the protests with a political claim. Based on this Act many news media and people from the opposition 
suffered great censorship and repression which led many to exile abroad. Besides that torture was basically 
institutionalized and this act represents the hardening of the Regime. All Institutional Acts were extinguished 
since the end of the Military Regime (Government, s.d.; Priori, 2004). 
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Court to answer for their crimes. Pedro Estevam Serrano (2014) states that this was an ‘auto-
amnesty’ produced by a society embedded in the dictatorship (In Folha de São Paulo, 2014).  
Furthermore, Congress reopened and political liberties were guaranteed once more, which 
motivated people to take the streets in the historical social movement called ‘Diretas Já’17 
which claimed for the right to fairly elect their President (Carvalho, 1990).  
Transition back to Democracy, Accountability and Elites 
 
Brazil made the transition from a military dictatorship to a democracy with 
relatively little fanfare at the instigation of its military administration.  A new 
constitution was put in place and civil liberties were restored.   However, the 
transition to democracy failed to address some entrenched governance 
problems, including political elitism, socioeconomic inequalities, a flawed 
judiciary, and the lack of accountability of state officials (Strzemp, 2013). 
As mentioned before, the economic and social situation pressured the military and, in order to 
cede control on their terms, they started negotiating the transition back to democracy years 
before the final transition was made. The Amnesty Law, created in 1979, protected 
perpetrators of extensive and systematic human rights violations and has constrained the 
institution of a full democracy in the country ever since.  
Moreover, the bargaining process included the country’s elites, most of whom were closely 
connected to the authoritarian regime and that would only support the transition if their 
interests were protected (Cancian, 2006). These process allowed many elites to be included in 
                                                 
17
 ‘Diretas já’ was one of the largest social movements of the history of Brazil. This large civil unrest movement 
demanded direct presidential elections in Brazil in during the last years of the authoritarian regime. It started in 
1983 and the demonstrations got larger with time, reaching over 1,500,000 people in São Paulo in 1984.  The 
movement, and its growth, happened in parallel to the worsening of the economic situation of the country that 
reached an annual inflation rate of 239% in 1983. This led to a generalized dissatisfaction of the population and 
brought together unions, class entities and representatives of multiple political parties fighting for the same 
cause: direct presidential elections. Lower ranks of military were also greatly affected by the inflation and 
started to voice their discontent and sometimes even join the public demonstrations, which increased the loss of 
prestige that the regime had amongst the population (Mendonça, 2014). 
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the subsequent democracy in key positions inside Congress and the military with no 
accountability for their actions during the dictatorship (Gombata, 2013). 
In 1984, the social movement ‘Diretas Já’ that called for direct presidential elections got 
stronger and their biggest demonstration preceded the vote in Congress, which would either 
allow direct presidential elections to be held once more or maintain the absence of direct 
elections for president. The bill did not pass on Congress, but the movement is considered to 
have been a catalyst for the re-democratization process in the country (Mendonça, 2014). 
Although the movement did not reach its goals immediately, it had a great effect in the 
subsequent history of the country by showing that the Military Regime was no longer 
sustainable. In the transition process a new Constitution was promulgated in 1988. The new 
Constitution guaranteed broad freedom of religion, association and expression (Freedom 
House Org., 2014), but the clauses relating to the militarized police, Army, Military Judicial 
System and Public Security were mainly left unaltered, mirroring the stipulations predicted 
by the authoritarian Constitution of 1967 (Tavares, 2014).
18
 
As long as the Amnesty Law is not revised and perpetrators are not judicially held 
accountable, little is expected to effectively change in this regard. In 2010, the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights concluded that the Brazilian Amnesty Law had no judicial 
validity and should be revisited (Amnesty International Brazil, 2012). Furthermore, it is 
believed that the continuity of part of the authoritarian political elite in Brazilian politics 
made it even harder for a positive transition and reconciliation process to be properly 
instituted.  
                                                 
18
 Article 144 of the Federal Constitution of 1988 states that both ostensive policing and the control of the rule 
of law are duties of the PMs. Furthermore, paragraph six of the same article state that they are subordinated to 
State Governments. Nonetheless, since they follow a very similar hierarchy to the Armed Forces, have similar 
training and only respond judicially to Military Courts, in practice they are under the Army framework (Senado 
Federal, 1988; (Poder Judiciario: Tribunal de Justica Militar, 2002) 
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Many examples of the continuity of elites and key dictatorship actors can be pointed out: 
Aparecido Laerte Calandras was accused of being part of torture sessions and killings and, 
after the transition, was promoted to the role of Commissioner of the Civil Police of São 
Paulo; Nilton Cerqueira was member a key military in the authoritarian years and had 
influential family in Rio de Janeiro, after the regime was dissolved he became the Secretary 
of Public Safety in Rio de Janeiro (Folha de São Paulo, 2014).  
Furthermore, many companies in Brazil (both domestic and foreign companies) helped the 
authoritarian regime by providing information about employees that could connect them to 
the resistance, especially related to class unions (Estado de São Paulo, 2014). Up to this day, 
these companies are controlled by the same big shareholder families.  
Also, it is important to state that during the protests (which are discussed below) the political, 
business and media-related elites linked to past perpetrations tried to delegitimize the 
demonstrations in order to try to avoid greater mobilization (Roque, 2014). 
Those are only a few examples of an extensive list of influential people that directly benefited 
from the past regime and the transition back to democracy and many of these families remain 
central to the discussion of public security and legislation around protests in the country. 
Given that a good part of the perpetrators and allied elites were not only not held accountable, 
but also remain in powerful positions, it is possible to affirm that there is a great level of elite 
continuity in the country.  
Clearly the initial reconciliation process was not very positive. Nonetheless, some positive 
development were achieved since the mid-90s: 
[T]he first significant institutional effort by Brazil towards accountability was 
a law—Act 9140—passed in 1995 that acknowledged the deaths of 136 
missing persons. The 1995 law also established a Special Commission on 
Deaths and Disappearances. In its final report, delivered in 2007, the Special 
Commission documented 479 cases of forced disappearance; acknowledged 
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state responsibility; and created a framework for compensating victims’ 
families.  
Another commission—the “Amnesty Commission”—was charged in 2001 
with granting reparations for victims of abuses not covered by the first 
commission. As of mid-2010, financial compensation had been awarded in 
over 12,000 cases (ICTJ, 2014). 
Finally, after much pressure from civil society, the law that established the National Truth 
Commission was passed. The Commission aims at shedding light to what truly happened in 
those years by reopening criminal cases and hearing testimonials from perpetrators and 
victims. It is widely reported that the creation of the Commission was only possible at this 
point because President Dilma Roussef herself was a victim of the military dictatorship in 
Brazil (Comissão da Verdade, 2012). 
The Commission will produce a report with non-binding recommendations to local and 
federal governments to both help on the reconciliation process and assure that those human 
rights violations will never happen again. This is already a great advance in terms of 
reconciliation and progress, but since the Commissions only has recommendatory powers 
there is the unfortunate expectation that it will only serve rhetorical purposes (Comissão da 
Verdade, 2012). Gombata (2013) defends such an argument and states that the recent efforts 
related to the creation of federal and local Truth Commission will only serve as part of a 
symbolic reconciliation.  
The feeling that the Brazilian Commission will only have rhetorical value is supported by 
many different classes and key stakeholders in the country. During his testimony, General 
Ustra—one of the perpetrators of the human rights violations during the previous regime—
stated that the Brazilian Military should be the ones giving their testimony, but he was the 
one giving it because “the terrorists were elected to key roles in the democracy that was 
preserved”, allowing them to be bulletproof to any prosecution and remain in power in the 
country. Finally, “while this impunity is maintained we cannot say that we closed the 
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transition cycle. The Brazilian society and State must send a clear message that this is not 
admissible, that these crimes are unforgiveable” (Roque, 2014).19  
There is an ongoing debate around the validity of the Amnesty Law. However, recently the 
Supreme Court of Brazil upheld the constitutionality of the bill when the Brazilian Bar 
Association challenged the coverage of such law in relation to torture which, in the Bar 
Association’s interpretation, should be exempt from amnesty according to the Brazilian 1988 
Constitution (Roniger, 2011).  
Thus, despite some commendable efforts, until 2014 Brazil has not yet achieved judicial 
accountability or a strong truth and reconciliation process in relation to the human rights 
abuses perpetrated during the military years (ICTJ, 2014). 
Protests and the Police 
 
Since the return to democracy in 1985, the country has enjoyed competitive elections and a 
reasonable level of democracy although some human rights violations have occurred since 
then. This experience with democracy can be observed through the Freedom House
20
 (2013) 
scale: 
                                                 
19
 Translated from the original in Portuguese: "Enquanto essa impunidade for mantida nós não podemos dizer 
que fechamos o ciclo da transição. A sociedade brasileira e o Estado precisam mandar uma mensagem clara de 
que isso não é admissível, de que esses crimes não são passíveis de perdão” (Roque, 2014). 
20
 According to the Freedom House Organization, their rating process is “based on a checklist of 10 political 
rights questions and 15 civil liberties questions. The political rights questions are grouped into three 
subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and Participation (4), and Functioning of 
Government (3). The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and 
Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights (4). Scores are awarded to each of these questions on a scale of 0 to 4, where a score of 0 
represents the smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present. The political rights section 
also contains two additional discretionary questions: question A (For traditional monarchies that have no parties 
or electoral process, does the system provide for genuine, meaningful consultation with the people, encourage 
public discussion of policy choices, and allow the right to petition the ruler?) and question B (Is the government 
or occupying power deliberately changing the ethnic composition of a country or territory so as to destroy a 
culture or tip the political balance in favor of another group?). For additional discretionary question A, a score 
of 1 to 4 may be added, as applicable, while for discretionary question B, a score of 1 to 4 may be subtracted 
(the worse the situation, the more that may be subtracted). The highest score that can be awarded to the political 
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Figure i: Freedom Score- Brazil (2001-2013) 
 
 
As it can be seen above, Brazil has never reached the best freedom score (1) on this scale 
since its inception, but this is not necessarily a reflection of the atmosphere in the country. 
Although Brazilians were not completely satisfied and occasional protests occurred,
21
 since 
the ‘caras pintadas’ (‘painted faces’) movement of 1992 that asked for the impeachment of 
then President Fernando Collor,
22
 the country had not seen any mass mobilization that took 
                                                                                                                                                        
rights checklist is 40 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 10 questions). The highest score that can be awarded to 
the civil liberties checklist is 60 (or a total score of 4 for each of the 15 questions). 
The scores from the previous survey edition are used as a benchmark for the current year under review. In 
general, a score is changed only if there has been a real world development during the year that warrants a 
change (e.g., a crackdown on the media, the country’s first free and fair elections) and is reflected accordingly in 
the narrative. 
In answering both the political rights and civil liberties questions, Freedom House does not equate constitutional 
or other legal guarantees of rights with the on-the-ground fulfillment of these rights. While both laws and actual 
practices are factored into the ratings decisions, greater emphasis is placed on the latter (Freedom House Org., 
2014). 
21
 Since the end of the dictatorial years, the country didn´t have great mass mobilizations. The exception were 
local and usually defined issues and, with a bigger frequency but not great numbers, union strikes and marches 
that claimed for better labor conditions, wages and rights.  
22
 The  ‘Caras Pintadas’ movement lead by the National Student Union (União Nacional de Estudantes-UNES-in 
its Portuguese origin), gathered thousands of people, mostly students and young civilians to ask for the 
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the streets to protest until the ones that swept the streets in June 2013. In the analyzed period 
(2011–13), it can be observed that the number of non-violent protests occurrences suffered an 
enormous increase. From only 28 non-violent protests in 2011, the country met its peak of 
peaceful demonstrations in 2013 with 400 occurrences. 
What motivated people to take the streets was manifold, but what sparked general commotion 
was the so-called ‘Movimento Passe Livre’ (MPL, ‘Free Pass Movement’). This movement 
had been advocating for free transport for students for many years and that lead the protests 
against a R$0.20
23
 transit-fee increase across the country (MPL, 2013). Nonetheless, the MPL 
was only the catalyst of the protests and soon the claims taking the streets were either aimed 
against the Brazilian State or the local Government.  
Table iv: Protests by type of claim- Brazil 
  Brazil 
Total Number of Protests 465 
# Housing 17 
# Education 0 
# Anti Government 189 
# Transport 53 
# Local Issue 185 
# Union 21 
 
During the investigated period Brazil received score 4 for both Amnesty International and US 
State Department accounts, compiled by the Political Terror Scale.
24
 Through this scale it 
was identified that for 2011 and 2012,
25
 “civil and political rights violations have expanded to 
large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of 
                                                                                                                                                        
impeachment of President Fernando Collor. The main dissatisfactions of the general public in relation to 
Collor´s government were the multiple corruption issues and unpopular economic policies. The name of the 
movement, ‘Caras Pintadas’ (‘Painted Faces’ in English) is such because their participants would paint their 
faces in green and yellow and sayings such as ‘For a’ (‘Out’ in English) and ‘Impeachement’   (Rohãn, 2012). 
23
 R$ 0.20 was averagely equivalent to US$ 0.09 in the first semester of 2013 (Money Convertor, 2013). 
24
 The criteria behind the PTS scale can be found on page 21. 
25
 Unfortunately, the Political Terror Scale does not present scores for the year 2013. 
Source: Folha de São Paulo (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013) 
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life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in 
politics or ideas” (PTS, 2014).  
This is partially supported by the many news accounts that exposed a disproportional degree 
of repression of non-violent demonstrations that could both symbolize a threat to the 
government or not.
26
 The original scale put forward by the present research is compatible 
with this view of repression of non-violent protests and in it Brazil was ranked as 
‘significantly repressive’ towards non-violent protests in 2013 and 2011 and as ‘not 
repressive’ in 2012. 
Table v: ‘Level of Represion’ of protests- Brazil 
Brazil 2011 2012 2013 
Total 
28 37 400 
No Repression 
19 35 278 
Mild Repression 
2 0 17 
Significant Repression 
8 2 103 
 
As it can be seen above, 103 out of 400 events were significantly repressed in 2013. This 
number (103) entries meets the 20% threshold for that year and, therefore, that year is 
considered to have been ‘significantly repressive’ towards peaceful demonstrations. Out of 
the demonstrations in 2011, eight out of 28 events were classified as ‘significantly 
repressive’, which also meets the threshold for that particular calendar year.  The two 
‘significantly repressed’ events that occurred in 2012 do not meet the threshold and this year 
is considered as ‘not repressive’. 
 All demonstrations that were met with repression involved the participation of the 
militarized police. According to the former Human Rights Minister for Brazil, Maria do 
                                                 
26 
In appendix b of this thesis is the full table with the compiled accounts of protests and their level of 
repression. 
Source: Folha de São Paulo (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013) 
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Rosário, the police model that still exists in Brazil is a vestige of the military dictatorship: 
‘we continue with a police model that we inherited from the dictatorship and the manuals 
with which the policemen are formed, as well as their training regarding people approach 
during demonstrations and in the streets, are a legacy of that regime’ (Rosario In Artigo 19, 
2014).
27
 Also, the training of the military police is not adequate to protest policing since they 
are embedded in a war like rationale. 
Tatsch (2010) builds on that argument by saying that the bargained transition allowed police 
institutions to stay in the margins of the transformations occurring in the country. 
Furthermore, Tatsch argues that the ‘militarized police are organized and trained like the 
Army, which has the purpose of destroying the enemy. Whereas the function of the police is 
to defend the citizens’ rights guaranteed by the Constitution’ (Tatsch, 2010).28  
In Brazil, the militarization of the police is also associated to the high levels of violence in the 
country. According to a report by the Violence Studies Research Center from the São Paulo 
University, on average 1185 people are killed during confrontations with the police in the 
states of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro alone (Carta Capital, 2013), and most police officers 
are never ‘prosecuted for abuses, and those charged are almost never convicted’ (Freedom 
House Org., 2014).  
Brazil’s in light of the three hypothesis 
This thesis has three hypothesis that will be further analysed on the section that follows the 
countries’ backgrounds. Nonetheless, it is important to briefly present each of the countries in 
light of these hypothesis. 
                                                 
27 Translated from the original in Portuguese: ‘Continuamos com um modelo de polícia que herdamos da 
ditadura e os manuais com os quais os policiais são formados, bem como as práticas de abordagem das 
pessoas nas manifestações e nas ruas, são resquícios daquele regime’ (Rosario In Artigo 19, 2014). 
28
 Translated from the original in Portuguese: ‘As polícias militares são organizadas como o Exército, que tem a 
função de destruir o inimigo. Já a função da polícia é defender os direitos existentes na Constituição’ (Tatsch, 
2010). 
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With regards to hypothesis 1 --“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for 
the repression of non- violent protests”— we found the following through some simple 
statistical analysis in SPSS: 
 
Table vi: SPSS Crosstabulation for Brazil (Brazil_LevelofThreat * 
Brazil_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation) 
Count 
 Brazil_LevelofRepression Total 
No Repression Mild Repression Significant 
Repression 
Brazil_LevelofThreat 
Not a Threat 244 15 73 332 
Mild Threat 66 1 27 94 
Significant Threat 23 3 13 39 
Total 333 19 113 465 
Source: SPSS 
 
After running some simple correlation for the Brazil cases, it was found that the correlation 
between the level of threat and the level of repression are not significant. Nonetheless, the 
Pearson coefficient met was .089 indicating that (although not significant) there is a positive 
relationship between the variables. 
29
 
In relation to hypothesis 2-- “Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non- 
violent protests in the new democratic regime”, as seen at the previous sections, not only the 
perpetrators and allied elites were not held accountable, but part of them still remain in 
powerful positions. Thus, this thesis gives a high score for elite continuity in Brazil. 
Finally, given Brazil’s presence of a Military Police force in its police structure, the fact that 
such body responds to the Army (not being under civilian control) and Brazil’s lack of 
accountability regarding past human rights violations, following the operationalization 
presented in a previous section, the country scores high in existence of a militarized police 
                                                 
29
 The SPSS output for this bivariate correlation can be found on this thesis’ appendix. 
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and lack of accountability which is part of hypothesis 3—“The existence of a militarized 
police increases the likelihood for the repression of non- violent protests. Such likelihood 
increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression 
under the authoritarian rule”. 
 
b.  Chile 
Antecedents of the authoritarian years 
As Brazil, the Republic of Chile is also young if compared to European nations, having 
gained its independence from Spain only in 1818. In its first century and a half the Republic 
enjoyed a democratic rule (Freedom House Org., 2000). However, such regime stability was 
also partially due to an overly centralized and verticalist political structure where mass 
politics was highly controlled from the higher offices in the country.  
Chile presented an anomaly in comparison to other democracies since its military forces 
historically had a great deal of autonomy. Furthermore, the country was controlled in the 
hands of few powerful families (elites). Such culture gradually increased the political 
polarization in Chilean society (Carruthers, 2001).  
The polarization intensified when, in 1970, Salvador Allende was elected, succeeding 
Eduardo Frei´s moderate presidency based on social and economic policies, and started to 
implement a government that shared aspects with socialism, which created great discontent 
amongst the elites. 
In time, it is relevant to note that, although Allende was elected in free and fair elections, he 
did not have a great deal of electorate support—he took office holding 36.2% of the votes 
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compared to 34.99% for the conservative candidate, in an election system where the winner 
would take it all and no second rounds were held (Bresnahan, 2002). 
Similar to what happen in Brazil, the anti-Marxist sentiment mobilized the elites and the 
military and, on September 11, 1973 a military coup overthrew the Allende government.  
Carruthers (2001) states that 
 
[C]lass and ideological positions hardened, making consensus difficult and 
coalitions less feasible. Instability peaked under Salvador Allende, elected 
president in 1970. Allende sought to increase mass support for his socialist 
project with an unprecedented effort to open space for broad citizen 
participation. However, in a climate of embedded verticalism and deepening 
class polarization, his gestures triggered radicalism across the spectrum. 
Leftist land and factory seizures prompted counter-mobilization in the centre 
[sic] and the right, plunging the country into economic decay, strikes, 
protests, guerrilla opposition, violence and militarization (Carruthers: 2001, 
p. 344). 
 
Dictatorship 
Faced with this chaotic scenario, the Military, led by General Augusto Pinochet took power 
to constrain popular conflict and restore normality. In order to achieve that the military 
regime  
undertook a forceful and radical restructuring of the Chilean polity, economy 
and society. Practicing the classic ‘politics of anti-politics’, the regime tightly 
closed political space and eliminated potential opposition, legitimizing 
repression as a necessary defense against communist subversion. Labour [sic] 
unions, civic associations and opposition parties were weakened or destroyed, 
their leaders killed, exiled or disappeared (Carruthers: 2001, p. 345). 
 
This regime proposed a neoliberal order and ideology for Chile and, in the social arena, 
released ten years of extreme repression that arbitrarily imprisoned and disappeared 
thousands of civilians suppressing the civic culture and reforming land and class dynamics 
according to the elites´ interests (McQuade, 1987). 
Pinochet  
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established iron control over the armed forces as well as the government, 
although insisting that they were separate entities. He made himself not only 
the chief executive of the state but also the commander in chief of the 
military. He shuffled commands to ensure that loyalists controlled all the key 
posts (Hudson, 1994). 
Compared to the case of the Brazilian dictatorship, the authoritarian years of Chile have 
received broader attention across the globe. This might be because of the more overt support 
from the US to the coup (Carruthers, 2001) and other variables that do not directly concern 
this research and thus, will not be addressed by this dissertation.  
Amongst one of the broadly known aspects of this dictatorship is the high rate of people that 
were killed, tortured and forced into exile by the violent actions of the carabineros (Chilean 
militarized police). The number of dead or missing surpassed 3000 people during the 
authoritarian years (BBC News, 2009; Wright, 2005; Folha de São Paulo, 2014).  
Furthermore, the junta (military government led by General Pinochet) suspended the 1925 
Constitution. All political dissidence was fiercely repressed and systematic human rights 
violations shocked the world (Stern, 2004).  
The first phase of the dictatorship (1973–75) was mainly destructive, aimed at 
rapid demobilization, depoliticization, and stabilization. The armed forces 
treated the members of the Popular Unity- UP-
30
 as an enemy to be 
obliterated, not just as an errant political movement to be booted from office. 
The military commanders closed Congress, censored the media, purged the 
universities, burned books, declared political parties outlawed if Marxist or in 
recess otherwise, and banned union activities (Hudson, 1994). 
Besides human rights violations, the regime held multiple social and economic reforms in the 
country and many of the current political and social characteristics of Chile were molded 
during the authoritarian years.  
Amongst the most controversial one was the reform of the educational system, which allowed 
education to be privatized and the quality of the overall public education to diminish 
                                                 
30
 Unidad Popular (UP in its Spanish acronym) was the biggest leftist coalition in Chile prior to the 
Authoritarian years. This coalition, composed by Marxist, Socialist and Communist parties supported Salvador 
Allende’s government and thus, were a threat to the Military regime (Collier & Sater, 1996). 
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significantly. Also, already feeling an increasing level of pressure from grassroots 
movements that had no leftist inclinations a new Constitution was constructed. 
Furthermore, another main reform of the Military regime was the agrarian reform. In order to 
break with any Socialist policy started in the Allende government,
31
 the Military redistributed 
large farms to influential and rich families allied with the regime (Jarvis, 1985). The overall 
aim was to concentrate power and resources on the hands of the Army and a few families. 
  
Transition Back to Democracy, Accountability and Elites 
In the southern cone of Latin America, and especially in the transition of […] 
Chile, the manner in which the first elected government has dealt with past 
human rights violations has been so entangled with political transition that it 
is difficult to talk about one without having to deal with the other (Correa: 
1991, p. 1455). 
 
Carruthers (2001) affirms that the strategy aimed at disarticulating civil mobilization ended 
up backfiring when, by trying to silence Marxists and leftists, the protest arena was emptied, 
which allowed new popular mobilizations to be born.  
The neoliberal state’s withdrawal from multiple social and economic 
activities further opened space for emerging citizen’s groups, as hundreds of 
grassroots organizations sought to fill the void with independent initiatives in 
education, health care, nutrition, microproduction, credit, and so on 
(Carruthers: 2001, p. 345). 
 
These new popular mobilizations started pressuring the regime that could no longer sustain 
its repression. Mass demonstrations took the streets asking for new elections. The 
Constitution of 1980 paved the path for a plebiscite held in 1988 that would decide whether 
Pinochet would have an eight year extension to his rule. Pinochet lost the plebiscite and was 
ousted in March 1990 (Bizarro, 2005; Arriagada, 1988). 
                                                 
31
 ‘At the time of the military coup, about 60 percent of Chile's irrigated land and 50 percent of total agricultural 
land was in control of the public sector. Land reform had started in the 1960s with expropriations of large 
landholdings (those larger than eighty basic irrigated hectares—BIH), and the encouragement of small farms 
(about 8.5 BIH) managed by their owners. The Allende administration favored large-scale farms under 
cooperatives and state-farm management over private ownership of agricultural land’ (Hudson, 1994). 
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Differently than the manner in which the transition and the bargaining process was done in 
Brazil, Chile was able to convict 76 perpetrators of human rights violations  soon after the 
return to democracy (Folha de São Paulo, 2014).  
As part of its transition process, an Amnesty Law was also approved but years later General 
Pinochet had an extradition request sent to England, where he resided, so that he would come 
back to Chile and face trial, along with other perpetrators. This was only possible because the 
immunity granted to them by the Amnesty Law was revoked. Nonetheless, in the end of the 
regime a great part of the elite was able to be included in the government and the carabineros 
were maintained (Carruthers: 2001, p. 346). 
Furthermore, in the bargaining process, a balance between judicial prosecution and the 
reform of the military was struck. ‘This balance, (they argued), helped guarantee the success 
of the Chilean transition by insulating the armed forces from overt political pressures’ 
(Hudson, 1994). 
Although a good effort was made to try to hold some perpetrators accountable and start the 
reconciliation process in the country, it is possible that some legacies of that time remain 
entrenched in the society, hurting the human rights of the Chilean people, especially in 
relation to their right to protest. These possible legacies must be revised in order for the 
country to fully enjoy and respect human rights (La Nación, 2013).  
Carruthers (2001) provides a sobering picture that indicates that  
 
[o]n the one hand, they demonstrate that threatened communities have been 
able to resuscitate a sense of participation, in spite of a depoliticized political 
climate. The environment is now a legitimate issue of public debate, firmly on 
the policy agenda. However, the law’s participatory mechanisms tend to 
exclude precisely the groups most directly affected by proposed 
developments. In practice, it remains largely a closed, negotiated process 
between the private sector and the ruling elite. The problem of agency capture 
is magnified by the absence of democratic channels and authentic pluralism. 
Environmental participation in Chile’s democracia de acuerdos has become 
instead an empty promise, masking incestuous co-operation between the state 
and the entrepreneurial interests, who typically see their projects approved 
along favoured [sic] lines (Carruthers: 2001, p. 351).  
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The authoritarian years brought economic development, but were also responsible for many 
human rights violations and for alienating the masses from politics and from power, that 
remained in the hands of a few elites.  
As they were before the end of the Authoritarian rule, Carruthers (2001, p. 353) states that 
“politics in Chile is extremely elitist both in structure and in practice. A handful of leading 
lights from each party [controls] the political proceedings, setting the agenda and paying only 
tactical heed to the opposition and even less to the human rights and other social 
movements”. 
Regarding elites, Chile has an interesting dynamic. Although it is not so common, the country 
has examples of business and politics being mixed: former President, Sebastián Piñera and 
his family are amongst Chilean main elites and, apart from formal involvement with politics, 
he was also an owner of a television network, is a big shareholder of Chile’s main industries 
and also owns a football club (El País, 2014).  
Masonic lodges and other social/political groupings controlled by elites also exercise 
significant control of the business environment. Nonetheless, it cannot be affirmed that elites 
would have a very strong influence on the response of non-violent demonstrations since, as 
Hudson (1994) argues: ‘with the return to democracy, social organizations recovered the 
ability to pressure Congress and the national government’. Furthermore, 
the new government opted for explicit solicitation of the opinions of 
important interest associations on some of the policies it was considering. It 
also fostered negotiations between top labor and business leaders over issues 
such as labor law reforms, minimum wage and pension levels, and overall 
wage increases for public employees. These negotiations led to several 
national agreements between state officials and business and labor leaders, 
thereby inaugurating a new form of top-level bargaining previously unknown 
in Chile (Hudson, 1994). 
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Thus, although elites in Chile still play a role in influencing policies (even those contrary to 
popular interests) as we will see more clearly in the next section, elites of this country are not 
considered to have largely remained in power  for the purposes of this analysis. 
 Protests and the Police 
The government tries to defeat the social protest in order to artificially sustain 
a domination model that is profoundly cracked and that the great majority of 
the population rejects (Silva, 2010).
32
  
This quote reflects the desire of the remaining elite to control the popular demonstrations, 
reproducing a lighter model of dominance over the civil rights of the Chilean people.   
As presented by the previous section, since the dictatorship years, there was little or no 
expressive mass mobilization and, straight after the end of the military regime any minor 
protest would be ‘discretely’ dismantled. Little attention was given to demonstrations in 
Chile until 2006, when thousands of high school students took the streets in the called 
‘Penguins Revolution’ that had few mildly violent clashes with Chilean gendarmerie forces 
(uniformed national police body), the carabineros, and that was terminated in three months 
(La Tercera, 2006).  
Overall Chile’s experience with democracy after the authoritarian regime can be observed 
through the Freedom House (2013) scale:
33
  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32
 Translated from the original in Portuguese: “O governo tenta derrotar o protesto social para sustentar 
artificialmente um modelo de dominação profundamente rachado e que a imensa maioria da população rechaça” 
(Silva, 2001). 
33
 The methodology for the Freedom House scores can be found on the Brazil section on page 38 of this thesis. 
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Figure ii: Freedom Score- Chile (2001-2013) 
 
After the ‘Penguins Revolution’ the only demonstrations that drew attention were, again, the 
students’ revolt that started in 2011 (Gideon, 2011). Many social organizations and unions 
were together in this historical string of protests that lasted more than five months and 
demanded improvements in the education system (Silva, 2011). 
Those protests were commonly met with tear gas and water cannons and marked the recent 
political history of Chile (Gideon, 2011). Some media reports compared the type of 
repression the students were suffering with the one committed thirty years ago during the 
dictatorship (La Diaria, 2011).  
Overall, as it can be observed further below, ‘Education’ was the main claim behind the 
demonstrations in the country in the three analyzed years, and that happened because the 
quality of education in the country fell while the tuition fees went up and some unpopular 
policies were being taken in relation to education. Students, professors and families 
advocated for a deep and comprehensive reform of education in the country (La Nación, 
2013).  
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After the first demonstrations started to attract large portions of the young population, and the 
elites began to fear what it could represent, the government tried to pass a prohibition of 
protests that was called Hinzpeter Law (named after President Piñera’s main supporter 
Rodrigo Hinzpeter, Minister of Interior), and this law was approved. The students and lower 
classes of the population continued to denounce the excessive repression practiced by the 
carabineros, under the command of government leaders, which are members of the political 
and industrial elites of the country (Martinez, 2011). Such disproportional repression caught 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ attention that criticized the  
disproportional force used against the students, which included horses and 
water cannons. [And the Commission] reaffirmed that the right to protest and 
the freedom of expression are fundamental rights and that the use of force in 
protests must be only used in exceptional occasions (La Nación, 2011).
34
 
The second largest claim, in absolute numbers of protests, is ‘Local issue’ which, in the case 
of Chile was very much connected to polemic policies towards energy at the Argentinian 
border. 
Table vii: Protests by type of claim- Chile 
  Chile 
Total Number of Protests 91 
# Housing 4 
# Education 46 
# Anti Government 9 
# Transport 2 
# Local Issue 26 
# Union 4 
 
                                                 
34
 Free translation from the original in Spanish “La Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos también 
criticó la desproporcionada fuerza utilizada contra los estudiantes, que incluyó caballos y carros lanza agua. 
Recordó que el derecho de manifestación y la libertad de expresión son fundamentales y que el uso de la fuerza 
en las protestas “debe ser excepcional” (La Nacíon, 2011). 
Source: La Nación (01/01/2011-31/12/2013) 
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During the observed period, Chile received score 2 for both Amnesty International and US 
State Department accounts on the political terror scale, compiled by PTS (2013)
35
. Through 
this scale it was identified that for 2011 and 2012,
36
 “there was a limited amount of 
imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and 
beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare” (Political Terror Scale, 2013). 
Such levels of repression are not fully compatible with the observance of many news 
accounts compiled at the original ranking put together by this research that found that, for 
2011 there was overall ‘significant repression’ against non-violent demonstrations (10 out of 
28 events, meeting and surpassing the threshold of 20%), especially the ones that advocated 
better education and that could be interpreted as being a threat to the government.
37
 The years 
of 2012 and 2013 were coded as being overall ‘not repressive’ towards non-violent 
demonstrations.  
Table viii: ‘Level of Repression’ of protests- Chile 
Chile 2011 2012 2013 
Total 28 32 31 
No Repression 15 22 24 
Mild Repression 3 9 5 
Significant 
Repression 10 1 2 
 
Although almost 70% of all protests in Chile between 2011 and 2013 had ‘non repressive’ 
responses from the police, in over 14% of the entries the carabineros ‘significantly repressed’ 
the non-violent demonstrations.   
The carabineros are a police force that have as their main mission the maintenance of order 
and the rule of law in the country. Originally they are under the control of the Ministry of 
                                                 
35
 Information on the criteria for the Political Terror Scale can be found on page 21. 
36
 Unfortunately, the Political Terror Scale does not present scores for year 2013. 
37
 The full compiled scale can be found in the appendix of the thesis. 
Source: La Nación (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013) 
 
 
54 
 
National Defense (headed by the armed forces
 
),
38
 have their own Undersecretariat at the 
Ministry, and, although in 2011 they started to officially report to the Ministry of the Interior 
and Public Security in an effort to distance the carabineros’ control from the three branches 
of the armed forces, this paramilitary force remains to be considered as a branch of the Army 
(Hudson, 1994). This is especially so because this uniformed police, besides not being under 
civilian judicial scrutiny, follows a military-like training in which it is trained to combat the 
“enemy” and not to protect the rights of civilians (Hudson, 1994). 
Chile in light of the three hypothesis 
With regard to hypothesis 1 --“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the 
repression of non- violent protests”— we found the following through some simple statistical 
analysis in SPSS: 
 
Table ix: SPSS Crosstabulation for Chile (Chile_LevelofThreat * 
Chile_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation) 
Count 
 Chile_LevelofRepression Total 
No Repression Mild Repression Significant 
Repression 
Chile_LevelofThreat 
Not a Threat 41 14 2 57 
Mild Threat 16 3 11 30 
Significant Threat 4 0 0 4 
Total 61 17 13 91 
Source: SPSS 
 
 Some simple statistics showed that the correlation between the level of threat and the level of 
repression are not significant. Nonetheless, for the Chilean cases, the Pearson coefficient was 
                                                 
38
 Ministério de Defensa Nacional in the original name in spanish. 
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.184, which means that, while not significant, there is a positive relationship between the 
variables.
39
  
In relation to hypothesis 2-- “Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non- 
violent protests in the new democratic regime”--, Chile is scored as medium with relation to 
elite continuity, since it would be too much of a stretch to connect current elites and their 
interests to the repression of peaceful events and the interests of the authoritarian years. 
With regards to hypothesis 3--“The existence of a militarized police increases the likelihood 
for the repression of non- violent protests. Such likelihood increases if there was a lack of 
accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”--, 
in order to assess the appropriate score for the existence of a militarized police and the 
intervening factor of having held perpetrators accountable, this thesis considered the judicial 
prosecutions related to the military years and the current carabineros structure in the police 
force. Thus, with regards to these variables, Chile is scored as medium since it has held its 
perpetrators accountable, but presents an active police force that it is not effectively under 
Civilian control. 
 
c.  Uruguay 
Antecedents to Authoritarian Years 
The Republic of Uruguay was proclaimed in 1828 and, different to the experiences of Brazil 
and Chile, after its institution, the country experienced decades of revolts and internal conflict 
before enjoying some stability in the beginning of the 20th century (Bielous, 2000). 
                                                 
39
 The SPSS output for this bivariate correlation can be found on this thesis’ appendix.  
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Two parties—Colorado and Blanco—competed for power since their inception and had their 
fiercest battle in polls during the 1950s and 60s when the economic situation in the country 
was deteriorating. During those decades the leftist insurgency—called the Tupamaros 
National Liberation Front—intensified, causing civil unrest and a strengthening of the 
conservative elite. In order to contain the Tupamaros the military organized a coup d’état in 
1973 (Freedom House Org., 2013). 
Dictatorship 
The regime had a rather peculiar characteristic. It had the support of the then Uruguayan 
President, Juan María Bordaberry that wanted to restore the normal state of social and 
economic settings. Together with the Military he closed the Senate and the Lower Chamber. 
A couple of years later the President dissolved all parties, but the Military rejected that and a 
conflict inside the regime itself was created (Bielous, 2000). 
The Military withdrew their support from Bordaberry, who then had no choice but to let his 
Vice President, Alberto Demicheli, take office. Under Demicheli the Institutional Acts 1 and 
2 were passed, giving all power to the Military and imposing a strict curfew.  
At the time, Uruguay was internationally known as the ‘torture chamber of Latin America’ 
because of its large number of arbitrary imprisonments and for having, at the time, the 
highest proportion of political prisoners in the region (Amnesty International, 1979). 
In 1980 the regime sensed that it was losing power, especially because they were losing 
support from the few existing industrial elites since the economy was not performing as 
desired. The Military felt the need to legitimize their rule in order to maintain the head office 
so they proposed a constitutional plebiscite. This plebiscite was rejected by 56% of the 
population of Uruguay, which allowed the reopening of the political arena and political 
debate to resurface (Bielous, 2000). 
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The regime had its end in 1984, when presidential elections were allowed and Julio María 
Sanguinetti of the Colorado Party, who had Military support and close connections to the 
elites, won (Caetano & Rilla, 1987).  
Transition back to Democracy, Accountability and Elites 
The connection between the newly elected President and the Military allowed the 1986 
Amnesty Law, which was also called ‘Expiry Law’, to be approved. According to Freedom 
House (2013), this law “granted members of the armed forces immunity for human rights 
violations committed during the years of dictatorship”. Furthermore, the law allowed the 
Executive, and not the Judicial branch, to decide which cases would go to trial. 
In a similar way to Brazil, during the negotiations to restore democracy many bargains were 
made, some of which did not allow for a thorough accountability of the perpetrators. 
Moreover, just like Brazil,  
[d]ue to the negotiated transition to electoral democracy, civilian political 
elites approached the transitional dilemma of balancing normative 
expectations and political contingency by promulgating legal immunity, for 
years avoiding initiatives to pursue trials or launch an official truth 
commission […] A constellation of national and transnational factors 
(including recurrent initiatives by social and political forces) eventually 
opened up new institutional ground for belated truth-telling and accountability 
for some historical wrongs—and yet, attempts to challenge the blanket legal 
impunity failed twice through popular consultation and in a recent 
parliamentary vote (Roniger: 2011, p. 693). 
 
After President José Mujica passed a law in 2011 to scrap Uruguay’s Amnesty Law, the 
Uruguayan Supreme Court ruled out his decision since it would have retroactive powers, 
which are incompatible with their Constitution (Roniger, 2011). Nonetheless, as mentioned 
above, there are loopholes in the Expiry Law that has allowed some high-ranking authorities 
to be prosecuted.   
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When in the 1990s (before Mujica`s time at the Presidency) another Colorado party 
candidate—Dr. Jorge Battle—was elected, the satisfactory economic situation allowed the 
party to discuss the implementation of an  
honest accounting of the human rights situation under the former military 
regime, while showing equally firm determination to reduce spending and 
privatize state monopolies. In 2001, crises in the rural economy and an 
increase in violent crime, as well as growing labor unrest, set off alarms in 
what was still one of Latin America’s safest countries (Freedom House Org., 
2013.)
40
 
Since the return to democracy, the country’s attempts at holding human rights violators 
during the Military years accountable lacked consistency. Since 2005 around 20 military men 
went to Court and were found guilty. Even former President Juan María Bordaberry was tried 
and convicted for crimes related to the kidnapping and killing of parliamentary leaders.
41
 
‘Mr. Bordaberry’s conviction notwithstanding, Uruguay has largely avoided prosecutions on 
the scale of Argentina or Chile, where hundreds of former military and police officialls have 
been tried for crimes against humanity’ (Garces, 2011)42.  
It is evident then, that although quite some progress was made regarding the accountability of 
the crimes committed during the Military regime, there is still some support for a revision and 
total annulment of the Amnesty Law. This movement got stronger with the 2011 
recommendation of the Inter-American Court that Uruguay should terminate the bill 
(Roniger, 2011). 
Regarding the country’s Truth Commissions, 
15 years passed in Uruguay before an official truth commission on past 
human rights violations was established in 2000 to draw up an authoritative 
and agreed-upon version of state crimes committed under the authoritarian 
dictatorship. This delay was more akin to Brazil’s experience, where a truth 
                                                 
40
Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/uruguay-0. Accessed February 12, 
2014. 
41
 Human rights organizations have that these killings are related to ‘Operación Condor’ (‘Operation Condor’), 
‘a secret pact between South America’s dictatorships to eliminate political opponents who had fled to 
neighboring countries’ (Garces, 2011). 
42
 Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/obituaries/former-uruguayan-dictator-juan-maria-
bordaberry-dies/2011/07/17/gIQAX54RKI_story.html.  Accessed February 12, 2014. 
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commission promised towards the end of the Lula government was finally 
announced by President Dilma Rousseff in 2011. Uruguay’s transitional path 
reflects the decision of the political class leading the process of re-
democratization to draw a line under the past without addressing normative 
expectations of truth and accountability, the initial success of these policies 
and the attempts by sectors of civil society to undo them. (Roniger: 2011, 
p.695) 
As with the other two study cases, but in a smaller scale, after the transition, parts of the 
Uruguayan elites managed to stay where they were before the coup and still have 
considerable say in policy making, although this is very limited to their field of influence (eg 
local trade) (Roniger, 2011). 
Different than what can be observed in other Latin American countries such as Brazil, 
Uruguayan politicians from the Conservative side ‘only rarely had business careers, apart 
from ranchers in the National Party. Rather, most made their living as lawyers and as public 
servants’, while ‘[t]he leaders of Uruguay's leftist parties were drawn from a somewhat 
wider spectrum of backgrounds than the Colorados and Blancos. Among the leaders of the 
former were many white-collar workers, especially educators, and a few labor union leaders’ 
(Hudson & Meditz, 1990). 
The leader of one of the most influential political parties of the country (the Colorado Party) 
and one of the main land owners of the country, Pedro Bordaberry, is the son of the 
authoritarian leader of the Uruguayan Dictatorship Juan Maria Bordaberry, convicted for his 
crimes. Pedro Bordaberry and his zone of influence control businesses worth over millions of 
euros and have great political influence, but they are, in reality, an exception in Uruguay and 
focus their influence in topics directly related to their businesses’ profit (Martinez, 2014). 
The biggest part of Uruguayan elites tend not to get overly involved with politics. ‘Compared 
with their counterparts on the Argentine pampas, Uruguay's latifundistas (large landholders) 
never achieved the same level of social and political preeminence’ (Hudson & Meditz, 1990).  
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Business elites were a bit more involved with national policies than landowners (although 
still in a smaller degree than in neighbouring countries), but since most industries were 
controlled by the State, there are not as many traditional families running business in the 
country as in other Latin American countries.  
Furthermore, ‘foreign multinational corporations were less active in Uruguay than in many 
other Latin American countries because of the small size of its domestic market’ (Hudson & 
Meditz, 1990).  
A specific kind of elite deserves special attention on the Uruguay case: the Armed Forces. 
‘As Uruguay returned formally to democratic rule in 1985, the armed forces continued to 
exercise a degree of tutelage over national affairs, despite their (official) depoliticized role’ 
(Hudson & Meditz, 1990). 
Some, such as Martin Weinstein (In Hudson & Meditz, 1990), believed that the Armed 
Forces would continue to exert an important influence over government, especially in relation 
to state actions on human rights and that the military could even ‘assume a tutelary role in 
areas such as economic policy and labor relations’. Contrary to this believe, the  influence of 
the armed forces’ elites in those two areas was not concretized (Hudson & Meditz, 1990). 
Taking this scenario into consideration, keeping in mind that business and some political 
elites in Uruguay had already distanced themselves from the military in the final years of the 
regime and adding the fact that modesty is ‘a quintessential Uruguayan trait’, exposed 
through its ‘Republican ideal of equality’ (El Pais, 2014), it is possible to argue that elite 
continuity in Uruguay has not been so clear since the return to democracy.  
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Protests and the Police 
Since the return to democracy there have been very few incidents of repression of non-violent 
protests. In reality there were very few social demonstrations that fall under the concept of 
non-violent demonstration put forward by this research, especially if compared to Brazil’s 
amount of events. The Uruguayan experience with democracy after the authoritarian years is 
exemplified through the Freedom House (2013) scale: 
Figure iii: Freedom Score- Uruguay (2001-2013) 
 
As it can be observed, the country is considered a full democracy by such scale and the 
overall population enjoys their civil and political rights. “Workers exercise their right to join 
unions, bargain collectively, and hold strikes.  Unions are well organized and politically 
powerful.  Strikes are sometimes marked by violent clashes and sabotage” (Freedom House 
Org., 2013).
43
 
                                                 
43
 More information on the criteria behind the Freedom House scores can be found on page 38 of this thesis. 
Freedom House Org., 2014. Available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/1999/uruguay. 
Accessed February 12, 2014.  
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For the observed period, namely 2011–2013, the PTS has given the country score 1 which 
means that Uruguay is “under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, 
and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare” (Political Terror 
Scale, 2012).
44
 
Delgado (2011) explains that Uruguay has been living a long siesta
45
 of demonstrations and 
that it was very unlikely that the country would have massive scale protests, because there is 
very little vertical and horizontal contagion of popular dissatisfactions and because the elites 
have a good control of the country’s general atmosphere (Delgado, 2011).  
For the period under analysis—January 2011 to December 2013—the only evident incidents 
of clashes with the government were related to protests organized by labor classes and 
unions. Moreover there is the indication that the small number of clashes that were met with 
some repression involved the interests of business elites. 
Table x: Protests by type of claim- Uruguay  
  Uruguay 
Total Number of Protests 25 
# Housing 0 
# Education 2 
# Anti Government 8 
# Transport 0 
# Local Issue 7 
# Union 8 
 
Santos (2013) believes that we might observe a change on this rather small number of 
demonstrations since there is a ‘trend’ of new social fights surfacing especially in the worker 
class (mining, infrastructure and commodities industries), but that will depend on their 
                                                 
44
 More information on the criteria behind the PTS can be found on page 21. PTS, 2014. Available at: 
http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/about.php. Accessed February 12, 2014.  
45
 A ‘siesta’ is the popular name given to a short nap taken mostly after lunch time in some Latin countries.  
Source: La Diaria (01/01/2011-31/12/2013) 
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capacity to bring the problems from the industries to the cities, articulate their claims with 
other unions and society strata and work around the elites’ interests.  
The independent scale compiled by this research finds a result very similar to the scores 
presented by PTS and Freedom House Organization. Following this thesis’ criteria for the 
level of repression, Uruguay presents a ‘not repressive’ response in all three years analysed. 
As it can be observed from the table below, no demonstration was significantly repressed 
during the analyzed years and the large majority of the events (24 out of 25 events in total) 
had no repression at all. Nonetheless, parts of the society are concerned with some isolated 
events of police repression of civil rights committed on the basis of the Police Procedures 
Law, which allows the Police to use force with little or no judicial control and is considered 
unconstitutional by many (La Diaria, 2013). 
Table xi: ‘Level of Repression’ of protests- Uruguay 
Uruguay 2011 2012 2013 
Total 3 2 20 
No Repression 3 2 19 
Mild Repression 0 0 1 
Significant Repression 0 0 0 
 
With regards to the police structure of the country, the Uruguayan National Police is 
structured differently than what was observed with the two other cases. Namely, it reports to 
the Ministry of Interior, indicating that it is under civilian control (Andrade, 1985). Besides 
that,  
[t]he government has effective mechanisms to investigate and punish abuse 
and corruption. The armed forces under the Ministry of National Defense are 
responsible for external security and have some domestic responsibilities as 
guardians of the outside perimeter of six prisons. There were no reports of 
Source: La Diaria(01/01/2011-31/12/2013) 
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impunity involving the police and security forces during 2012 (US State 
Department, 2012).  
  
Civilian control was made clear with the 1980 Constitution. Article 168 gave the Uruguayan 
President, through the Minister of Interior, the responsibility for the public order 
maintenance, while Article 173 gave the President the power to nominate the Head of 
different police departments, following a different approach than the one traditionally 
observed in the Armed Forces (Uruguay Government, 1980).  
Although there is no militarized police acting on the traditional control of the rule of law, the 
Uruguayan police structure includes two paramilitary police bodies: the Republican Guard 
and the Metropolitan Guard. Both are located at the capital, Montevideo, and have tasks 
related to guard duties and ceremonial events. Nonetheless, both might be summoned for the 
support of the regular police in case a given situation (violent riot etc.). These bodies have 
equipment suited for confrontational situations that the regular police who oversee daily life 
do not possess (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989; Ingleton, 1979; English, 
1994).  
Uruguay in light of the three hypothesis 
In relation to hypothesis 1 --“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the 
repression of non- violent protests”— we found the following through some simple statistical 
analysis in SPSS: 
Table xii: SPSS Crosstabulation for Uruguay (Uruguay_LevelofThreat * 
Uruguay_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation) 
 
 
 Uruguay_Level
ofRepression 
Uruguay_Level
ofThreat 
Uruguay_LevelofRepressio
n 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.089 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.672 
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N 25 25 
Uruguay_LevelofThreat 
Pearson Correlation -.089 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .672 
 
N 25 25 
                                                                                              Source: SPSS 
 
As with the other two study cases, the correlation between the level of threat and the level of 
repression is not significant. Interestingly enough, different than what was observed with the 
cases of Brazil and Chile, the Pearson coefficient found for the Uruguayan cases was -.089, 
which indicates that, while not significant, there is a negative relationship between the 
variables.
46
  
With regards to hypothesis 2-- “Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non- 
violent protests in the new democratic regime”--, this thesis understands that there is an 
average elite interest in influencing (or standard actual capability of influence) and, thus, has 
given Uruguay’s elite continuity a medium score.   
Following the scoring criteria provided for independent variable ‘existence of a militarize 
police’ and for intervening variable ‘lack of accountability’ and taking into consideration 
Uruguay’s police structure and the path taken so far towards transitional justice, Uruguay is 
scored as low in variables related to hypothesis 3 ---“The existence of a militarized police 
increases the likelihood for the repression of non- violent protests. Such likelihood increases 
if there was a lack of accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the 
authoritarian rule”--. 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 The SPSS output for this bivariate correlation can be found on this thesis’ appendix.  
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V. ANALYSIS OF HYPOTHESES  
Taking into consideration the broad historical and political similarities that Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay share, the standard theory regarding protest and repression declares that these 
countries should respond in similar ways to similar challenges. Nonetheless, this is not what 
was observed between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013.  
Based on the criteria developed by this thesis,
47
 in 2011 Brazil and Chile were considered to 
be ‘significantly repressive’ towards non-violent protests while Uruguay was considered as 
‘not repressive’.48 2012 was considered as an overall ‘not repressive’ year towards 
demonstrations in all three countries.
49
 Finally, in 2013 it is only Brazil that is no longer in 
the ‘not repressive’ category, being considered ‘significantly repressive’ due to its actions 
towards non-violent demonstrations.
50
 
In order to attempt to understand this variation in the level of repression between the cases, 
this thesis set out to test one hypothesis present in established literature around the topic and 
two other hypotheses related to possible subtle political legacies in the countries. The 
following table provides a summary for the level of repression (dependent variable) and this 
thesis’ findings can be seen further below: 
                                                 
47‘Significantly repressive’ year  ≥ 20% of all entries for the calendar year being labelled as ‘significantly 
repressive’. If the ‘significantly repressive’ threshold is not met, the second threshold is for the ‘mildly 
repressive’ behavior which has to meet ≥ 33% of the total number of protests of a given year under the ‘mild 
repression’. Finally, if none of these thresholds are met, a given year will be considered as being ‘non- 
repressive’. The same thresholds are used when establishing the overall level of repression of a given country 
for the whole observed period.  
As a reminder, this thesis considered as ‘not repressive’ those protests that were met by no coercive tactics and 
in which there were no injuries/ arrests. The ‘mild repression’ category was used when there was either the use 
of coercive tactics or there were injuries/ arrests. Finally, protests coded as being ‘significantly repressive’ were 
the ones in which coercive tactics were used and in which there was the occurrence of injuries and/or arrests 
and/or deaths.   
48
 2011 was coded as an overall ‘significantly repressive’ year for Brazil and Chile because eight out of the 28 
protests in Brazil and ten out of 28 protests in Chile on that year were ‘significantly repressed’, meeting the 
threshold of 20%. On the same year, Uruguay responded ‘non-repressively’ to all of its three protests.   
49
 In 2012, none of the countries met the threshold for being considered as ‘significantly repressive’ or ‘mildly 
repressive’.   
50
 In 2013 Brazil ‘significantly repressed’ 103 of its 400 events, meeting once again the threshold. 
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Table xiii: ‘Level of Repression’ per year and country  
 Level of Repression 
Country 2011 2012 2013 Overall 
Brazil Sig. Repression No Represion Sig. Repression Sig. Repression 
Chile Sig. Repression No  Repression No Repression No Repression 
Uruguay No Repression No Repression No Repression No Repression 
 
 Hypothesis 1—“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of 
non-violent protests”. 
Based on the data collected from the three news media sources (Folha de São Paulo for 
Brazil; La Nación for Chile; and La Diária for Uruguay), an SPSS crosstabs and simple 
bivariate correlation were performed in order to allow us to observe the relationship between 
the level of threat
51
 that the demonstrations represented to the government and the level of 
repression that they received. The following tables provide an interesting overview of the 
data collected: 
Table xiv: ‘No Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’  
No Repression Brazil    Chile   Uruguay 
Total Occurrence 333 61 24 
Number of 'Not a Threat' Protests that suffered ‘No 
Repression’ 244 41 20 
Number of 'Mild Threat' Protests that suffered ‘No 
Repression’ 66 16 4 
Number of ' Significant Threat' Protests that suffered ‘No 
Repression’ 23 4 0 
 
 
                                                 
51
 The operationalization of the independent variable ‘level of threat’ was presented on the operationalization 
section. In any case, ‘no threat’ protest= 1st–122nd protest with the same claim in a given year and between 1–
1000 people in a single event; ‘mild threat’ protest= 123th–365th protest with the same claim in a given year 
and between 1–1000 people in a single event, or 1st–12th protest with the same claim in a given year and 
between 1001–100,000 people in a single event; ‘significant threat’ protest= 13th or higher protest (coded as 
mild threat) with the same claim in a given year and between 1001–100,000 people in a single event, or 366th or 
higher protest with the same claim in a given year with between1–1000 people in a single event, or any given 
protest has more than or equal to 100,001 people in a single event. 
 
Source: Folha de São Paulo; La Nación; La Diaria  (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013) 
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Table xv: ‘Mild Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’  
Mild Repression Brazil Chile Uruguay 
Total Occurrence 19 17 1 
Number of 'Not a Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Mild 
Repression’ 15 14 
 
1 
Number of 'Mild Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Mild 
Repression’ 1 3 
 
0 
Number of ' Significant Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Mild 
Repression’ 3 0 
 
0 
 
 
Table xvi: ‘Significant Repression’ of protests and ‘Level of Threat’  
Significant Repression Brazil Chile Uruguay 
Total Occurrence 113 13 0 
Number of 'Not a Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Significant 
Repression’ 73 2 
 
0 
Number of 'Mild Threat' Protests that suffered ‘Significant 
Repression’ 27 11 
 
0 
Number of 'Significant Threat' Protests that suffered 
‘Significant Repression’ 13 0 
 
0 
 
Let us start by observing Brazil´s examples: out of the 39 protests coded under ‘significant 
threat’, 13 were ‘significantly repressed’, three were ‘mildly repressed’ and 23 were ‘not 
repressed’, while out of the 332 protests coded as ‘not a threat’, 73 were ‘significantly 
repressed’, 15 were ‘mildly repressed’ and 244 suffered ‘no repression’. This indicates that 
hypothesis 1 cannot be completely accepted, given that ‘significant threatening’ protests 
received ‘no repression’, while ‘not threatening’ protests were ‘significantly repressed’. 
Chile’s accounts support this difficulty in completely accepting hypothesis 1, since 14 of their 
‘non-threatening’ protests encountered ‘mild repression’, while all four of its ‘significantly 
threatening’ events suffered ‘no repression’.  
For its part, Uruguay also has examples that fail to offer support for this hypothesis: all four 
of their ‘mildly threatening’ demonstrations received ‘no repression’ at all.  
Source: Folha de São Paulo; La Nación; La Diaria  (01/01/2011- 31/12/2013) 
Source: Folha de São Paulo; La Nación; La Diaria  (01/01/2011- 31/12/2014) 
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The following table provides an overview of this imperfect relationship. Both the 
independent variable (level of threat, named as LevelofThreat_all3countries on the table 
below), the dependent variable (level of repression, named as 
LevelofRepression_all3countries on the table below) can be observed: 
Table xvii: SPSS Crosstabulation for all three countries (LevelofThreat_all3countries * 
LevelofRepression_all3countries Crosstabulation) 
Count 
 LevelofRepression_all3countries Total 
No Repression Mild Repression Significant 
Repression 
LevelofThreat_all3countries 
Not a Threat 305 30 75 410 
Mild Threat 86 4 38 128 
Significant Threat 27 3 13 43 
Total 418 37 126 581 
      Source: SPSS 
Thus, it is clear that not all the totality of protests that represented ‘significant threats’ were 
‘significantly repressed’, while not all ‘non-threatening’ demonstration were met by a lack of 
repression, indicating that the relationship between the threat of a protest and the repression it 
suffers is not perfectly proportional. This is not to say that the hypothesis is completely 
invalid. In order to further evaluate hypothesis 1, a simple correlation between the level of 
threat of protests and the level of repression was ran on SPSS. The following table presents 
the findings: 
Table xviii: SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ 
 LevelofThreat_all
3countries 
LevelofRepressio
n_all3countries 
LevelofThreat_all3countries 
Pearson Correlation 1 .106* 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .010 
N 581 581 
LevelofRepression_all3countri
es 
Pearson Correlation .106* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010  
N 581 581 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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The above table shows the results for all countries tested together. The Pearson correlation 
coefficient, which indicates the strength of a given relationship, can vary between -1 and 1, 
ranging respectively from a perfectly negative relationship (which in this case would be: the 
less threatening a protest is, the more severely it will be repressed) to a perfectly positive 
relationship (which in this hypothesis would mean: the more threatening a protest is, the 
greater the repression). 
The Pearson’s correlation coefficient for this relationship is .106, meaning that there is a 
minor positive relationship between the level of threat of a given protest and the level of 
repression it receives. The table also shows that this result is statistically significant at the 
five per cent significance level (2-tailed), which strengthens the findings reached from the 
calculation.  
Thus, the assumption that the higher the level of threat, the higher the level of repression, is 
strengthened. It is important to point out, nonetheless, that Pearson’s correlation coefficient 
does not present the actual direction of relationship, which means that the relationship could 
also be: the higher the level of repression, the higher the level of threat.  
At the individual country level, the correlations between the level of repression and the level 
of threat were not found to be significant at the five per cent level (2-tailed). Nonetheless, 
taken together, the SPSS findings for all three countries and the qualitative analysis done 
above allow us to partially accept hypothesis 1—“The higher the level of threat, the higher 
the likelihood for the repression of non-violent protests”. Furthermore, although it is intuitive 
to assume that costs and benefits will be taken into consideration when a given government is 
choosing whether or not to repress a non-violent demonstration, in reality this hypothesis 
(although accepted) plays a smaller role than expected. 
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Hypothesis 2—“Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests 
in the new democratic regime” 
The following table summarizes the aforementioned dependent (level of repression) and 
independent (elite continuity) variables: 
Table xix: Summary of ‘Elite Continuity score and overall ‘Level of Represision’ 
Country Elite Continuity Score Overall Level of Repression 
Uruguay Medium ‘Not Repressive’ 
Chile Medium ‘Not Repressive’ 
Brazil High ‘Significantly Repressive’ 
 
This hypothesis is somewhat connected to the one before since there is a “view that police 
response to protest is a reaction to the threats directed at elites’ political and financial 
interests”. Therefore there is “continued relevance of elite interests in shaping some element 
of police response to collective gatherings” (Warner & McCarthy: 2013, p.2). 
The deals cut when each of country was going through the re-democratization process 
guaranteed that key people, families and groups remained in power. Furthermore there is 
some indication that the continuity of elites in and around the government has a relationship 
with the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests in democracies. 
The reason behind it is simple: elites would incite support or/and allow the repression of non-
violent demonstrations if their interests were being jeopardized or targeted by the 
demonstrations.  
 As observed in the tables presented above, Uruguay has the smallest number of protests 
(only 25 incidents) and repression (only one case of ‘mild repression’ and no case of 
‘significant repression’), having an overall score of ‘no repression’ for the years observed. 
Nonetheless, in relation to this specific independent variable (elite continuity) the country 
scored as medium given that a part of the Uruguayan elites were able to maintain their 
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powerful positions in government and in society as a whole, although being rather limited to 
their field of influence (Roniger, 2011). 
For its part, Chile also scored medium for elite continuity as some big industrialist groups and 
traditional ruling elites managed to maintain at least part of their influence. Moreover they 
highly benefit from the status quo of some of the claims raised by protests (especially the 
ones pro-education), and likely have been affected by the recent protests. Nonetheless, 
differently than Uruguay, Chile has presented a more repressive response to its protests, 
having been scored as ‘significantly repressive’ in 2011 although it the country fits in the 
overall ‘not repressive’ level of the scale.  
On the other hand, Brazil shows a great degree of elite continuity in decision making and 
other influential positions, both in the government and in society (especially in the three most 
economically important states: Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and São Paulo). Furthermore, 
some of the military were reabsorbed in the re-democratization process—part of them still 
hold senior positions in the government, including in areas related to public security, which 
allows Brazil to be scored as having a high level of elite continuity. Given that some of the 
elites that managed to remain had influence over police policies and that Brazil presented an 
overall ‘significantly repressive’ response to protest, it is possible to suspect that the 
hypothesis that “elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests 
in the new democratic regime” has some validity.  
Nonetheless, overall this hypothesis cannot be fully accepted nor can it be completely 
dismissed in light of the evidence found, since countries that have been scored at the same 
level of elite continuity (Chile and Uruguay with a medium score) have presented distinct 
levels of repression across the years. At the same time, the country that scored the highest 
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with regards to this variable—Brazil—indeed had the highest degree of repression, both in 
absolute numbers as well as proportionally.     
Elite continuity seems to have an impact, and the fact that there are no cases of “low 
continuity” means that isolating this effect is unfeasible. Indeed, it appears that there is more 
evidence for the acceptance of this hypothesis than against it: Brazil has high elite continuity, 
and the highest repression (both in absolute number and proportionally) out of the three 
cases. Chile has some continuity of powerful people, and although being labelled as generally 
‘not repressive’, it has also been scored as ‘significantly repressed’ in 2011. Uruguay has 
medium but weak elite continuity, and the least repression. It might be the case that level of 
influence of these elites matter more than the level of elite continuity itself, nonetheless it 
would be premature to reach this conclusion now.  
Thus, in order to fully positively support this hypothesis, much more research on the (pre- 
and post-military dictatorship) elite and government composition and spheres of power would 
be requested, especially because the influence of non-government officials in policy making 
is hard to be tested.  At this point, it would be irresponsible to either confirm or dismiss this 
hypothesis completely, but it is important that this is considered as a piece of the puzzle 
around the repression of protests.  
In any case, a great deal of caution is recommended in case one tries to expand it to other 
countries and time periods as the dynamics between these elites, government and society 
might be different and it is rather complex trying to identify which families and individuals 
actively control which arena. 
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Hypothesis 3—“The existence of a militarized police increases the likelihood for the 
repression of non-violent protests. Such likelihood increases if there was a lack of 
accountability regarding the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule” 
The following table provides a summary of the score of each country in relation to the 
independent and intervening varibles (existence of a militarized police and accountability, 
respectively) and the dependent variable (level of repression): 
 
Table xx: Summary of ‘Existence of a Militarized Police/ Lack of Accountability score 
and overall ‘Level of Represision’ 
Country Existence of a Militarized 
Police/ Lack of 
Accountability 
Overall Level of Repression 
Uruguay Low ‘Not Repressive’ 
Chile Medium ‘Not Repressive’ 
Brazil High ‘Significantly Repressive’ 
 
There is general support in the case studies for the relationship between the existence of a 
militarized police and the repression of non-violent protests.  
Both the carabineros in Chile and the Policia Militar
52
 in Brazil (the uniformed militarized 
police forces of those countries) have been denounced by Amnesty International and the Inter 
American Commission on Human Rights for their excessive use of force when handling 
protests. 
The main issue with having this type of police-- such as the gendarmeries and other 
militarized police forces-- as the main law enforcement unit of a country is that they are 
trained under the mentality of confrontation and not respectful civic policing. Furthermore, in 
practice these police forces are not under full control of civilian bodies and do not even 
respond to civilian judicial courts.   
                                                 
52
 Military Police in free translation to english. 
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In both of the countries with militarized police, we observe that even some of the non-violent 
protests that represented ‘no threat’ were ‘significantly repressed’ by the gendarmeries of 
Brazil and Chile, confirming their unsuitability to handle non-violent protests. Their abuse of 
force is evident across both countries.  
Meanwhile, the non-existence of a militarized police in Uruguay (which halted the military 
policing of civil activities, and now has a civil police force in charge of these activities),
53
 and 
the distinct lack of repression of Uruguayan demonstrations, suggests that having a high 
capacity to violently repress protests goes a long way in determining the level of repression 
inflicted.  
The evidence gathered from Brazil and Chile, enhanced by the strong indication of 
relationship presented by the Uruguayan experience, make a strong case for this hypothesis to 
be supported.   
Furthermore, 
societies that have undergone periods of civil unrest, repression and human 
rights violations often face a tortuous process of coming to terms with the 
legacy of atrocities. They hold contrasting views of what happened and find it 
difficult to reconstruct consensus, all the while debating whether and how to 
make those responsible accountable for their past deeds. Furthermore, they 
must decide whether to push for justice, ask forgiveness from the victims, 
require expiation from the perpetrators, select policies of compensation and 
material and moral reparations, and introduce plans to honour [sic] the 
memory of the dead, through which they may eventually reach a stage of 
reconciliation (Roniger: 2011, p. 264). 
 
Based on the argument in the quote and research presented in previous sections regarding the 
observed cases, we can point out that there is a satisfying level of evidence that supports the 
effects of the intervening variable (namely, the accountability in relation to crimes committed 
during the Authoritarian years) in the hypothesis. This is because the three cases had three 
                                                 
53
 And only summons the elite units mentioned in previous section in extreme cases. 
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different experiences with the accountability of the military years and also present different 
levels of repression of non-violent demonstrations. 
All three countries had Amnesty Laws, which allowed a conservative bargaining process to 
be done. However, despite of it Chile was able to convict a large number of its perpetrators, 
including its main leader Augusto Pinochet and had an early start (when compared to its 
South American counterparts) on the reconciliation process. Uruguay has not annulled its 
Amnesty Law as of yet, but was able to hold some of he Dictatorship’s perpetrators 
accountable and has had an active Truth Commission.  
At the other end of the spectrum is Brazil, which, despite International Organizations’ 
recommendations, is resistant to the revision and annulment of the Amnesty Law and only set 
up its Truth Commission in 2012 (largely so that it can maintain the protection of some of the 
ruling elites who got amnesty during the bargaining process).  The lack of accountability of 
past human rights violations committed by the Military provides the current (militarized) 
police with a sense of security that they answer to no one when it comes to prosecuting their 
wrongdoings. The logic is once again simple: the Military, in practice and on paper, answer 
only to themselves and, since no one was held accountable in the past, is very likely such 
impunity will repeat itself and the Military as well as the militarized police are free to commit 
any atrocity they see fit for their agenda and beliefs. Given that in Brazil the PMs are the ones 
involved in protest policing and they have this impunity mindset based on the lack of 
accountability of the Authoritarian years, they feel free to respond to protests in any manner 
they like.  
The difference between the three countries regarding the transition period, their police forces 
and their behavior regarding protests shed light on the fact that having a militarized police 
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might indeed increase the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests and not having 
proper accountability and transition process might aggravate such a relationship.  
As observed before, Uruguay had the least repressive responses to protests (‘not repressive’ 
in 2011, 2012 and 2013) and, with regards to militarized police and accountability, Uruguay 
scored low since it does not have a militarized police and has gone through a good deal of 
reconciliation process, including holding some past perpetrators accountable for their crimes 
during the Dictatorship, as was the case with former president Bordaberry. 
With regards to Chile, only in 2011 the country was considered as ‘significantly repressive’. 
In the two following years the country fell under the ‘not repressive’ category and, although 
Chile still has a militarized police that has disproportional violent responses to protests at 
times, the country’s efforts towards reconciliation make it receive medium as the score for 
‘the existence of a militarized police and accountability’.  
Finally, Brazil has made some recent progress towards reconciliation, such as the creation of 
the National Truth Commission. Nonetheless, the country was unable to bring to justice any 
of the perpetrators of its Dictatorship which makes the country score high in ‘the existence of 
a militarized police and accountability’. Out of the three, Brazil is the only one to have met 
the threshold for overall ‘significantly repressive’ response to non-violent protests twice, in 
2011 and 2012.
54
 
Taken together, it is possible to identify a certain relationship between a low score in ‘the 
existence of a militarized police and lack of accountability’ and the overall ‘no repression’ of 
protests in a country, such as it is the case of Uruguay. Furthermore, a medium score was also 
related to an overall ‘non-repressive’ behavior in Chile. Lastly, a high score in ‘the existence 
                                                 
54
 For the three years together, Brazil had a rate of 24.3% (out of a 465 total) events being ‘significantly 
repressed’, meeting the 20% threshold for a year (or the whole) period to be considered as ‘significantly 
repressive’.  
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of a militarized police and accountability’ corresponds to the most repressive of the three 
cases, as seen in the Brazil case.  
Thus, this hypothesis, and its intervening variable have strong support from the evidence put 
forward on this research, indicating that, although not perfect, there is a relevant relationship 
between the existence of a militarized police and the intervening variable, namely the lack of 
accountability. 
Put simply, the existence of a militarized police, influenced by the lack of accountability in 
relation to past human rights violations, is related to an increase in the likelihood of a protest 
being repressed. Nonetheless, it is important to point out that the exact degree of this 
relationship is hard to evaluate. 
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VI. FINAL REMARKS 
The relationship between regime type, repression and protests has received a lot of scholarly 
attention, however, the literature on the repression of non-violent protests by democracies 
still requires further development. 
For an example, the existing literature seems to suggest that countries that have similar 
political and social structures would behave in a similar way when challenged by similar 
social demonstrations. Moreover, the level of threat that a given protest represents is 
frequently cited as having a close relationship to the level of repression it suffers. This thesis 
challenged these assertions by testing examining the South American puzzle.   
The cases of Chile, Brazil and Uruguay typify this puzzle. Each behaves differently when 
deciding to repress non-violent protests, despite their similarities. 
Brazil has presented the most violent response to non-violent protests with use of rubber 
bullets, tear gas, arbitrary arrests and intimidating dispersion tactics and was overall 
‘significantly repressive’. Chile was mostly ‘non-repressive’ towards demonstrations (with 
the exception of the education protests in 2011, which were largely repressed). And Uruguay 
has demonstrated an overall peaceful response to demonstrations.
55 
This thesis examined this variety of responses. This was done by evaluating the hypothesis in 
the existing literature (namely the relationship between the level of repression and the level of 
threat that a given protest poses to the government), and by postulating novel hypotheses 
examining the relationship between the level of repression and subtle dictatorial political 
legacies (specifically elite continuity and the presence of a militarized police force).  
                                                 
55
 Brazil: ‘significantly repressive’ in 2011, ‘not repressive’ in 2012 and ‘significantly repressive’ in 2013, being 
overall considered to be ‘significantly repressive’ for having met the 20% threshold of events under that label. 
Chile: ‘significantly repressive’ in 2011, ‘not repressive’ in 2012 and 2013, being overall considered to be ‘not 
repressive’. Uruguay: ‘not repressive’ in 2011, 2012 and 2013, being overall considered as being ‘not 
repressive’.  
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What was found was that the threat explanation (H1) cannot be considered a perfect 
explanation as it fails to explain why some ‘non-threatening’ protests are ‘significantly 
repressed’ while some ‘significantly threatening’ demonstrations are ‘not repressed’ at all. 
The level of threat and the amount of repression were found to be only slightly correlated, 
providing enough support for this hypothesis to be partially accepted. Therefore this 
hypothesis has some validity, but does not tell the whole story.  
The legacies of the authoritarian regimes that each of these cases experienced were then 
analyzed for their impact on protest repression. It was found that there was a limited 
connection between the amount of elite continuity and the level of repression (H2), however 
the existence of a militarized police force (that is, a gendarmerie- like body performing civil 
policing duties) was found to be highly associated with the use of violent force against 
peaceful demonstrators, especially when taken into consideration the lack of accountability of 
a given country in relation to past human rights violations (H3). Although slightly different 
for each country, the deals cut during the transition from dictatorship to democracy meant 
that human rights violators remained in positions of influence (in varying degrees) and/or the 
police force still clings to its former ideology as untouchable and unaccountable. The strength 
of this ideology is further reinforced by the progress of the reconciliation process in each 
country. 
Thus, it was found that some authoritarian skeletons in each countries’ closets might still 
haunt the present. There is a considerable indication that the existence of the militarized 
police is connected to an increase in the level of repression in a given country and that might 
even be accentuated if the country in question has had no accountability in relation to past 
crimes; elites might still play a role in the repression of peaceful marches if they perceive 
their interests as being threatened; and last but not least, the threat posed by a demonstration 
is a useful heuristic but is not enough to explain the repressive behavior of a country against a 
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peaceful demonstration. To reach these conclusions, a small-n comparative case study 
methodology was performed, supported by some simple quantitative analysis (bivariate 
correlation done through SPSS).
56
  
Firstly, the contextual factors and background of each of the case studies were presented so to 
provide a better understanding of their dynamics. Then, data from news media were analyzed 
and an original scale of protest repression was developed. Afterwards, the three hypotheses
57
 
were analyzed and tested, making use of the aforementioned scale of repression. This process 
revealed that, while intuitively pleasing, the hypothesis in the existing literature cannot fully 
account for the observed realities in these countries. Indeed, it appears that dictatorial 
legacies have important and significant impacts on police practices, which calls for greater 
research and more understanding. 
Despite these revelations, this thesis is not without its limitations. Some protests could not be 
considered due to the lack of figures provided by the news media and due to the relatively 
small observed period, the relationships discovered may not be wholly representative 
(however the chances of this are slim). Furthermore, it is possible that the studied puzzle was 
an anomaly only applicable to the period observed, South American countries or perhaps 
countries that have emerged from dictatorships about three decades ago, as are thes case 
herein studied. 
Despite these limitations however, it is possible to draw some general conclusions and this 
thesis helps to expand the existing literature around the topic.  
The issues discussed by this thesis and its findings have relevant consequences for policy, 
particularly in terms of truth and reconciliation programmes, police structures and the study 
                                                 
56
 The output for the SPSS ran tests can be found on appendix a of this thesis. 
57
 Hypothesis 1:“The higher the level of threat, the higher the likelihood for the repression of non-violent 
protests”; Hypothesis 2: “Elite continuity increases the likelihood of repression of non-violent protests in the 
new democratic regime”; and Hypothesis 3: “The existence of a militarized police increases the likelihood for 
the repression of non-violent protests. Such likelihood increases if there was a lack of accountability regarding 
the perpetrators of the repression under the authoritarian rule”. 
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of political elites. There are ongoing debates around the tradeoffs between militarized police 
and their (war) mentaility and  discipline against risks of corruption (eg the militarized 
peacemakers police units- UPPs in their Portuguese acronym- in Rio de Janeiro that have 
been inserted into slums and poor communities to control the rule of law and fight organized 
crime), not to mention that policymakers might benefit of better understanding the 
relationship between past and ongoing reconciliation processes and current behavior of the 
militarized police and its consequent repression of citizens.  
Although there is insufficient evidence to completely prove or disqualify any of the 
hypotheses contained herein, this thesis has provided another stepping stone for this 
important literature by indicating that the explanation of the repression of non-violent protests 
is rather complex and that, in order to understand it one must consider many different 
variables.  
Further developments for this literature could include a careful quantitative study of other 
interesting puzzles such as the presented by this thesis to provide further support for the 
hereby proposed hypothesis. Also simply expanding the sample size, both of terms of n 
(entries) and observed period, would be very enriching for the literature and for further policy 
implications. Moreover, this literature could benefit from the development of studies around 
the influence of civil elites in decision making. 
In summary, the real revelation of this thesis goes beyond the violent repression of non-
violent protests. What it does is to show that, although the days of dictatorial tyrants and 
“disappearances” are considered to be over, these historical blights continue to impact the 
citizens of Latin America in perverse and often violent ways. There is no clear or easy way to 
discharge these authoritarian legacies, however research like this one represents a small step 
in the right direction. 
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APPENDIX A: SPSS OUTPUT 
 
1. All three study cases together 
 
i. SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ for all three 
cases 
Correlations 
 LevelofThreat_
all3countries 
LevelofRepressi
on_all3countrie
s 
LevelofThreat_all3countries 
Pearson Correlation 1 .106
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.010 
N 581 581 
LevelofRepression_all3coun
tries 
Pearson Correlation .106
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 
 
N 581 581 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
ii. SPSS Crosstabulation for all three countries (LevelofThreat_all3countries * 
LevelofRepression_all3countries) 
 
LevelofThreat_all3countries * LevelofRepression_all3countries Crosstabulation 
Count 
 LevelofRepression_all3countries Total 
No Repression Mild Repression Significant 
Repression 
LevelofThreat_all3countries 
Not a Threat 305 30 75 410 
Mild Threat 86 4 38 128 
Significant Threat 27 3 13 43 
Total 418 37 126 581 
 
2. Brazil 
 
i.         SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ for Brazil 
 
Correlations 
 Brazil_Levelof
Repression 
Brazil_Levelof
Threat 
Brazil_LevelofRepression 
Pearson Correlation 1 .089 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.056 
 
III 
 
N 465 465 
Brazil_LevelofThreat 
Pearson Correlation .089 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .056 
 
N 465 465 
 
 
ii. SPSS Crosstabulation for Brazil (Brazil_LevelofThreat * Brazil_LevelofRepression 
 
Brazil_LevelofThreat * Brazil_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation 
Count 
 Brazil_LevelofRepression Total 
No Repression Mild Repression Significant 
Repression 
Brazil_LevelofThreat 
Not a Threat 244 15 73 332 
Mild Threat 66 1 27 94 
Significant Threat 23 3 13 39 
Total 333 19 113 465 
 
3. Chile 
i. SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ for Chile 
 
Correlations 
 Chile_LevelofR
epression 
Chile_LevelofT
hreat 
Chile_LevelofRepression 
Pearson Correlation 1 .184 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.081 
N 91 91 
Chile_LevelofThreat 
Pearson Correlation .184 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .081 
 
N 91 91 
 
 
ii. SPSS Crosstabulation for Chile (Chile_LevelofThreat * Chile_LevelofRepression 
 
Chile_LevelofThreat * Chile_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation 
Count 
 Chile_LevelofRepression Total 
No Repression Mild Repression Significant 
Repression 
 
IV 
 
Chile_LevelofThreat 
Not a Threat 41 14 2 57 
Mild Threat 16 3 11 30 
Significant Threat 4 0 0 4 
Total 61 17 13 91 
 
 
 
4. Uruguay 
 
i. SPSS correlation between ‘Level of Threat’ and ‘Level of Repression’ 
 
Correlations 
 Uruguay_Level
ofThreat 
Uruguay_Level
ofRepression 
Uruguay_LevelofThreat 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.089 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.672 
N 25 25 
Uruguay_LevelofRepressio
n 
Pearson Correlation -.089 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .672 
 
N 25 25 
 
ii. SPSS Crosstabulation for Uruguay (Uruguay_LevelofThreat * 
Uruguay_LevelofRepression 
 
Uruguay_LevelofThreat * Uruguay_LevelofRepression Crosstabulation 
Count 
 Uruguay_LevelofRepression Total 
No Repression Mild Repression 
Uruguay_LevelofThreat 
Not a Threat 20 1 21 
Mild Threat 4 0 4 
Total 24 1 25 
 
 
V 
 
 
 
CITY DAT
E 
# OF 
PARTICI
PANTS 
Threat in 
relation to 
# of 
participan
ts 
CLAI
MS/ 
REAS
ONS 
PEP
PER 
SPR
AY 
NON 
LET
HAL 
BOM
BS 
RUBB
ER 
BULL
ETS 
FIRE 
ARM 
WAT
ER 
CAN
NON 
INJU
RED 
PEOP
LE 
ARRE
STED 
PEOPL
E 
LEVEL 
OF 
REPRES
SION 
Website link 
Brazil 
Vila Velha- 
ES 
27.12.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1390517-com-23-mortos-e-protesto-
espirito-santo-procura-desaparecidos.shtml 
Brazil 
Humaitá, 
AM 
25.12.
13 3,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1
2/1390289-moradores-ateiam-fogo-em-sede-
da-funai-e-entram-em-conflito-com-policia-
no-amazonas.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
24.12.
13 950 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1390076-sem-teto-levantam-
acampamento-do-viaduto-do-cha-para-
passar-as-festas-em-ocupacao.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
23.12.
13 120 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1389616-protesto-de-sem-teto-
surpreende-visitantes-da-paulista-
natalina.shtml  
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
21.12.
13 350 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/
12/1388975-torcedores-da-portuguesa-
protestam-na-avenida-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
20.12.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1388667-cerca-de-500-pessoas-
protestam-contra-aumento-da-tarifa-no-
rio.shtml  
Brazil Brasília, DF 
20.12.
13 15 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1
2/1388663-contra-prisoes-do-mensalao-15-
manifestantes-lavam-estatua-da-justica-no-
stf.shtml  
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
17.12.
13 40 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1387049-indigenas-e-estudantes-fazem-
novo-ato-e-ocupam-a-reitoria-da-uerj.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
16.12.
13 200 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1386539-alunos-da-gama-filho-
protestam-no-rio-para-exigir-volta-as-
aulas.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
13.12.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1385679-protesto-de-black-blocs-
termina-com-oito-detidos-na-av-
paulista.shtml  
APPENDIX B: DATA COMPILATION 
 
 
VI 
 
Brazil 
Florianópoli
s, SC 
12.12.
13 50 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues YES YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1384500-novo-protesto-antimendigos-
enfrenta-resistencia-em-florianopolis.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.12.
13 6,500 
Mild 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1384043-sem-teto-desocupa-viaduto-
do-cha-e-segue-protesto-no-centro-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
10.12.
13 10 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1
2/1383533-manifestantes-distribuem-sacos-
de-farinha-no-senado-e-pedem-cpi-do-caso-
perrella.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
10.12.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1383388-grupo-faz-manifestacao-em-
frente-a-estacao-do-metro-na-zona-leste-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
08.12.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1382690-pm-prende-grupo-que-
protestava-contra-clinton-em-
copacabana.shtml 
Brazil 
Sorocaba, 
SP 
07.12.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1
2/1382540-em-tom-de-campanha-no-
interior-de-sp-aecio-diz-que-visitara-oito-
estados-ate-o-fim-do-ano.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
02.12.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1379922-protesto-na-zona-sul-do-rio-
termina-com-quatro-pessoas-detidas.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
02.12.
13 40 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1379574-protesto-bloqueia-parte-da-
marginal-pinheiros-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.12.
13 11 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/12/1379338-grupo-fica-seminu-em-ato-
pela-liberdade-da-nudez-no-ibirapuera-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.11.
13 1,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1377798-motoboys-fazem-protesto-
por-motofaixa-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
25.11.
13 50 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1376098-moradores-do-butanta-fazem-
protesto-em-frente-a-batalhao-da-
policia.shtml  
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
19.11.
13 60 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1373624-manifestacao-bloqueia-
 
VII 
 
on marginal-tiete-em-sp-e-causa-72-km-de-
lentidao.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
08.11.
13 50 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1368984-manifestacao-interdita-
parcialmente-avenida-vinte-e-tres-de-
maio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
08.11.
13 25 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1368984-manifestacao-interdita-
parcialmente-avenida-vinte-e-tres-de-
maio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
06.11.
13 2 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1368942-jovens-fazem-greve-de-fome-
pela-liberacao-de-manifestantes-presos-no-
rio.shtml  
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
07.11.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1368397-protesto-fecha-terminal-
campo-limpo-por-mais-de-uma-hora.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
07.11.
13 39 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/saopaulo/201
3/11/1368203-protesto-de-trabalhadores-
bloqueia-loja-na-oscar-freire.shtml  
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
05.11.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1367416-dois-sao-detidos-durante-
manifestacao-no-centro-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
05.11.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1367405-policia-detem-cinco-pessoas-
apos-confusao-durante-ato-na-avenida-
paulista.shtml  
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
05.11.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1367327-cerca-de-200-pessoas-fazem-
manifestacao-no-centro-do-rio-de-
janeiro.shtml  
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
02.11.
13 70 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1366073-manifestantes-fazem-velorio-
simbolico-de-amarildo-na-rocinha.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.11.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat housing NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/11/1365532-manifestantes-bloueiam-
marginal-tiete-no-sentido-ayrton-senna.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
31.10.
13 250 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1365192-grupo-faz-protesto-contra-o-
aumento-do-iptu-em-frente-a-casa-de-
haddad.shtml 
 
VIII 
 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
31.10.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1364963-manifestacao-de-artistas-
reune-300-no-centro-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
31.10.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1
0/1364897-policiais-federais-promovem-dia-
das-bruxas-em-protesto-contra-
planalto.shtml  
Brazil Recife, PE 
31.10.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/1
0/1364897-policiais-federais-promovem-dia-
das-bruxas-em-protesto-contra-
planalto.shtml  
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
30.10.
13 20 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1364473-protesto-contra-aumento-do-
iptu-encerra-sessao-na-camara-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
29.10.
13 200 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrada/2013
/10/1363889-servidores-do-minc-fazem-
manifestacao-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Contagem, 
MG 
29.10.
13 200 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1363784-sem-teto-liberam-br-040-e-
pm-faz-desapropriacao-tranquila-em-
minas.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
29.10.
13 15 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1363690-apos-protesto-de-15-pessoas-
raposo-e-liberada.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
28.10.
13 12 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1363214-black-blocs-fazem-ocupacao-
na-esquina-do-governador-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Cachoeira, 
BA 
26.10.
13 30 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrada/2013
/10/1362843-manifestantes-impedem-
debates-de-colunistas-da-folha-em-festival-
literario-na-bahia.shtml 
Brazil 
Porto 
Alegre, RS 
25.10.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1362468-protestos-registram-
confrontos-em-porto-alegre-campinas-e-
natal.shtml 
Brazil 
Campinas, 
SP 
25.10.
13 100 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1362468-protestos-registram-
confrontos-em-porto-alegre-campinas-e-
natal.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
25.10.
13 2,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1362337-comerciantes-fecham-as-
portas-durante-protesto-no-centro-de-
 
IX 
 
ment on sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
24.10.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1361677-grupo-faz-novo-ato-por-
melhoria-no-transporte-na-zona-sul-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
24.10.
13 150 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/10/1361372-manifestantes-
sao-impedidos-de-entrar-na-prefeitura-de-
ribeirao-preto-sp.shtml 
Brazil Recife, PE 
23.10.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1361144-ato-por-passe-livre-no-recife-
tem-confronto-e-adolescentes-
apreendidos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
23.10.
13 200 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues YES NO NO NO NO S NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1361118-protesto-do-mpl-tem-
principio-de-tumulto-na-regiao-do-
grajau.shtml 
Brazil Cubatão, SP 
23.10.
13 900 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/10/1360826-em-novo-protesto-petroleiros-
bloqueiam-rodovia-no-litoral-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
21.10.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1360151-pms-cercam-consulados-dos-
eua-e-de-angola-durante-protesto-no-
rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Campinas, 
SP 
21.10.
13 3,200 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues YES YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/10/1360112-trabalhadores-paralisam-bosch-
em-campinas.shtml 
Brazil Cubatão, SP 
21.10.
13 2,500 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/10/1359912-conflitos-entre-policiais-e-
manifestantes-deixam-oito-feridos-no-
rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
21.10.
13 300 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1359738-manifestantes-encerram-
protesto-na-zona-sul-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
20.10.
13 60 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1359533-candidatos-que-se-atrasaram-
para-concurso-publico-protestam-no-centro-
de-sp-diz-pm.shtml 
Brazil 
São Roque, 
SP 
19.10.
13 500 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1359293-ativistas-de-defesa-dos-
animais-bloqueiam-raposo-tavares-na-altura-
de-sao-roque-sp.shtml 
 
X 
 
Brazil 
Porto 
Alegre, RS 
18.10.
201 8 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1358667-manifestantes-invadem-e-
picham-escritorio-dos-eua-em-porto-
alegre.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
18.10.
13 300 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1358554-motorista-avanca-com-carro-
em-cima-de-alunos-que-fechavam-entrada-
da-usp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
17.10.
13 20 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1358301-protesto-ocupa-duas-faixas-
da-av-paulista-no-sentido-consolacao.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
17.10.
13 200 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/10/1358270-petroleiros-reunem-poucos-
manifestantes-em-protesto-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
17.10.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1358001-manifestantes-fecham-
viaduto-do-cha-prefeita-em-exercicio-
reclama-de-vandalismo.shtml 
Brazil Curitiba, PR 
16.10.
13 40 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1357385-em-protesto-grupo-ocupa-
camara-de-vereadores-em-curitiba.shtml 
Brazil 
Araraquara, 
SP 
15.10.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/10/1356957-manifestantes-e-
pm-se-confrontam-em-protesto-por-onibus-
em-araraquara.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
15.10.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat housing YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1356879-em-protesto-grupo-de-sem-
teto-tenta-invadir-predio-da-camara-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
14.10.
13 300 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/10/1356305-servidores-do-hc-
fazem-protesto-por-aumento-em-ribeirao-
preto-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
14.10.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1356355-secretaria-municipal-de-
transporte-do-rio-e-invadida-por-
manifestantes.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
12.10.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1355802-motoristas-de-vans-fazem-
protesto-na-zona-oeste-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.10.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1355514-manifestantes-fazem-
passeata-pela-regiao-central-de-sao-
paulo.shtml 
 
XI 
 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.10.
13 400 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1355166-manifestantes-fazem-ato-
contra-aumento-de-iptu-na-camara-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.10.
13 200 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1355104-protesto-de-estudantes-fecha-
entrada-da-usp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
10.10.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1354917-professores-municipais-e-
estaduais-fazem-passeata-em-direcao-a-
alerj.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
09.10.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1354264-protesto-de-estudantes-da-
usp-bloqueia-pista-da-av-brigadeiro-luis-
antonio.shtml 
Brazil Cuiabá, MT 
08.10.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha
nacopa/2013/10/1353529-professores-e-
estudantes-invadem-arena-pantanal-em-
protesto.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
07.10.
13 30,000 
Mild 
Threat union NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1353245-manifestantes-atacam-
consulado-dos-eua-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
07.10.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1352847-carro-explode-durante-
protesto-e-fere-quatro-na-zona-oeste-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
05.10.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1352847-carro-explode-durante-
protesto-e-fere-quatro-na-zona-oeste-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
03.10.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/10/1351166-em-greve-
carteiros-fazem-passeata-e-reivindicacoes-
em-ribeirao-preto.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
02.10.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1350964-indios-chegam-ao-
monumento-as-bandeiras-apos-protesto-na-
av-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
02.10.
13 350 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1350508-pms-fazem-protesto-na-sede-
do-governo-de-sp-por-reajuste-salarial.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.10.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/10/1350162-estudantes-invadem-reitoria-
 
XII 
 
on da-usp-durante-manifestacao.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
28.09.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1349231-profissionais-da-educacao-sao-
retirados-da-camara-do-rio-em-meio-a-
confusao.shtml 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1349169-policia-militar-chega-a-camara-
do-rio-para-retirar-professores-ha-
confusao.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
28.09.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/09/1349044-marcha-das-
vadias-tem-seios-a-mostra-e-protesto-em-
igreja-em-ribeirao.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
27.09.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1348412-pm-usa-bombas-e-consegue-
liberar-transito-na-marginal-tiete.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
27.09.
13 600 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1348389-professores-da-rede-municipal-
do-rio-decidem-manter-greve-e-ocupacao-da-
camara.shtml 
Brazil 
Porto 
Alegre, RS 
26.09.
13 250 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1348268-protesto-termina-com-
predios-depredados-e-prisoes-em-porto-
alegre.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
26.09.
13 600 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1348040-professores-invadem-a-camara-
do-rio-e-cancelam-votacao-do-plano-de-
carreira.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
26.09.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1347698-apos-protesto-indios-liberam-
rodovia-dos-bandeirantes-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
25.09.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/09/1347071-em-novo-ato-
servidores-de-ribeirao-preto-paralisam-
atividades-na-autarquia-de-agua.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
20.09.
13 40 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1345437-vias-do-centro-e-da-zona-sul-
de-sp-sao-liberadas-apos-protestos.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
20.09.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1345098-professores-ocupam-sede-da-
prefeitura-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
19.09.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1344709-manifestacao-contra-cabral-
 
XIII 
 
ment on termina-de-maneira-pacifica-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil Recife, PE 
18.09.
13 250 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1344073-protesto-em-recife-acaba-com-
16-detidos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
18.09.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1344047-descontentes-com-o-stf-
manifestantes-fazem-protesto-em-sao-
paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
Guarulhos, 
SP 
18.09.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1344010-manifestacao-e-obras-
provocam-15-km-de-lentidao-na-ayrton-
senna.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
18.09.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1344006-mst-invade-crm-do-ceara-em-
protesto-a-favor-de-medicos-cubanos.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
13.09.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1342003-sem-mascaras-protesto-de-rua-
no-rio-tem-mais-pms-que-
manifestantes.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
12.09.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1341481-protesto-de-motoristas-de-
vans-gera-caos-no-transito-no-centro-do-
rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
12.09.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1341267-manifestacao-pacifica-pede-
liberdade-para-presos-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
12.09.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1341008-manifestantes-bloqueiam-
faixa-da-av-paulista-no-centro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
12.09.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1340981-professores-fazem-protesto-nas-
escadarias-da-alerj.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.09.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1340714-grupo-faz-protesto-contra-a-
folha-diante-da-sede-do-jornal.shtml 
Brazil 
Porto 
Alegre, RS 
09.09.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat union NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1339183-policia-usa-bombas-em-
protesto-de-professores-na-casa-de-
governador-gaucho.shtml 
Brazil 
Manaus, 
AM 
07.09.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1338769-turistas-e-policiais-sao-maioria-
 
XIV 
 
on em-protesto-fracassado-em-manaus.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
07.09.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1338690-mascarados-depredam-onibus-e-
entram-confronto-com-a-pm-em-
salvador.shtml 
Brazil Natal, RN 
07.09.
13 2,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1338586-sete-de-setembro-em-natal-tem-
servidores-em-greve-e-protesto-do-grito-dos-
excluidos.shtml 
Brazil Curitiba, PR 
07.09.
13 400 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1338557-policia-bloqueia-ruas-em-curitiba-
para-evitar-passagem-de-manifestantes.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
07.09.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1338549-pm-e-manifestantes-entram-em-
confronto-no-rio-cinco-foram-detidos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
06.09.
13 800 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1338301-apos-invadir-predio-mtst-
fecha-marginal-na-volta-a-paraisopolis-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
06.09.
13 2,500 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1337728-nova-chefe-da-presidencia-em-sp-
estreia-com-manifestacao-na-av-
paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
05.09.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1337736-apos-fechar-ruas-no-centro-
protesto-de-black-blocs-fecha-a-av-
paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
05.09.
13 2,500 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1337301-manifestantes-encerram-ato-
e-avenida-paulista-e-liberada.shtml 
Brazil 
Cosmópolis, 
SP 
05.09.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1337276-manifestantes-voltam-a-
fechar-pedagio-de-cosmopolis-sp-apos-2-
meses.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
04.09.
13 700 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1336774-movimentos-sociais-protestam-
contra-cartel-do-metro-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
03.09.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
9/1336124-manifestantes-querem-barrar-
proibicao-de-mascaras-em-protestos-no-
 
XV 
 
on rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Embu das 
Artes, SP 
02.09.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1335725-professores-protestam-na-
regis-bittencourt-em-embu-das-artes-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.09.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1335371-moradores-do-morumbi-
fazem-protesto-por-mais-seguranca.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.09.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/09/1335371-moradores-do-morumbi-
fazem-protesto-por-mais-seguranca.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
31.08.
13 800 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1335223-manifestacao-feminista-reune-
800-e-ocupa-centro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
30.08.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1334918-protesto-de-black-blocs-contra-o-
governador-sergio-cabral-fecha-ruas-no-
rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
30.08.
13 1,500 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1334708-protestos-reunem-1500-
pessoas-e-fecham-vias-do-centro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
30.08.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1334595-apos-protestos-estacoes-de-
onibus-operam-normalmente-em-bh.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
30.08.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/08/1334458-manifestantes-
fecham-a-anhanguera-por-30-minutos-em-
ribeirao-preto.shtml 
Brazil Cubatão, SP 
30.08.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1334344-apos-protesto-anchieta-e-
liberada-por-manifestantes.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
29.08.
13 1,600 
Mild 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1334191-protesto-por-moradia-acaba-
em-frente-ao-palacio-dos-bandeirantes.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.08.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1333359-comerciantes-fecham-
marginal-pinheiros-contra-obras-do-
metro.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.08.
13 1,500 
Mild 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1333204-por-moradias-manifestantes-
realizam-protestos-e-bloqueiam-avenida-em-
sp.shtml 
 
XVI 
 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
27.08.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1332965-confusao-entre-manifestantes-e-
policiais-em-manifestacao-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
26.08.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1332369-medicos-brasileiros-
protestam-em-fortaleza-contra-
estrangeiros.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
24.08.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1331676-apos-tumulto-no-transito-
protesto-contra-remocoes-no-horto-termina-
no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
24.08.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1331569-contra-bufe-milionario-
manifestantes-fazem-buchada-no-palacio-no-
ceara.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
23.08.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO YES NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1331308-black-blocs-lancam-pedras-
contra-a-editora-abril-policia-usa-bombas-e-
gas-lacrimogeneo.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
22.08.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1330699-manifestantes-protesta-contra-o-
desaparecimento-do-pedreiro-amarildo.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
22.08.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1330553-cerca-de-500-pessoas-
ocupam-plenario-da-camara-para-
audiencia.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
22.08.
13 1,100 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1330157-motoristas-de-vans-escolares-
protestam-em-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
21.08.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1329753-professores-protestam-nas-ruas-
do-centro-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil Natal, RN 
21.08.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1329721-servidores-em-greve-acampam-
em-frente-a-residencia-oficial-da-
governadora-do-rn.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
21.08.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha
nacopa/2013/08/1329696-manifestantes-
protestam-em-frente-a-odebrecht-no-rio-
contra-venda-do-maracana.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
21.08.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1329513-manifestantes-voltar-a-protestar-
contra-alckmin-no-centro-de-sp.shtml 
 
XVII 
 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
20.08.
13 4,000 
Mild 
Threat union NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1329139-batalhao-de-choque-cerca-
prefeitura-do-rio-durante-protesto-de-
professores.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
20.08.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1329081-policiais-federais-fazem-
protesto-em-frente-a-superintendencia-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
20.08.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues YES YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1328969-protesto-termina-em-novo-
conflito-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
19.08.
13 5 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/
08/1328619-torcedores-do-corinthians-
fazem-protesto-apos-emerson-dar-selinho-
em-amigo.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
18.08.
13 40 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1328348-domingo-na-ocupacao-da-
camara-do-rio-tem-ioga-e-lavagem-das-
escadarias.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
18.08.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1328329-professores-fazem-enterro-
simbolico-de-cabral-em-protesto-na-orla-de-
copacabana.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
17.08.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1328207-manifestantes-fazem-vigilia-na-
frente-da-casa-do-prefeito-do-rio-eduardo-
paes.shtml 
Brazil Osasco, SO 
16.08.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1327899-manifestantes-queimam-
segundo-onibus-e-um-carro-em-osasco.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
16.08.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1327764-professores-estaduais-protestam-
por-melhores-condicoes-de-trabalho-no-
rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
15.08.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1327171-manifestantes-e-policiais-
entram-em-confronto-em-protesto-em-
fortaleza.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
15.08.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1327134-manifestantes-protestam-
contra-pm-e-fecham-ruas-no-centro-de-
sp.shtml 
 
XVIII 
 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
15.08.
13 250 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1326860-policiais-do-choque-cercam-a-
camara-do-rio-para-evitar-acesso-de-
ativistas.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
14.08.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1326653-ato-contra-cabral-termina-mais-
uma-vez-em-confronto-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
14.08.
13 3,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1326621-pm-de-sp-usa-bombas-contra-
protestos-na-camara-e-na-assembleia.shtml  
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1326433-manifestantes-queimam-boneco-
de-alckmin-em-protesto-em-
sp.shtmlhttp://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder
/2013/08/1326580-manifestantes-ocupam-
auditorios-da-assembleia-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Manaus, 
AM 
14.08.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1326618-protesto-do-mpl-reune-30-
pessoas-em-manaus.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
14.08.
13 600 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1326580-manifestantes-ocupam-
auditorios-da-assembleia-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
14.08.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1326372-protesto-contra-cartel-do-metro-
reune-200-pessoas-em-sp-diz-pm.shtml 
Brazil Curitiba, PR 
14.08.
13 5 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1326319-protesto-contra-tarifa-reune-
apenas-cinco-e-vira-panfletagem-em-
curitiba.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
13.08.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/08/1325999-policiais-civis-
fazem-protesto-em-praca-no-centro-de-
ribeirao-preto.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
13.08.
13 15 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1325822-vendedores-de-hot-dog-
protestam-no-centro-de-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
12.08.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1325551-policiais-e-manifestantes-tem-
novo-confronto-no-palacio-guanabara.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
09.08.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1324529-apos-protestos-manifestantes-
 
XIX 
 
on liberam-vias-em-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
09.08.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1323987-manifestantes-tentam-entrar-na-
camara-do-rio-para-acompanhar-cpi-mas-
sao-barrados.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
08.08.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1323818-ato-de-servidores-da-saude-
prejudica-pacientes-do-sirio-libanes-diz-
hospital.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
08.08.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1323500-passeata-de-policiais-interdita-
avenida-no-centro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
07.08.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1323185-policia-prende-manifestante-em-
protesto-contra-tv-globo-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
07.08.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1323183-pilotos-da-tam-protestam-em-
congonhas-contra-demissoes.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
07.08.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1322970-deficientes-fazem-protesto-na-
prefeitura-grupo-quer-mais-
acessibilidade.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
07.08.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1322722-cid-gomes-tenta-negociar-mas-e-
vaiado-por-manifestantes-em-fortaleza.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
06.08.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1322730-em-ato-contra-alckmin-
manifestantes-usam-coxinha-para-provocar-
pms.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
06.08.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1322356-apos-protesto-das-centrais-
sindicais-av-paulista-e-liberada.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
05.08.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1321838-protesto-a-favor-da-telexfree-
interdita-faixas-da-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
04.08.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1321574-manifestante-faz-greve-de-
fome-no-quarto-dia-de-ocupacao-a-camara-
de-bh.shtml 
 
XX 
 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
04.08.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1321536-apos-4-meses-ato-pede-
justica-por-morte-de-mulher-em-
higienopolis.shtml 
Brazil 
Franco da 
Rocha, SP 
04.08.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1321529-rodovia-e-liberada-em-franco-
da-rocha-apos-interdicao-por-
manifestantes.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
03.08.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1321373-manifestantes-gritam-contra-pt-
lula-e-comunismo-em-frente-a-reuniao-do-
foro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
03.08.
13 15 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1321355-manifestantes-acampam-em-
frente-a-sede-do-governo-de-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
02.08.
13 400 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES NO NO YES YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1321039-protesto-contra-alckmin-e-cabral-
reune-400-no-centro-de-sao-paulo.shtml  
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1321355-manifestantes-acampam-em-
frente-a-sede-do-governo-de-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.08.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/08/1320416-manifestantes-protestam-
diante-de-delegacia-veja-video-de-
tumulto.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
31.07.
13 40 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
8/1319992-policia-militar-retira-
manifestantes-do-plenario-da-camara-dos-
vereadores-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
31.07.
13 275 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1319713-manifestacao-dos-medicos-
interdita-pista-da-av-paulista-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil Vitória, ES 
31.07.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1319698-confronto-entre-sindicalistas-
termina-com-dois-baleados-e-28-detidos-em-
vitoria-es.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
31.07.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1319689-segundo-dia-de-protesto-de-
medicos-tem-paralisacao-em-21-estados-e-
df.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
31.07.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1319563-manifestantes-ocupam-esquina-
de-cabral-ha-mais-de-62-horas-no-rio.shtml 
 
XXI 
 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
31.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1319482-termina-passeata-de-
aeroviarios-na-zona-sul-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil Recife, PE 
31.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1319482-termina-passeata-de-
aeroviarios-na-zona-sul-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
30.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1319326-grupo-protesta-perto-de-
delegacia-apos-prisao-de-
manifestantes.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
30.07.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1319262-protesto-volta-a-ter-
vandalismo-e-confronto-em-sp-20-sao-
detidos.shtml  
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1319214-manifestantes-depredam-
bancos-e-loja-de-carros-pm-usa-
bombas.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
30.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/07/1318962-tam-demite-ate-mil-
funcionarios-apos-corte-na-oferta-de-
voos.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
30.07.
13 10 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1318900-apesar-de-apelo-manifestantes-
permanecem-em-frente-ao-predio-de-
cabral.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
29.07.
13 75 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1318606-movimentos-sem-teto-
ocupam-hall-da-prefeitura-de-belo-
horizonte.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
29.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1318469-contra-prisoes-no-denarc-
delegados-fazem-passeata-no-centro-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil Cubatão, SP 
29.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1318426-protesto-termina-na-rodovia-
conego-domenico-rangoni-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
29.07.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1318396-manifestantes-viram-a-noite-em-
protesto-contra-cabral-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
28.07.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1318235-manifestantes-fazem-novo-
ato-no-rio-contra-o-governador-sergio-
cabral.shtml 
 
XXII 
 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.07.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1318044-apos-dois-anos-de-morte-de-
vitor-gurman-familiares-protestam-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
27.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1317922-foco-de-protesto-em-copacabana-
gera-tensao-entre-manifestantes-e-
peregrinos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
27.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1317766-policia-detem-8-apos-
manifestacao-violenta-na-avenida-
paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
25.07.
13 700 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1316805-manifestantes-se-deslocam-pelo-
leblon-no-rio-em-protesto-contra-o-
governador.shtml 
Brazil 
João Pessoa, 
PB 
24.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1316245-apos-protesto-manifestantes-
ocupam-assembleia-em-joao-pessoa.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
24.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1316183-estudantes-medicos-e-
marisqueiros-protestam-antes-de-evento-
com-dilma-em-salvador.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
23.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1315311-protesto-rebatiza-
monumento-da-familia-de-acm-em-
salvador.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
22.07.
13 14 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1315053-membros-do-movimento-
passe-livre-ocupam-a-camara-de-
salvador.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
21.07.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/
07/1314508-poucos-manifestantes-fazem-
ato-em-frente-ao-maracana.shtml 
Brazil 
São 
Bernardo do 
Campo, SP 
20.07.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1314262-manifestantes-fazem-
churrascao-em-protesto-na-grande-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
19.07.
13 350 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1314048-apos-tres-horas-
manifestantes-encerram-protestos-na-
avenida-paulista.shtml 
Brazil Natal, RN 
19.07.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1314003-manifestantes-entram-em-
confronto-com-a-pm-durante-ato-em-
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on natal.shtml 
Brazil Vitória, ES 
19.07.
13 400 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1313871-protesto-em-vitoria-es-
termina-com-38-detidos.shtml 
Brazil Natal, RN 
18.07.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1313253-retirada-de-manifestantes-
termina-em-confronto-na-camara-de-
natal.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
18.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1312913-dilma-e-recebida-com-protestos-
de-indios-e-medicos-em-fortaleza.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
18.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1312913-dilma-e-recebida-com-protestos-
de-indios-e-medicos-em-fortaleza.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
18.07.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1312881-madrugada-de-caos-assusta-
moradores-da-zona-sul-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
17.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
7/1312770-manifestantes-na-rua-de-sergio-
cabral-entram-em-confronto-com-a-policia-
no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
17.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1312263-protesto-bloqueia-avenida-
que-da-acesso-a-terminal-na-zona-norte-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
16.07.
13 3,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1312128-protesto-de-profissionais-da-
saude-termina-e-paulista-e-liberada.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
16.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1312063-aposentados-do-aerus-fazem-
novo-protesto-no-centro-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Campo 
Verde, MT 
15.07.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1311289-rodovia-interditada-por-
manifestantes-em-mato-grosso-e-
liberada.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
15.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1311167-manifestantes-acampam-em-
frente-a-prefeitura-de-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
14.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1311027-manifestantes-protestam-em-
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ment on frente-a-sede-do-governo-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
13.07.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1310857-grupo-faz-protesto-em-
casamento-de-filha-de-empresario-de-
onibus-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
13.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1310832-manifestantes-protestam-em-
frente-a-sede-do-governo-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
13.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1310754-manifestantes-acampam-em-
obra-contra-construcao-de-aquario-em-
fortaleza.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
12.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1310613-ruas-da-regiao-central-de-sp-
sao-liberadas-apos-novos-protestos.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
12.07.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1310023-noite-de-conflitos-entre-
manifestantes-e-a-pm-no-rio-termina-com-
46-detidos.shtml / 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1310113-policia-do-rio-prendeu-50-
pessoas-por-participarem-das-
manifestacoes.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
12.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/07/1309840-ato-revela-mais-
um-problema-financeiro-da-prefeitura-de-
ribeirao-preto.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
12.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309950-sindicalistas-fazem-protesto-
em-todo-pais-mas-adesao-e-baixa.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.07.
13 400 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309936-rede-globo-vira-alvo-de-
manifestantes-em-sp-e-rs.shtml 
Brazil 
Embu das 
Artes, SP 
11.07.
13 1,500 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309843-regis-bittencourt-e-liberada-
na-grande-sp-apos-protesto-e-
confronto.shtml 
Brazil 
Porto 
Alegre, RS 
11.07.
13 3,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309796-manifestacao-reune-3000-
pessoas-no-centro-de-porto-alegre.shtml 
Brazil Goiânia, GO 
11.07.
13 5,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309648-reitoria-de-universidade-e-
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ment on invadida-em-goiania-ato-reune-5000.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.07.
13 7,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309643-paulista-e-liberada-apos-
quase-4-horas-grupo-segue-para-a-
republica.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
11.07.
13 2,500 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309631-manifestantes-entra-em-
confronto-com-o-choque-durante-ato-no-
rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Manaus, 
AM 
11.07.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309579-protesto-fecha-vias-e-
restringe-circulacao-de-onibus-em-manaus-
am.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
11.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/07/1309526-donos-de-vans-
fazem-protesto-na-gestora-do-transporte-
em-ribeirao.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
11.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/07/1309526-donos-de-vans-
fazem-protesto-na-gestora-do-transporte-
em-ribeirao.shtml 
Brazil 
Campo 
Grande, MS 
11.07.
13 35,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309523-ato-de-trabalhadores-reune-
35-mil-em-campo-grande-ms-segundo-a-
pm.shtml 
Brazil Natal, RN 
11.07.
13 6,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309484-manifestante-bloqueiam-
rodovias-em-ao-menos-oito-estados.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
11.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309446-manifestantes-fecham-centro-
de-operacoes-dos-correios-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
10.07.
13 160 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1309275-protestos-se-juntam-e-
mantem-bloqueio-parcial-na-paulista-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil Santos, SP 
10.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/07/1308869-protesto-de-estivadores-
paralisa-carregamento-de-13-navios-no-
porto-de-santos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
09.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1308713-grupo-protesta-pela-morte-de-
mc-daleste-na-zona-leste-de-sp.shtml 
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Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
08.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1308067-protesto-de-empregados-
domesticos-ocupa-duas-faixas-da-av-
ipiranga.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
07.07.
13 40 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/
07/1307673-protesto-antes-de-classico-pede-
saida-de-juvenal-do-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
07.07.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1307649-professores-da-uerj-
protestam-na-esquina-da-casa-do-
governador-sergio-cabral.shtml 
Brazil Ilhabela, SP 
06.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1307540-protesto-contra-ocupacao-da-
cidade-reune-200-pessoas-em-ilhabela.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
06.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1307520-cerca-de-300-deficientes-
auditivos-protestam-na-av-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
06.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1307512-grupo-protesta-na-praca-da-
se-pela-morte-de-menino-boliviano.shtml 
Brazil Vitória, ES 
05.07.
13 3,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues YES NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1307124-protesto-contra-pedagio-em-
vitoria-termina-com-dez-pessoas-
presas.shtml 
Brazil 
Florianópoli
s, SC 
04.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1306478-bloqueios-de-estradas-
diminuem-e-capitais-tem-protestos-por-
melhor-transporte.shtml 
Brazil Vitória, ES 
04.07.
13 400 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1306478-bloqueios-de-estradas-
diminuem-e-capitais-tem-protestos-por-
melhor-transporte.shtml 
Brazil 
Juazeiro, 
BA/Petrolin
a, PE 
04.07.
13 2,000 
Significant 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1306179-ponte-entre-bahia-e-
pernambuco-e-liberada-apos-9-horas-de-
protestos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
04.07.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1306152-protesto-de-policiais-bloqueia-
trafego-da-av-paulista-no-centro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
04.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1306152-protesto-de-policiais-bloqueia-
trafego-da-av-paulista-no-centro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Campinas, 
SP 
04.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1306081-protesto-bloqueia-por-cinco-
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on horas-estrada-que-da-acesso-a-
viracopos.shtml 
Brazil 
Campinas, 
SP 
03.07.
13 250 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305958-pm-detem-cerca-de-30-
manifestantes-apos-protesto-em-
campinas.shtml 
Brazil Vitória, ES 
03.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios-
publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo-
pais.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
03.07.
13 250 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios-
publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo-
pais.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
03.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios-
publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo-
pais.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
03.07.
13 3,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios-
publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo-
pais.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
03.07.
13 2,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios-
publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo-
pais.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
03.07.
13 800 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios-
publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo-
pais.shtml 
Brazil Goiânia, GO 
03.07.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305875-grupos-ocupam-predios-
publicos-em-mais-um-dia-de-protestos-pelo-
pais.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
03.07.
13 5,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305852-av-paulista-e-liberada-apos-
protestos-que-reuniram-5000-pessoas.shtml 
Brazil 
Cosmópolis, 
SP 
03.07.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305506-protesto-em-cosmopolis-
resulta-em-depredacao-da-prefeitura-e-
confronto.shtml 
Brazil 
Guarulhos, 
SP 
03.07.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201
3/07/1305320-por-melhorias-alunos-da-
unifesp-ocupam-sala-no-campus-de-
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guarulhos.shtml 
Brazil Curitiba, PR 
02.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305179-novo-protesto-por-reducao-
de-tarifa-reune-cerca-de-300-em-curitiba-
pr.shtml 
Brazil Aracajú, SE 
02.07.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305179-novo-protesto-por-reducao-
de-tarifa-reune-cerca-de-300-em-curitiba-
pr.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
02.07.
13 5,500 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305167-manifestantes-se-dispersam-
no-complexo-da-mare-av-brasil-e-
liberada.shtml 
Brazil Santos, SP 
02.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304846-apos-mais-de-24-horas-
choque-libera-acesso-ao-porto-de-santos-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Cosmópolis, 
SP 
03.07.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305506-protesto-em-cosmopolis-
resulta-em-depredacao-da-prefeitura-e-
confronto.shtml 
Brazil 
Guarulhos, 
SP 
03.07.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201
3/07/1305320-por-melhorias-alunos-da-
unifesp-ocupam-sala-no-campus-de-
guarulhos.shtml 
Brazil Curitiba, PR 
02.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305179-novo-protesto-por-reducao-
de-tarifa-reune-cerca-de-300-em-curitiba-
pr.shtml 
Brazil Aracajú, SE 
02.07.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305179-novo-protesto-por-reducao-
de-tarifa-reune-cerca-de-300-em-curitiba-
pr.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
02.07.
13 5,500 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1305167-manifestantes-se-dispersam-
no-complexo-da-mare-av-brasil-e-
liberada.shtml 
Brazil Santos, SP 
02.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304846-apos-mais-de-24-horas-
choque-libera-acesso-ao-porto-de-santos-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
02.07.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304806-central-sindical-faz-protesto-
em-frente-ao-aeroporto-de-congonhas.shtml 
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Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml ; 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304558-grupo-bloqueia-a-paulista-em-
ato-contra-morte-de-menino-boliviano.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml ; 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304559-manifestantes-fazem-
protesto-contra-a-corrupcao-em-sao-
paulo.shtml 
Brazil Santos, SP 
01.07.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml 
Brazil Vitória, ES 
01.07.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
01.07.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml ; 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304671-cerca-de-300-manifestantes-
fazem-protesto-em-brasilia.shtml 
Brazil 
Florianópoli
s, SC 
01.07.
13 40 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml 
Brazil 
Manaus, 
AM 
01.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
01.07.
13 80 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
01.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
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estados.shtml 
Brazil Maceió, AL 
01.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304725-com-menos-gente-e-pautas-
variadas-protestos-atingem-dez-
estados.shtml 
Brazil Santos, SP 
01.07.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304678-caminhoneiros-bloqueiam-
acesso-ao-porto-de-santos-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
30.06.
13 2,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/07/1304155-em-manha-fria-marcha-por-
seguranca-reune-2000-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
30.06.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303962-marcha-das-criancas-mobiliza-
mais-de-500-pessoas-em-ato-no-df.shtml 
Brazil 
Nova 
Rosalândia, 
TO 
30.06.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303960-apos-morte-de-casal-
manifestantes-bloqueiam-rodovia-em-
tocantins.shtml 
Brazil 
Taboão da 
Serra 
30.06.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303951-manifestantes-bloqueiam-a-
regis-shopping-fecha-cancelas.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
30.06.
13 250 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303943-passe-livre-faz-protesto-em-
salvador-pm-convoca-1600-policiais.shtml 
Brazil 
São Luis, 
MA 
30.06.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303942-grupo-protesta-contra-
importacao-de-medicos-em-sao-luis-no-
ma.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
30.06.
13 3,500 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha
nacopa/2013/06/1303934-a-8-horas-da-final-
manifestantes-comecam-a-se-concentrar-no-
rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
29.06.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303855-termina-protesto-de-
bolivianos-em-sp-ruas-do-centro-sao-
liberadas.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
29.06.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303775-manifestantes-bloqueiam-
trecho-da-av-paulista.shtml 
Brazil Curitiba, PR 
29.06.
13 1,500 
Significant 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303676-nova-manifestacao-reune-500-
pessoas-em-curitiba-afirma-pm.shtml 
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Brazil 
Cosmópolis, 
SP 
28.06.
13 120 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303505-mais-de-14-mil-pessoas-vao-
as-ruas-no-pais-pautas-sao-diversas.shtml 
Brazil Natal, RN 
28.06.
13 10,000 
Significant 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303505-mais-de-14-mil-pessoas-vao-
as-ruas-no-pais-pautas-sao-diversas.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.06.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303382-manifestantes-bloqueiam-av-
paulista-protesto-e-contra-ato-medico.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.06.
13 400 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303382-manifestantes-bloqueiam-av-
paulista-protesto-e-contra-ato-medico.shtml 
Brazil Maricá, RJ 
28.06.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303330-manifestacoes-fecham-
rodovia-no-rio-e-provocam-lentidao-no-
transito.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
28.06.
13 400 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303312-cerca-de-700-medicos-e-gays-
fazem-manifestacao-no-centro-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
28.06.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1303312-cerca-de-700-medicos-e-gays-
fazem-manifestacao-no-centro-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
27.06.
13 2,000 
Significant 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1302718-onibus-sao-depredados-e-
policia-usa-bombas-contra-grupo-na-ba.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
27.06.
13 2,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1302507-nova-passeata-no-centro-do-
rio-reune-cerca-de-2000-pessoas.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
26.06.
13 50,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha
nacopa/2013/06/1301684-marcha-em-belo-
horizonte-ja-reune-50-mil-e-tem-13-
presos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
25.06.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1301438-avenida-paulista-e-liberada-
apos-protesto-contra-a-pec-37.shtml 
Brazil 
Florianópoli
s, SC 
25.06.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1301412-grupo-protesta-em-frente-a-
casa-do-governador-de-santa-catarina.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
25.06.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1301133-manifestantes-lotam-galerias-
da-camara-do-rio-de-janeiro.shtml 
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Brazil 
Cristalina, 
GO 
25.06.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1300915-manifestantes-voltam-a-
fechar-rodovia-onde-mulheres-morreram-
atropeladas-em-go.shtml 
Brazil 
Porto 
Alegre, RS 
24.06.
13 10,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1300764-manifestacao-em-porto-
alegre-reune-10-mil-e-repete-
confrontos.shtml  
Brazil Belém, PA 
24.06.
13 3,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1300739-protesto-em-belem-tem-3000-
pessoas-e-ao-menos-tres-prisoes.shtml 
Brazil Teresina, PI 
24.06.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1300721-protesto-em-teresina-termina-
com-ataque-a-camara-e-pms-feridos.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
24.06.
13 3,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1300264-passeata-no-rio-tem-clima-de-
domingao-com-cerveja-e-churrasco.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
23.06.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1300208-acesso-a-aeroporto-em-
fortaleza-teve-bloqueio-parcial.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
23.06.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://f5.folha.uol.com.br/fofices/2013/06/1
300065-duzentas-criancas-participam-de-
manifestacao-em-frente-ao-congresso-
nacional.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
22.06.
13 35,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1299909-manifestacao-reune-35-mil-
em-protesto-contra-a-pec-37-na-av-
paulista.shtml  
Brazil Brasília, DF 
22.06.
13 3,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1299855-apesar-de-adiado-ato-reune-3-
mil-pessoas-na-esplanada-dos-ministerios-
em-brasilia.shtml 
Brazil 
Uruguaiana, 
RS 
22.06.
13 2,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1299797-protesto-bloqueia-ponte-
entre-uruguaiana-rs-e-argentina.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
22.06.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1299775-marcha-das-vadias-faz-
manifestacao-para-o-fim-violencia-contra-a-
mulher-em-brasilia.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
22.06.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1299759-protesto-com-1000-pessoas-
bloqueia-avenida-celso-garcia-na-zona-
leste.shtml 
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Brazil Curitiba, PR 
21.06.
13 15,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1299462-ato-em-curitiba-soma-15-mil-
e-tem-inicio-de-confronto-em-frente-a-
estadio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
21.06.
13 1,100 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1299397-protesto-contra-cura-gay-
reune-1000-em-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
Uberlândia, 
MG 
21.06.
2103 40,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/06/1298916-manifestacao-
reune-40-mil-nas-ruas-de-uberlandia-
mg.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
20.06.
13 30,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298817-manifestacao-reuniu-30-mil-
em-brasilia-patriota-diz-estar-indignado.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
20.06.
13 300,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298816-manifestacao-no-rio-termina-
com-confronto-e-62-pessoas-feridas.shtml 
Brazil 
Campinas, 
SP 
20.06.
13 35,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298807-manifestacao-transforma-
campinas-sp-em-cenario-de-combate.shtml 
Brazil Macapá, AP 
20.06.
13 1,100 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES YES NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298800-protestos-no-macapa-ap-
terminam-em-confronto-22-sao-
detidos.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
20.06.
13 20,000 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298791-salvador-tem-jovem-baleado-
onibus-incendiados-saques-e-20-mil-nas-
ruas.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
20.06.
13 20,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298786-belo-horizonte-mg-tem-
manifestacao-tranquila-com-20-mil-nas-
ruas.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
20.06.
13 25,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/06/1298406-manifestacoes-
levam-25-mil-as-ruas-em-ribeirao-preto-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
João Pessoa, 
PB 
20.06.
13 31,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298770-em-joao-pessoa-protesto-
termina-de-forma-pacifica-e-com-poucas-
depredacoes.shtml 
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Brazil 
Manaus, 
AM 
20.06.
13 85,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298774-protestos-em-manaus-am-
reunem-85-mil-e-terminam-com-
detidos.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
20.06.
13 3,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298763-protesto-em-fortaleza-ce-
termina-com-confronto-e-61-detidos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
20.06.
13 70,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1298593-manifestantes-entram-em-
confronto-na-av-paulista-homem-fica-
ferido.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
19.06.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1297954-protesto-na-periferia-pede-
melhoria-no-transporte-moradia-e-
saude.shtml 
Brazil Niterói, RJ 
19.06.
13 5,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1297874-cerca-de-4000-manifestantes-
fazem-protesto-em-niteroi-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
19.06.
13 50,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/multimidia/vid
eocasts/2013/06/1297635-manifestantes-
queimam-bandeira-de-sp-durante-protestos-
veja.shtml 
Brazil 
Florianópoli
s, SC 
18.06.
13 50,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1297439-cerca-de-50-mil-fecharam-
pontes-em-florianopolis-estima-pm.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio Branco, 
AC 
18.06.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1297372-centenas-de-pessoas-saem-as-
ruas-na-capital-do-acre.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
18.06.
13 50,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1297256-protesto-reune-cerca-de-10-
mil-pessoas-em-passeata-no-centro-de-
sp.shtml 
Brazil Belém, PA 
17.06.
13 15,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1297734-protesto-em-belem-reune-15-
mil-em-principal-avenida-da-cidade.shtml 
Brazil 
Juiz de Fora, 
MG 
17.06.
13 5,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1296735-ato-em-solidariedade-a-
protestos-reune-5000-em-juiz-de-fora-
mg.shtml 
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Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
17.06.
13 475,000 
Significant 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1296834-protesto-em-sao-paulo-e-o-
maior-desde-manifestacao-contra-
collor.shtml ; 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1296734-manifestantes-fecham-av-
paulista-e-ponte-estaiada-em-protesto-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil Curitiba, PR 
17.06.
13 15,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1296700-protesto-em-curitiba-contra-
aumento-da-tarifa-reune-5000-pessoas.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
17.06.
13 5,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1296688-protesto-contra-tarifas-leva-
multidao-na-esplanada-dos-ministerios.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
17.06.
13 15,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1296661-pm-usa-bombas-de-gas-e-
balas-de-borracha-durante-protesto-em-
bh.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
17.06.
13 10,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1296647-protesto-contra-tarifas-de-
onibus-e-obras-da-copa-reune-5000-em-
salvador.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
17.06.
13 40,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1296640-protesto-contra-tarifas-leva-
centenas-de-pessoas-as-ruas-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil Niterói, RJ 
14.06.
13 1,100 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1295491-manifestantes-protestam-
contra-aumento-da-tarifa-de-onibus-no-
centro-de-niteroi.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
14.06.
13 1,075 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1295466-termina-protesto-na-avenida-
paulista-contra-desapropriacoes-da-copa-do-
mundo.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
14.06.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha
nacopa/2013/06/1295019-manifestantes-
provocam-tumulto-em-frente-a-estadio-de-
abertura-da-copa.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
13.06.
13 5,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1295237-13-policiais-militares-foram-
feridos-no-4-dia-de-protestos-em-sao-
paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
10.06.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201
3/06/1292569-alunos-do-colegio-
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on bandeirantes-vestem-saias-durante-
protesto.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
09.06.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1292347-familiares-e-amigos-de-
vitimas-da-violencia-protestam-na-zona-
oeste-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
07.06.
13 4,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1291867-apos-protesto-em-pinheiros-
manifestantes-fecham-faixa-da-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
06.06.
13 4,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1291109-ao-menos-30-pessoas-se-
feriram-em-protesto-em-sp-dizem-
manifestantes.shtml ; 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1291096-protesto-contra-aumento-da-
tarifa-de-onibus-afeta-o-transito-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
06.06.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/06/1291096-protesto-contra-aumento-da-
tarifa-de-onibus-afeta-o-transito-no-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Carlos, 
SP 
04.06.
13 40 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/06/1289443-inseguranca-nas-
escolas-gera-ato-de-professores-em-sao-
carlos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
29.05.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/05/1286590-comerciantes-da-feira-da-
madrugada-interditam-faixa-da-avenida-do-
estado.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
25.05.
13 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/05/1284936-marcha-das-vadias-reune-
cerca-de-300-pessoas-na-av-paulista-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
25.05.
13 800 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/05/1284911-alunos-de-medicina-
protestam-contra-importacao-de-medico-
sem-prova.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
22.05.
13 4,500 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
5/1282941-manifestantes-pedem-reforma-
agraria-em-brasilia.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
21.05.
13 4,500 
Mild 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201
3/05/1282600-professores-municipais-de-sp-
protestam-e-decidem-manter-greve.shtml 
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Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
18.05.
13 400 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/05/1281102-cerca-de-400-fazem-
manifestacao-pelo-dia-antimanicomial-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
17.05.
13 6,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/
05/1280848-protesto-contra-presidente-do-
bahia-reune-6000-na-fonte-nova.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
17.05.
13 2,000 
Mild 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/05/1280413-manifestacoes-fecham-vias-e-
complicam-o-transito-no-centro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Fortaleza, 
CE 
12.05.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/05/1277486-em-protesto-mulheres-
bloqueiam-saida-de-pms-em-fortaleza.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
10.05.
13 1,500 
Mild 
Threat union YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/05/1276931-protesto-de-professores-
termina-com-pms-feridos-e-dois-
detidos.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
09.05.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/folha
nacopa/2013/05/1275763-manifestantes-
protestam-contra-concessao-do-
maracana.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
03.05.
13 9,250 
Mild 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/05/1272873-protestos-de-professores-
fecham-av-paulista-e-viaduto-do-cha-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo Monte, 
PA 
03.05.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/05/1272828-protesto-paralisa-obras-em-
belo-monte-pelo-segundo-dia.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
30.04.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/04/1271497-grupo-protesta-e-pede-justica-
por-morte-de-dentista-na-grande-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
27.04.
13 11,750 
Mild 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/04/1269846-ato-de-professores-fecha-a-av-
paulista-por-uma-hora-e-meia-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
27.04.
13 11,750 
Mild 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/04/1269846-ato-de-professores-fecha-a-av-
paulista-por-uma-hora-e-meia-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
26.04.
13 3,500 
Mild 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/04/1269505-professores-fazem-passeata-
em-sp-e-bloqueia-a-rua-da-consolacao.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
24.04.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
4/1267986-protesto-contra-feliciano-tem-
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ment on beijaco-e-casamento-gay-quatro-sao-
detidos.shtml 
Brazil Tucuruí, PA 
23.04.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/04/1267288-moradores-de-tucurui-no-para-
bloqueiam-transamazonica-em-
protesto.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
19.04.
13 1,500 
Mild 
Threat union YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/04/1265539-professores-protestam-e-
fecham-os-dois-sentidos-da-av-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
Eldorado do 
Carajás/Mar
abá, PA 
17.04.
13 2,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
4/1264143-mst-protesta-contra-pedido-de-
liberdade-de-condenado-por-massacre-no-
pa.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
17.04.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
4/1264076-manifestantes-sem-terra-
marcham-em-brasilia-pelo-fim-da-
impunidade-no-campo.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.04.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/04/1260943-av-paulista-e-liberada-apos-
protesto-de-alunos-da-casper-libero.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
01.04.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
4/1255740-manifestantes-pedem-que-dilma-
se-manifeste-sobre-feliciano.shtml 
Brazil 
Porto 
Alegre, RS 
31.03.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/03/1255166-morte-de-5-taxistas-gera-
protesto-no-rs-policia-investiga-o-caso.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
27.03.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/03/1253642-manifestantes-protestam-
contra-acao-no-antigo-museu-do-indio.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
25.03.
13 600 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2013/0
3/1252406-no-rio-artistas-protestam-contra-
permanencia-de-feliciano-em-comissao.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
25.03.
13 600 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/03/1252365-comerciarios-protestam-contra-
informalidade-no-setor.shtml 
Brazil 
Altamira, 
PA 
21.03.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/03/1249985-indios-e-ribeirinhos-invadem-
canteiro-de-obras-de-belo-monte.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
20.03.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2013/03/1249325-estudantes-de-
medicina-da-usp-protestam-em-evento-com-
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alckmin.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
17.03.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/03/1247876-grupo-protesta-pedindo-
justica-pelo-atropelamento-de-ciclista-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
16.03.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/03/1247628-manifestacao-reune-cerca-de-
500-contra-a-privatizacao-do-maracana.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
12.03.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/
03/1244838-cerca-de-30-corintianos-
protestam-em-frente-ao-consulado-da-
bolivia-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
10.03.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/03/1243943-ciclistas-farao-protesto-na-av-
paulista-apos-atropelamento.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
02.03.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2013/
03/1239824-protesto-de-organizadas-do-
corinthians-reune-cem-pessoas-na-
paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
01.03.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ilustrada/2013
/03/1239392-artistas-protestam-em-
inauguracao-de-museu-com-presenca-de-
dilma.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
21.02.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/02/1234527-protesto-de-motoboys-segue-
para-av-reboucas-ha-registro-de-filas.shtml 
Brazil Recife, PE 
18.02.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2013/
02/1232333-blogueira-cubana-e-recebida-
com-protesto-no-recife.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
16.02.
13 120 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/02/1231946-pessoas-dancam-no-vao-do-
masp-para-protestar-contra-a-violencia-a-
mulher.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
01.02.
13 6,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/02/1224292-motoboys-liberam-av-paulista-
apos-protesto-contra-fiscalizacao.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.11.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
3/01/1213302-raposo-tavares-e-liberada-
apos-manifestacao-mas-lentidao-
persiste.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo Monte, 
PA 
08.01.
13 25 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2013
/01/1211683-obras-de-belo-monte-
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ment on continuam-parcialmente-paralisadas.shtml 
Brazil 
Salvador, 
BA 
10.12.
12 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/119
8859-manifestantes-ateiam-fogo-a-dois-
micro-onibus-na-bahia.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
04.12.
12 150 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/1
2/1195833-palacio-do-planalto-e-alvo-de-
protestos-de-agricultores-sindicalistas-e-
indios.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
20.11.
12 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/11/1193755-manifestacao-causa-
transtornos-no-aeroporto-tom-jobim-no-
rio.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
21.11.
12 300 
Not a 
Threat housing NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/1
1/1188843-mst-bloqueia-tres-rodovias-no-df-
e-governo-classifica-ato-de-radicalismo.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
08.11.
12 250 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/1
1/1182623-indios-protestam-contra-projeto-
que-da-ao-congresso-poder-de-demarcar-
terras.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
25.10.
12 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/1
0/1175020-em-ato-contra-mensalao-tucanos-
e-ex-mulher-de-costa-neto-batem-boca.shtml 
Brazil 
Ribeirão 
Preto, SP 
22.09.
12 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/2012/09/1157874-falta-dagua-faz-
grupo-protestar-em-frente-a-casa-da-
prefeita-de-ribeirao-preto.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
08.08.
12 20 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/09/1150419-em-desfile-parentes-
protestam-contra-mortes-de-pms-em-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
07.09.
12 1,000 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/0
9/1150245-ato-contra-corrupcao-em-sp-
pede-punicao-para-condenados-do-
mensalao.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
07.09.
12 10,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/0
9/1150245-ato-contra-corrupcao-em-sp-
pede-punicao-para-condenados-do-
mensalao.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
29.08.
12 100 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/08/1145139-agentes-da-pf-em-greve-
fazem-protesto-na-regiao-da-lapa-em-
sp.shtml 
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Brazil Brasília, DF 
28.08.
12 40 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mercado/2012
/08/1144157-indios-protestam-contra-belo-
monte-em-frente-ao-supremo.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
15.08.
12 3 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/08/1137752-ativistas-da-femen-sao-presas-
durante-manifestacao-em-sp-veja-fotos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
10.08.
12 1,500 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/08/1135550-protesto-de-marronzinhos-
complica-transito-mas-enche-banco-de-
sangue-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
09.08.
12 400 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/08/1134566-protestos-de-servidores-
federais-causa-lentidao-na-av-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
29.07.
12 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/112
8155-sindicato-dos-medicos-realiza-protesto-
em-copacabana.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.07.
12 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/07/1127799-familiares-protestam-em-sp-
um-ano-apos-morte-de-vitor-gurman.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
06.07.
12 20 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/0
7/1116131-pelo-segundo-dia-dilma-enfrenta-
protestos-de-estudantes.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
22.06.
12 2 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/110
9214-protesto-interrompe-entrevista-sobre-
resultados-da-rio20.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
21.06.
12 50 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/110
8374-participantes-da-cupula-dos-povos-
protestam-no-riocentro.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
20.06.
12 50 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/110
8626-protesto-surpresa-contra-a-rio-20-vai-
de-nudismo-a-poesia.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
16.06.
12 30 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/ambiente/110
5969-manifestantes-ocupam-praca-no-
centro-do-rio.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
31.05.
12 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/109
8483-protesto-interdita-trecho-da-av-
washington-luis-em-sp-ha-lentidao.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
20.05.
12 14 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/05/1093064-bombeiros-do-rio-protestam-
por-salarios-e-contra-expulsoes.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
19.05.
12 1,700 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/05/1092883-marcha-da-maconha-comeca-
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on em-sp-e-fecha-a-av-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
05.05.
12 250 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/108
6127-protesto-bloqueia-parcialmente-a-rua-
augusta-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
17.04.
12 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2012/0
4/1077187-mst-bloqueia-estrada-em-sao-
paulo-em-acao-pela-reforma-agraria.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
04.04.
12 100,100 
Significant 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/107
1908-sp-registra-transito-acima-da-media-a-
dois-dias-do-feriado.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
21.03.
12 1,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/03/1065012-protesto-por-melhoria-no-
transporte-acaba-com-promessa-de-
reuniao.shtml 
Brazil Matão, SP 
05.03.
12 200 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ribei
raopreto/1057280-protesto-contra-
demissoes-na-citrovita-reune-200-em-matao-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.02.
12 300 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/02/1047465-grupo-entra-em-shopping-de-
sp-e-protesta-contra-o-racismo.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
04.02.
12 50 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/02/1044119-gays-protestam-em-sp-apos-
beijo-proibido-em-lanchonete.shtml 
Brazil Recife, PE 
25.01.
12 500 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/103
9479-estudantes-protestam-em-pe-contra-
aumento-da-tarifa-de-onibus.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
25.01.
12 400 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO YES YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/01/1039294-apos-confronto-em-sp-grupo-
encerra-protesto-na-cracolandia.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
22.01.
12 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/01/1037938-manifestacao-contra-
reintegracao-de-area-em-sp-fecha-a-
paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
22.01.
12 5,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/103
7885-manifestacao-na-paulista-contra-maus-
tratos-de-animais-reune-5000.shtml 
Brazil Teresina, PI 
12.01.
12 40 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
2/01/1033499-estudantes-fazem-novo-
protesto-no-pi-contra-reajuste-de-
tarifa.shtml 
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Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
14.12.
11 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/102
1112-garis-fazem-protesto-por-aumento-
salarial-no-centro-de-sp.shtml 
Brazil Itatim, BA 
14.12.
11 800 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/102
1051-cerca-de-800-manifestantes-fecham-a-
br-116-na-bahia.shtml 
Brazil 
Amambaí/P
ontaporã, 
MS 
01.12.
11 500 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/1
2/1014945-tres-sao-presos-por-suspeita-de-
atacar-acampamento-indigena-no-ms.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
20.11.
11 600 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/11/1009324-marcha-da-consciencia-negra-
reune-600-em-sao-paulo.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
10.11.
11 2,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/11/1004985-protesto-de-alunos-da-usp-
termina-sem-confronto-unesp-faz-
paralisacao.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
29.10.
11 80 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO YES NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/10/998745-policia-detem-seis-durante-
protesto-de-camelos-na-regiao-do-bras-
sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
12.10.
11 2,500 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/1
0/989636-manifestantes-protestam-contra-
corrupcao-no-rio-de-janeiro.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
12.10.
11 20,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/1
0/989594-em-brasilia-marcha-anticorrupcao-
reune-20-mil.shtml 
Brazil 
Belo 
Horizonte, 
MG 
27.09.
11 25 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/educacao/201
1/09/981625-professores-em-greve-se-
acorrentam-na-assembleia-de-mg.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
07.09.
11 1,200 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2011/0
9/971643-marcha-anticorrupcao-leva-
milhares-as-ruas-em-brasilia.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.08.
11 2,500 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/08/966575-2500-pessoas-protestam-
contra-a-violencia-no-morumbi-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
11.08.
11 250 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/08/958026-comerciantes-da-feira-da-
madrugada-voltam-a-protestar-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
Rio de 
Janeiro, RJ 
30.07.
11 20 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/esporte/2011/
07/952175-manifestantes-protestam-em-
frente-ao-evento-da-copa-no-rio.shtml 
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Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
15.07.
11 700 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/944
381-lojistas-da-regiao-da-25-de-marco-fazem-
protesto-contra-kassab.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
28.06.
11 550 
Not a 
Threat housing YES YES NO NO NO NO YES 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/935
911-sem-teto-protestam-em-sp-e-pedem-
rapidez-na-aprovacao-de-projetos.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
13.06.
11 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/06/929452-ciclistas-protestam-na-regiao-
da-sumare-apos-morte-de-empresario.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
03.06.
11 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/06/925004-marcha-da-maconha-e-
proibida-no-df-e-vira-ato-por-liberdade.shtml 
Brazil Curitiba, PR 
22.05.
11 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/919
334-manifestantes-pro-maconha-marcham-
por-expressao-em-curitiba.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
21.05.
11 700 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/05/919065-pm-usa-bombas-de-gas-para-
dispersar-manifestacao-na-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
20.04.
11 450 
Not a 
Threat housing NO YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/04/905212-mtst-protesta-em-sp-e-se-
reune-com-secretaria-da-habitacao.shtml 
Brazil Brasília, DF 
05.04.
11 15,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/898393
-protesto-em-brasilia-pede-aprovacao-do-
novo-codigo-florestal.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
24.03.
11 500 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES YES NO NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/03/893605-protesto-interdita-avenida-
paulista-no-sentido-consolacao.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
10.03.
11 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/multimidia/vid
eocasts/887116-manifestantes-queimam-
boneco-de-kassab-veja-video.shtml 
Brazil 
Porto 
Alegre, RS 
01.03.
11 1,750 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issues NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/03/883028-ciclistas-protestam-em-porto-
alegre-rs-contra-atropelador.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
09.02.
11 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/02/873155-termina-protesto-contra-
aumento-da-tarifa-do-metro-em-sp.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
27.01.
11 3,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/01/866971-passeata-contra-tarifa-de-
onibus-em-sp-segue-para-camara.shtml ;  
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on 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
20.01.
11 3,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/01/863813-grupo-encerra-protesto-apos-
percorrer-pista-da-avenida-paulista.shtml 
Brazil 
São Paulo, 
SP 
13.01.
11 700 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt YES YES YES NO NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/multimidia/vid
eocasts/2011/01/860334-protesto-contra-
aumento-da-tarifa-de-onibus-em-sp-termina-
em-conflito-veja.shtml ; 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/cotidiano/201
1/01/863813-grupo-encerra-protesto-apos-
percorrer-pista-da-avenida-paulista.shtml 
               
               
COUN
TRY 
CITY DAT
E 
# OF 
PARTICI
PANTS 
THREAT 
IN 
RELATIO
N TO # 
OF 
PARTICI
PANTS 
CLAI
MS 
(REAS
ONS) 
PEP
PER 
SPR
AY 
NON 
LET
HAL 
BOM
B 
RUBB
ER 
BULL
ETS 
 
WAT
ER 
CANN
ONS 
FIRE 
ARM 
INJU
RED 
PEOP
LE 
ARRE
STED 
PEOPL
E 
Level of 
Repressi
on 
Website link 
Chile Santiago 
11.12.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/vivienda
/suegras-y-nueras-lideraron-ruidosa-protesta-
frente-a-vivienda/2013-12-11/115955.html 
Chile Bocamina 
03.12.
13 4 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/regiones/bio
-bio/coronel-4-mujeres-suben-a-torre-en-
protesta-contra-termoelectrica/2013-12-
03/175640.html 
Chile Santiago 
03.12.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/psu-feuc-protesta-frente-al-mineduc-y-
exige-que-se-elimine-examen/2013-12-
03/162504.html 
Chile Santiago 
27.11.
13 2,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
con-6-marchas-en-6-ciudades-se-protesta-
por-muerte-de-juan-pablo-jimenez/2013-11-
27/200956.html 
Chile Santiago 
21.11.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
protesta-por-la-muerte-del-sindicalista-juan-
pablo-jimenez-dejo-6-detenidos/2013-11-
21/113727.html 
Chile Santiago 
20.11.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/simce-secundarios-protestan-frente-al-
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on mineduc/2013-11-20/113143.html 
Chile Santiago 
12.11.
13 20 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/municipales-en-paro-vuelven-a-protestar-
en-la-alameda/2013-11-12/073324.html 
Chile Santiago 
03.11.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO YES NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/detenidos-heridos-y-taco-de-proporciones-
en-longotoma-por-protesta/2013-11-
03/191240.html 
Chile Santiago 
22.10.
13 4,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/galerias/eco
nomia/sector-publico-fotos-de-las-marchas-
en-santiago-y-valparaiso/2013-10-
22/140415.html 
Chile Valparaiso 
22.10.
13 8,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/galerias/eco
nomia/sector-publico-fotos-de-las-marchas-
en-santiago-y-valparaiso/2013-10-
22/140415.html 
Chile Santiago 
17.09.
13 70 
Not a 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
vecinos-de-renca-protestaron-contra-actuar-
de-carabineros-durante-el-11/2013-09-
17/091408.html 
Chile Chaitén 
23.08.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/regiones/los-
lagos/chaiten-se-toman-la-carretera-austral-
en-protesta-por-falta-de-electricidad/2013-
08-23/104047.html 
Chile Arica 
20.08.
13 2,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment YES NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/regiones/aric
a-parinacota/arica-con-51-detenidos-
termino-protesta-contra-proyecto-minero-
los-pumas/2013-08-20/103217.html 
Chile Valparaiso 
06.08.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat Union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/regiones/val
paraiso/trabajadores-de-la-refineria-de-
concon-protestan-por-falta-de-
seguridad/2013-08-06/112059.html 
Chile Santiago 
06.08.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/mapuches-cortan-alameda-en-protesta-por-
asesinato-de-comunero/2013-08-
06/210021.html 
Chile Santiago 
06.08.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/transpo
rtes/cerca-de-300-colectiveros-de-puente-
alto-protestan-por-alza-de-bencinas/2013-08-
06/093111.html 
Chile Santiago 
05.08.
13 650 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/santiag
o/la-bulliciosa-protesta-a-las-afueras-del-
minvu-en-imagenes/2013-08-05/171318.html 
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Chile 
Parque 
Almargo 
23.07.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat Union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/u-central-funcionarios-protestaron-para-
exigir-que-se-libere-sede-retomada/2013-07-
23/124733.html 
Chile Santiago 
14.06.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/nuevos-disturbios-tras-cacerolazo-en-la-
casa-central-de-la-u-de-chile/2013-06-
14/080416.html 
Chile 
Punta 
Arenas 
11.04.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en-
regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html 
Chile Valdivia 
11.04.
13 4,000 
Significant 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en-
regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html 
Chile Temuco 
11.04.
13 1,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en-
regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html 
Chile Talca 
11.04.
13 2,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en-
regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html 
Chile La Serena 
11.04.
13 3,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en-
regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html 
Chile Antofagasta 
11.04.
13 600 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en-
regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html 
Chile Iquique 
11.04.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en-
regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html 
Chile Arica 
11.04.
13 800 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-tambien-se-manifestaron-en-
regiones/2013-04-11/185155.html 
Chile El Bosque 
27.03.
13 4 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/cuatro-jovenes-protestaron-contra-
bachelet-fuera-del-centro-civico-de-el-
bosque/2013-03-27/230526.html 
Chile Lo Prado 
16.03.
13 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO YES NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/salud/p
rotesta-en-lo-prado-contra-proyecto-
electrico-del-metro/2013-03-16/163445.html 
Chile San Joaquin 
27.02.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/terremo
to-27-f/pobladores-de-la-villa-brasil-de-san-
joaquin-protestan-por-la-
reconstruccion/2013-02-27/114616.html 
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Chile La Reina 
02.01.
13 60 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
la-reina-vecinos-bloquean-vespucio-y-
resisten-a-carabineros/2013-01-
02/081004.html 
Chile Santiago 
23.22.
12 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/200-mujeres-protestaron-contra-la-
violencia-en-la-alameda/2012-11-
22/230028.html 
Chile 
Viña del 
Mar 
04.11.
12 20 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/estudiantes-de-universidad-del-mar-
levantaron-barricadas-en-la-ruta-68/2012-11-
04/195525.html 
Chile Santiago 
28.10.
12 12 
Not a 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/municip
ales-2012/protesta-silenciosa-recordo-a-
presos-del-73-en-el-nacional/2012-10-
28/141106.html 
Chile Puente Alto 
26.10.
12 18 
Not a 
Threat 
Housin
g NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
carabineros-enfrenta-bloqueo-de-pobladores-
en-la-alameda/2012-10-26/111902.html 
Chile Santiago 
24.10.
12 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Housin
g NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
grupo-sin-casa-en-bloqueos-parciales-de-
avenidas-en-santiago/2012-10-
24/073004.html 
Chile Santiago 
27.09.
12 70,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO YES NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-masivo-acto-tras-marcha-con-
disturbios-desde-la-usach/2012-09-
27/132724.html 
Chile Santiago 
13.09.
12 3,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-marcha-desde-la-usach-copo-
la-plaza-de-armas/2012-09-13/123821.html 
Chile Maipu 
31.08.
12 100 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/transpo
rtes/transantiago-protesta-por-demora-y-
servicio-en-maipu/2012-08-31/074658.html 
Chile Santiago 
29.08.
12 30 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-estafados-por-credito-corfo-
marchan-por-centro-de-santiago/2012-08-
29/205742.html 
Chile Antofagasta 
28.08.
12 3,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a-
punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html 
Chile La Serena 
28.08.
12 1,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a-
punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html 
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Chile Rancagua 
28.08.
12 2,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a-
punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html 
Chile Concepcion 
28.08.
12 4,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a-
punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html 
Chile Valdivia 
28.08.
12 3,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a-
punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html 
Chile 
Punta 
Arenas 
28.08.
12 1,100 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/marchas-se-replicaron-desde-arica-a-
punta-arenas/2012-08-28/172720.html 
Chile Tobalada 
27.08.
12 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Transpo
rt NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/transpo
rtes/indignados-del-transantiago-bloquearon-
avenida-providencia/2012-08-
27/092700.html 
Chile Santiago 
09.08.
12 13 
Not a 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/manifestantes-tinen-de-rojo-pileta-frente-a-
la-moneda/2012-08-09/130958.html 
Chile Santiago 
18.07.
12 15 
Not a 
Threat 
Anti 
Govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
protesta-contra-ley-hinzpeter-frente-a-la-ani-
termina-con-8-detenidos/2012-07-
18/133636.html 
Chile Santiago 
10.07.
12 20 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/escolares-toman-sede-de-konecta-en-
apoyo-a-huelguistas/2012-07-
10/084604.html 
Chile Santiago 
07.07.
12 100 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/vivienda
/con-al-menos-20-detenidos-termino-
protesta-de-andha-chile/2012-07-
07/214346.html 
Chile Santiago 
01.06.
12 500 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-se-tomaron-el-liceo-
cervantes/2012-06-01/075022.html 
Chile Lampa 
30.05.
12 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Housin
g NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/protesta-ciudadana-provoca-gran-taco-en-
lo-echevers/2012-05-30/085121.html 
Chile Santiago 
17.05.
12 30 
Not a 
Threat 
Housin
g NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/pobladores-deponen-toma-del-instituto-
libertad/2012-05-17/142703.html 
Chile Santiago 
16.05.
12 101,000 
Significant 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/fech-
cerca-de-100-mil-asistentes-en-marcha-de-
santiago/2012-05-16/123925.html 
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Chile Santiago 
05.05.
12 5 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/manifestantes-de-andha-deponen-protesta-
en-grua-a-60-metros-de-altura/2012-05-
05/172813.html 
Chile Santiago 
25.04.
12 4,000 
Significant 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/marcha-estudiantil-en-concepcion-sumo-
4-000-participantes/2012-04-25/183408.html 
Chile Santiago 
21.04.
12 2,000 
Significant 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-resumieron-objetivos-2012-
en-acto-del-parque-almagro/2012-04-
21/174738.html 
Chile Santiago 
12.04.
12 100 
Not a 
Threat Union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
protesta-por-viviendas-bloqueo-la-alameda-
en-estacion-central/2012-04-12/082208.html 
Chile Santiago 
08.03.
12 20,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/mas-de-10-mil-personas-marcharon-en-
santiago-por-el-dia-de-la-mujer/2012-03-
08/232816.html 
Chile Santiago 
05.03.
12 11 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/expulsadas-se-encadenaron-en-vuelta-a-
clases-del-carmela-carvajal/2012-03-
05/084029.html 
Chile Santiago 
27.02.
12 4 
Not a 
Threat Union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/arriesgada-protesta-en-reloj-de-la-estacion-
central-bajaron-a-manifestantes/2012-01-
27/124003.html 
Chile Santiago 
19.01.
12 1,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/naciona
l/incidentes-en-plaza-de-armas-por-protesta-
contra-ley-anti-tomas/2012-01-
19/201604.html 
Chile Santiago 
24.12.
11 20 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/jovenes-protestaron-desnudos-en-el-
centro-de-concepcion/2011-11-
24/173811.html 
Chile Santiago 
15.12.
11 100 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/politica/
manifestantes-funan-acto-de-fundacion-
jaime-guzman/2011-12-15/205705.html 
Chile Valparaiso 
09.11.
11 10,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-marchan-por-valparaiso-sin-
paso-al-congreso/2011-11-09/130340.html 
Chile Santiago 
04.11.
11 50 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-se-toman-la-casa-central-de-
la-universidad-austral/2011-11-
04/102951.html 
 
LI 
 
Chile 
Rio 
Mapocho 
28.10.
11 30 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/secundarios-se-toman-ribera-del-rio-
mapocho/2011-10-28/074052.html 
Chile Santiago 
05.10.
11 100 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/universitarios-realizan-olla-comun-por-
cese-de-becas-alimenticias/2011-10-
05/153931.html 
Chile Santiago 
26.09.
11 1,200 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO YES NO YES NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/escolares-marchan-por-providencia-hacia-
municipio-de-labbe/2011-09-26/091334.html 
Chile Providencia 
24.09.
11 30 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/grupo-de-estudiantes-protesta-frente-a-
la-udi/2011-09-24/131308.html 
Chile Maipu 
13.09.
11 40 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/estudiantes-rebeldes-intentaron-tomarse-
la-sede-del-pc/2011-09-12/140829.html 
Chile Providencia 
22.08.
11 11 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/educaci
on/impactante-protesta-de-estudiantes-en-
puente-de-providencia/2011-08-
22/064824.html 
Chile Santiago 
08.08.
11 11,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://lanacion.cl/articulo/2011/8/en-familia/ 
Chile Santiago 
09.08.
11 15,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on YES YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://lanacion.cl/articulo/2011/11/intereses-
de-clases/ 
Chile Valparaiso 
09.08.
11 11,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on YES YES NO NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://lanacion.cl/articulo/2011/11/intereses-
de-clases/ 
Chile Santiago 
25.08.
11 10,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on YES YES YES NO NO YES YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://lanacion.cl/articulo/2011/8/protestar-
es-humano/ 
Chile Santiago 
26.07.
11 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/policial/
protesta-en-chilean-eagles-college-termina-
con-incidentes/2011-07-26/223051.html 
Chile Santiago 
10.06.
11 10,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/sin-
mayores-incidentes-termino-marcha-contra-
hidroaysen/2011-06-10/232131.html 
 
LII 
 
Chile Santiago 
01.06.
11 22,500 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/carabin
eros-detuvo-a-15-personas-al-finalizar-
marcha-de-la-confech/2011-06-
01/165809.html 
Chile Santiago 
19.05.
11 500 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/nueva-
marcha-en-santiago-contra-hidroaysen-sin-
mayores-incidentes/2011-05-19/092453.html 
Chile Santiago 
20.05.
11 40,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/marcha-
contra-hidroaysen-en-la-capital/2011-05-
20/215800.html 
Chile Santiago 
12.05.
11 15,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO YES NO NO NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/estudia
ntes-masiva-marcha-termina-en-el-parque-
almagro/2011-05-12/104644.html 
Chile Santiago 
28.05.
11 30,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/sin-
mayores-incidentes-termino-marcha-contra-
hidroaysen/2011-06-10/232131.html 
Chile Valparaiso 
10.05.
11 600 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO YES NO NO YES NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/se-
reanudan-protestas-contra-hidroaysen/2011-
05-10/221658.html 
Chile La Serena 
10.05.
11 200 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/se-
reanudan-protestas-contra-hidroaysen/2011-
05-10/221658.html 
Chile Santiago 
10.05.
11 350 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/se-
reanudan-protestas-contra-hidroaysen/2011-
05-10/221658.html 
Chile Santiago 
28.04.
11 5,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Educati
on NO NO NO YES NO NO YES 
Significa
nt 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/masiva-
protesta-de-universitarios-por-mas-
financiamiento-para-la-educacion/2011-04-
28/152959.html 
Chile Santiago 
21.04.
11 30 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/concepc
ion-con-detenidos-termino-protesta-contra-
visita-de-obama/2011-03-21/151418.html 
Chile Santiago 
11.01.
11 100 
Not a 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
nhttp://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/magall
anicos-protestaron-frente-a-la-moneda-y-
apelan-a-pinera/2011-01-11/150020.html 
Chile Santiago 
09.01.
11 10,000 
Mild 
Threat 
Local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/pais/multitu
dinaria-manifestacion-en-magallanes-por-
alza-de-gas/2011-01-09/191420.html 
               
 
LIII 
 
COUN
TRY 
CITY DAT
E 
# OF 
PARTICI
PANTS 
Threat in 
relation to 
# of 
participan
ts 
CLAI
MS/ 
REAS
ONS 
PEP
PER 
SPR
AY 
NON 
LET
HAL 
BOM
BS 
RUBB
ER 
BULL
ETS 
FIRE 
ARM 
WAT
ER 
CAN
NON 
INJU
RED 
PEOP
LE 
ARRE
STED 
PEOPL
E 
LEVEL 
OF 
REPRES
SION 
Website link 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
18.12.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/informacion/ciclistas-
coparon-ciudad.html 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
10.12.
13 80 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/informacion/clasificad
ores-marcharon-zona-exclusion-imm.html 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
05.11.
13 25 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/informacion/ambulant
es-no-armaron-protestaron.html  
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
07.11.
13 4 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=80635 
Urugu
ay 
Gualeguayc
hú 
04.11.
13 100 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=80543 
Urugu
ay Azucarlito 
09.10.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=79673 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
27.09.
13 250 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/dando
-la-cara/ 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
25.09.
13 10 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Mild 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/y-van/ 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
13.09.
13 450 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/apura
ndo-la-marcha/ 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
13.09.
13 2,000 
Mild 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/apura
ndo-la-marcha/ 
Urugu
ay Paysandu 
05.09.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=78219 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
03.09.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat 
educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=78116 
Urugu Montevideo 25.08. 400 Not a anti NO NO NO NO NO NO NO No 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/8/las-
dos-marchas/ 
 
LIV 
 
ay 13 Threat govern
ment 
Repressi
on 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
19.07.
13 120 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=76344 
Urugu
ay Aloef 
11.07.
13 30 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=76038 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
22.05.
13 10,000 
Mild 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/5/forma
s-de-gritar/ 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
08.05.
13 200 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/5/guard
a-los-vidrios/ 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
27.03.
13 500 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2013/9/dando
-la-cara/ 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
19.03.
13 150 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2012/4/bala-
perdida/ 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
15.02.
13 300 
Not a 
Threat 
anti 
govern
ment NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=79388 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
15.05.
12 2,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=59
825 
Urugu
ay Bella Unión 
17.01.
12 2,000 
Mild 
Threat 
local 
issue NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2012/1/para-
tomar-impulso/ 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
25.11.
11 3 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://www.ladiaria.com.uy/politica/480923-
protesta-encadenada  
Urugu
ay Fray Bentos 
23.11.
11 130 
Not a 
Threat union NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/index.php?id=52726 
Urugu
ay Montevideo 
23.08.
11 200 
Not a 
Threat 
educati
on NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
No 
Repressi
on 
http://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2011/8/comu
nidad-zorrilla/ 
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